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ABSTRACT  
 
Egypt has excellent natural conditions for the generation of electricity from 
Renewable Energy (RE) sources. It has in particular an immense potential for solar 
and wind energy. At the same time, an Egyptian energy crisis is emerging. 
Conventional domestic energy sources are declining and thus, Egypt will have to rely 
increasingly on costly imported energy in the near future. In addition, energy efficient 
(EE) consumption is an almost unknown term within the Egyptian society. Experts 
project for Egypt an energy saving potential of approximately 70%. Therefore, the 
promotion of RE & EE could be a successful policy instrument to mitigate the 
emerging Egyptian energy crisis. Furthermore, the development of a green Egyptian 
economy based on RE & EE could contribute to the country´s economic growth by 
increasing foreign direct investment, creating employment and providing much 
needed technology transfer. Besides these political considerations, Egypt could also 
fulfill its international obligation under the United Nation Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change by 
promoting RE & EE.  
 
Key to the sustainable diffusion of RE & EE and the eventual creation of a green 
domestic economy is the implementation of a sound and consistent legal policy. The 
Egyptian regulator has already identified this need and has implemented a series of 
regulatory measures to promote RE & EE. In the field of RE, it is the declared 
objective of the Egyptian government to satisfy 20% of the country’s primary energy 
demand through RE by 2020. In order to reach this ambitious goal, Egypt is 
implementing a tendering system to award RE projects to private developers. 
However, it is the long-term objective to regulate the Egyptian RE sector through a 
feed-in law. For the promotion of EE, the Egyptian government has not yet formulated 
an official policy. Nevertheless, it has developed EE Building Codes, EE standards 
and labels for electric appliances, and it has promoted solar water heating systems.  
 
Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet led to the creation of a substantial RE & EE 
sector in Egypt. In general, the reason for this failure is that the Egyptian RE & EE 
strategy lacks comprehensiveness as well as consistent long-term dedication. 
Invitations to tender usually focus entirely on wind energy projects, while neglecting 
the huge potential for solar energy. Legal and price uncertainties further impede the 
promotion of RE. The Egyptian approach to promote EE is highly fragmented and 
incoherent, and suffers from lack of enforcement and acceptance in the market. 
iv 
 
However, existing subsidies for conventional energy sources and unfavorable 
electricity pricing structures for RE & EE remain the key barriers to the sustainable 
development of the sector. Although there are many regulatory instruments to 
minimize the aforementioned barriers, only consistent long-term commitment by the 
Egyptian government can lead to the establishment of healthy domestic RE & EE 
industry. 
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I. Introduction 
The scientific evidence is overwhelming: climate change presents very serious global 
risk and demands an urgent global response.1 Measures to mitigate climate change 
require international commitment, national response strategies as well as local 
participation and acceptance. Renewable energies (RE) and energy efficiency (EE) 
play a crucial role in mitigating climate change by reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
In addition, the diffusion of RE & RE could advance energy security by diversifying 
the energy mix thereby reducing the impact of price instability of fossil fuel and thus 
stimulating the development of a green economy.2 The key to successful diffusion of 
RE & EE is the implementation of a sound legal policy and a regulatory framework 
that will attract large-scale investments. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
elements of this new and rapidly growing area of law – climate change law3 – with a 
particular focus on the Egyptian policy and regulatory framework in regard to RE and 
EE. 
 
On the international level, climate change law finds its primary source in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).4 The UNFCCC 
creates an international structure to address climate change, including provisions for 
reporting on climate change, scientific and technological research, and planning 
annual meetings of the Conference of the Parties. For the first time, the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC5 stipulates binding commitments of developed countries to 
reduce green house gas (GHG) emissions by at least 5% from 1990-levels between 
2008 and 2012.6  No comparable commitment is included for developing countries. 
Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol introduces three new market-based flexibility 
instruments, namely international emission trading, joint implementation and the 
                                            
1 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, available in the internet, http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm (last visited: 24th June 2009). 
2 Xiadong Wang, Climate Law Reporter: Legal and Policy Frameworks for Renewable Energy to 
Mitigate Climate Change, 7 Sustainable Development Law & Policy, American University 
2007(quoted as Wang 2007) at 17.  
3 John C. Dernbach and Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 Energy Law 
Journal, Energy Bar Association 2008 (quoted as Dernbach/Kakade 2008), at 1. 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York 1992, available at, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2009). 
5 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto 1998, 
available at, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2009). 
6 Id. at Art. 3.1. 
2 
 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In contrast to the first two instruments, CDM 
is the only one that addresses developing countries like Egypt, and therefore merits 
particular focus in the course of this thesis. International climate change negotiations 
are still ongoing and should eventually lead to a substantial post-Kyoto agreement that 
stipulates binding GHG emission reduction obligations for both developed and 
developing countries. The last phase of international climate change negotiations was 
the fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC at Copenhagen in December 
2009. Unfortunately the result of the conference, the “Copenhagen Accord” was again 
a non-binding agreement and a prominent example of the barriers of climate change 
negotiation. 
 
From the national perspective, the current legal discourse sets out three major policy 
options for the promotion of RE. The first approach is a price-based feed-in law that 
requires mandatory purchase of RE at a fixed price. Secondly, quantity-based RE 
portfolio standards are being discussed, which require that a minimum share of power 
or a minimum level of installed capacity in a given region is met by RE. A third 
option is a tendering mechanism involving government-sponsored competitive 
bidding processes for the acquisition of renewable electricity whereby long-term 
contracts are awarded. All these three legal policy approaches have their specific 
advantages and disadvantages that must be considered when applied on specific 
country conditions.7 Additionally, the diffusion of RE can be facilitated by financial 
and legal policy incentives such as net metering, public funding and various other tax 
incentives.8, The key to a successful national strategy for the mitigation of climate 
change however is a comprehensive approach including RE policy tools as well as 
incentives and regulations for a more EE consumption. EE policy measures typically 
include inter alia EE building codes, EE standards for electrical appliances or the 
phasing out of inefficient lightning. 
 
According to national policy objectives, the various RE & EE policy instruments are 
selected in view of the specific country conditions as well as in regards to the 
                                            
7 Wang 2007, supra note 2, at 18. 
8 Dernbach/Kakade 2008, supra note 3, at 16. 
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available energy resources and electricity market structure. In the course of this thesis, 
the advantages and disadvantage of these policy instruments in general and in 
particular in respect to the Egyptian energy situation will be examined. 
 
The Egyptian government has declared the objective of generating 20% of Egypt´s 
electricity through RE by 2020.9 The national conditions for reaching this objective 
are excellent. Egypt is located in the North-African Sunbelt and is, thus, a prime 
location to generate solar energy.10 Furthermore, the wind conditions at the west coast 
of the Red Sea and in other parts of the country are among the best in the world 
facilitating the generation of wind energy.11 However, the objective of the Egyptian 
government remains very ambitious. In 2005, 94% of Egypt´s energy demand was still 
satisfied through fossil fuels, including 50.4% as oil share and 43.6% as natural gas 
share.12 The remaining 6% is mainly met though coal with a share of 1.05% and 
hydropower with a share of 4.75%, while the remainder from other sources of RE 
covered only 0.2% of the primary Egyptian energy demand (solar, wind, biomass).13  
 
Despite these excellent conditions for RE, Egypt is also attempting to decrease its 
dependency on fossil fuels through the usage of nuclear energy. After the Egyptian 
government had dropped a first nuclear energy program in the 1980s, it officially 
declared a relaunch for the program for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in 
September 2006.14 The objective of the Egyptian nuclear program is the erection of 
the first nuclear power plant within the next ten years.15 The utilization of nuclear 
                                            
9 NREA, Annual Report 2007/2008, at 12, available at, http://nrea.gov.eg/annual%20report/eng.pdf 
(last visited: 24th June 2010). 
10 Rafik Youssef Georgy/ Adel Tawfik Soliman, Mediterranean and National Strategies for 
Sustainable Development, Priority Field of Action 2: Energy and Climate Change, Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy Egypt - National study; Plan Bleu, Regional Activity Centre, Sophia 
Antipolis March 2007, at 19 (quoted as Georgy/Soliman), available at, 
http://www.planbleu.org/publications/atelier_energie/EG_National_Study_Final.pdf (last visited: 
24th June 2010). 
11 Id. at 19. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 Id. at 3. 
14 BBC News, Egypt Unveils Nuclear Power Plan, 25th September 2006, available at, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5376860.stm (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
15 Sherine Nasr, Nuclear Power Program Taking Off, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 953, 2009 
(quoted as Nasr 2009), available at, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/953/ec3.htm (last visited: 24th 
June 2010). 
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energy is highly disputed, especially in regard of plant safety issues and the storage of 
nuclear waste. However, this thesis will not examine the question whether nuclear 
energy is viable alternative to decrease the dependency from fossil fuels. It should be 
sufficient to mention that developing countries can hardly be denied the same right as 
developed countries to satisfy their ever increasing energy demand by means of 
nuclear energy. 
 
Egypt is currently at an energy ‘cross-roads’, facing critical decisions over its future 
energy supply. Conventional fuels are becoming increasingly expensive and it is 
recognized that these fuel reserves are finite. The Egyptian government officials have 
declared that Egyptian oil reserves will be exhausted within the next ten years and that 
current gas reserves are not expected to last beyond 2040.16 This energy situation 
makes the transition to a system based on alternative energy resources a pressing need 
for Egyptian politics. The main political challenge for an alternative energy program 
in Egypt is two-fold: on the one hand the standing subsidies for conventional energy 
products and on the other hand a lack of public awareness for the challenges of 
climate change. 
 
The adverse impacts of climate change combined with the need for an alternative 
energy solution have already raised the awareness of the Egyptian regulator to this 
increasingly important issue. Egypt will need to attempt to face the consequences of 
climate change with a wide range of measures on the domestic as well as on the 
international level. 
 
On the international level, Egypt signed the UNFCCC in 1992 and also ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2005. As consequence to its commitment to the UNFCCC, the 
Egyptian regulator issued a new Environmental Protection law (Law No. 94/1994, 
“EPL”) in 1994 supplemented by the Executive Regulation (Decree No. 338/1995). 
For the first time in Egypt the EPL introduced mandatory thresholds against noises 
and polluters including corresponding monitoring procedures. 
                                            
16 Egyptian Minister of Energy and Electricity Hassan Yunis quoted in Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 
October 2006, Experts on Site, available at, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/816/eg3.htm (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
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Passed by the Egyptian parliament in April 2009, the new draft Electricity Law is 
expected to enhance the diffusion of RE. Innovatively, the new draft Electricity Law 
introduces incentive measures for the generation of electricity from RE sources.17 It 
makes allowances for the fact that the absence of an appropriate legal framework was 
identified as a central obstacle to the further development of the RE sector in Egypt. 
 
In the field of EE the Egyptian regulator has not yet formulated a substantive national 
strategy. However, it must be acknowledged that certain measures have already been 
implemented that could pave the way for an Egyptian EE strategy. As early as 1987 a 
Ministerial Decree was issued stipulating the installation of solar water heating 
systems in new buildings. Unfortunately, it was enforced only with limited success. 
Another approach was the creation of EE standards and labels for electronic 
appliances. Most recently EE building codes for the commercial and residential sector 
have been developed and have been mplemented by virtue of a presidential decree in 
2008.  
 
This thesis will examine the question whether the current and prospective regulatory 
framework for RE & EE in Egypt is tailored to meet the country’s energy situation 
and the respective structure of the energy sector; and further, whether the chosen 
policy instruments may lead to the creation of a green economy based on RE & EE. 
However, the lack of information on the domestic level still hinders the development 
of RE & EE in Egypt. Therefore, this thesis attempts to discuss how this gap can be 
closed and provides a comprehensive proposal for facing the challenge of 
implementing a RE & EE policy in Egypt.  
 
To that end, chapter II will provide an overview on the state of international climate 
change law and ongoing climate change negotiations. Chapter III will discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of the available national policy options for RE & EE, in 
order to provide a framework for the subsequent analysis of Egyptian policies. 
Chapter IV will focus on Egypt’s social economic development, its energy situation 
                                            
17The Egyptian Draft Electricity Law, available at, http://www.jcee-
eg.net/library/draft_electricity_law.doc (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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and the structure of the Egyptian Electricity market, so as to establish the basis for 
Egyptian policy consideration. The results of the two foregoing chapters will provide 
the basis for a subsequent legal policy analysis of the current and the prospective 
Egyptian regulatory framework for RE & EE in Chapter V. This thesis will close in 
Chapter VI with the conclusions drawn from the legal analysis of the Egyptian 
approach to promote RE & EE and propose general recommendations for future 
Egyptian policymakers. 
 
At the outset of this thesis it must be noted that any analysis of legal structures in 
Egypt must take into account the current status of the rule of law. It is not uncommon 
in the Egyptian legal system that law and actual practice fall apart, due to corruption 
and other personal interests involved. Therefore, it might be possible that a certain 
legal issue is interpreted and decided by the competent Egyptian authority in a manner 
contradictory to the clear wording of the written law. This situation must be kept in 
mind, while regarding the legal policy analysis conducted in this thesis. 
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II. International Climate Change Law  
International law initially focused on environmental protection rather than on 
challenges of climate change. International environmental law addresses both specific 
interests of neighboring states as well as the needs of the international community at 
large. Since the end of the 1970s the diffusion of international environmental law has 
gained momentum and today constitutes a complex legal framework of treaties, 
conventions and statutes.18  
 
Central for international environmental law is the precautionary principle that limits 
territorial sovereignty in relation to neighboring states.19 A milestone for the 
development of the precautionary principle was the Stockholm Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which stipulated the famous 
Principle 21:20 
 
“States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibilities to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”   
 
Additionally, the concept of sustainable development has gained increasing 
importance in international environmental law. It primarily refers to the 
interdependency between economical development and the treatment of natural 
resources.21 The normative value of the concept of sustainable development is still 
vague.22 However, it functions as guideline for contract interpretation in favor of 
                                            
18 Matthias Herdegen, International Law, Munich 2006 (quoted as Herdegen 2006), at 355.  
19 Id., at 355. 
20 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 1972, 
available at, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503 (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
21 Herdegen 2006, supra note 18at 356. 
22 Id., at 356. 
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environmental issues.23 The concept of sustainable development was first referred to 
in Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:24 
 
“Human beings are the centre of concerns for sustainable development. 
They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with 
nature.” 
 
As seen from these two examples, international environmental law primarily 
approaches the issue of environmental protection in relation to human life. 
However, when the scientific evidence on the adverse impacts of climate change 
on the way of life in all countries became overwhelming, the need for an 
internationally coordinated response led to the emerging discipline of climate 
change law. Climate change legislation has been created at the intersection of 
various areas of law, including environmental law, energy law, business law and 
international law.25 The purpose of this chapter is to present and elaborate on the 
international dimension of climate change law.  
 
First, the scientific basis of climate change will be illustrated in order to explain 
the pressing need for international action (1.). Next, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (2.) and its Kyoto Protocol (3.) will 
be analyzed as the most significant sources of international climate change law. 
Subsequently, the so-called Copenhagen Accord and the general barriers for 
future climate change negotiations will be evaluated (4.). Finally, the chapter will 
close with a short critical excurse on the role of the Clean Development 
Mechanism for developing countries such as Egypt (5.). 
 
                                            
23 Id., at 356. 
24 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
June 1992, available at, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
25 Dernback/ Kakade 2008, supra note 3, at 2. 
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A. Climate Change Science 
In 1989, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to provide policy-makers with an objective source of information on 
climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic consequences.26 
The initial mandate of the IPPC is stipulated in UN General Assembly Resolution 
45/53 of 1988 and includes actions leading to a comprehensive review and 
recommendation in respect to the state of knowledge of the science of climatic 
change, programs and studies on its social and economic impact and possible response 
strategies to delay, limit or mitigate the adverse impacts climate change.27 The IPCC 
has published four climate change assessments reports since 1990. In 2007, the IPCC 
produced the most recent assessment that includes the reports of the three IPCC´s 
Working Groups (WGs) and a respective synthesis report. The reports of the WGs 
address the physical science basis of climate change (WG I), the impacts of climate 
change including vulnerability and adaptation (WG III), and the mitigation of climate 
change (WG III). Recently the IPCC has selceted 831 authors for its fifth assessment 
report that will be published between 2013 and 214.28 
 
The concept of climate change (also described as global warming) results from the 
entrapment of heat radiated from the earth. This is understood by climate scientists as 
follows. Solar radiation reaches the earth in the form of short wavelengths.29 Some of 
this energy is absorbed by the Earth´s surface and thereby heats up the planet, while 
the rest re-radiates back into space.30 Because the Earth´s temperature is lower than 
the sun´s, the energy reflects back out at a lower wavelength.31 The problem is that the 
                                            
26 IPCC Official Website, History, available at, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.htm (last visited: 24th June 2010).  
27 UN General Assembly Resolution 45/53 of December 1988, Protection of global climate for 
present and future generations of mankind, available at, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
28 IPCC Press Release, 831 Experts selected for the Fifth Assessment Report, June 210, available at, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press-releases/press-release.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
29 Lynne M. Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law – Prospects for 
Progress in the Legal Order, University Press of America 1996, at 3.  
30 Id., at 3-4. 
31 Id. at 4. 
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so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs)32 in the atmosphere have a low transmissivity for 
these lower wavelengths and thus, hinder their escape into space.33 Instead, the lower 
wavelength energy becomes trapped between the Earth´s atmosphere and surface and 
result in the warming of the planet.34 
 
The evidence for global warming is overwhelming. The 2007 WG I report stipulates 
that this conclusion is based on evidence of global surface temperatures, changes in 
precipitation patterns and observations of ocean and arctic temperatures.35 Eleven out 
of the last twelve years (1995-2006) ranked among the twelve warmest years since 
1850.36 The rate of warming over the last 50 years is almost double compared to the 
last 100 years.37 The melting of ice due to Arctic temperature rises will in turn 
contribute to rising sea levels.38 In light of these conclusions climate change cannot be 
denied. 
 
However, climate scientists were at odds for a long time over the question whether 
human activities actually do have an impact on climate change. In 1990, the first IPCC 
assessment reported only little evidence of human influence; the second assessment 
(1995) found a discernable influence of human activities; and eventually, the third 
assessment (2001) reported a probability between 60 to 90% that human activities 
have caused the increase in global temperature due to GHG emissions.39  This 
discussion became obsolete when the 2007 WG I report concluded that natural forces 
cannot offer a sufficient explanation for the observed global warming and that it is 
                                            
32 Major GHGs include carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel use and other sources; methane (CH4) 
from agriculture, was and energy; nitrus oxide (N2O) from agriculture.  
33 Jurgielewicz, supra note 27, at 4. 
34 Id. at 4. 
35 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science of Climate Change, Contribution of Working 
Group I tot he Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Press (quoted as IPCC 
2007, WG I), available at, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg1_report_
the_physical_science_basis.htm (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
36 Id. at 252. 
37 Id. at 237. 
38 Id. at 237, 252 and 339. 
39 Id., at 669. 
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very likely (90-99%) that the observed temperature rise is due to human caused GHG 
emissions.40 
 
The 2007 WG II report focused on the impacts of climate change on natural and 
human systems as well as on the capacity of these systems to adapt and their 
respective vulnerability.41 It concluded that human-caused warming has had a 
discernable influence on many physical and biological systems.42 This includes for 
instance, increasing numbers of glacial lakes, increasing ground instability in 
permafrost areas and rock avalanches in mountain regions as well as warming of lakes 
and rivers with effects on thermal structure and water quality.43  
 
Furthermore, the 2007 WG II report describes future impacts and particular 
vulnerabilities, of which the major findings will summarized below:44 
• By 2050, water availability is projected to increase by 10-40% at high 
latitudes and some wet tropical areas, and decrease by 10-30%  in some dry 
regions that are already today water-stressed areas, 
• In a scenario with 1.5-2.5 degree temperature rise, it is projected that 20-
30% of species are likely to face increased risk of extinction, 
• Coastal areas are projected to be exposed to increasing risks, including 
coastal erosions due to sea-level rise, 
• Corals are at risk of bleaching and mortality, since they are vulnerable to 
warm sea temperatures and have little adaptive capacity, 
• Several million of people are projected to be flooded out of their habitat 
every year due to sea-level rise, 
• Projected climate change is likely to directly and indirectly affect the 
health of millions of people, 
                                            
40 Id. at 669. 
41 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working 
Group II tot he Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Press (quoted as IPCC 
2007, WG II), Summary for Policymakers, at 8, available at, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/contents.html(last visited: 24th June 2010). 
42 Id. at 9. 
43 Id. at 8. 
44 Id. at 11-15. 
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• By 2020, between 75 million and 250 million people are expected to be 
exposed to increased water stress in Africa, and 
• Certain small islands show characteristics making them especially 
vulnerable to sea-level rise and other extreme weather events. 
 
The 2007 WG III report addresses the challenges of mitigating climate change.45 
Based on the estimate that global GHG emissions have increased by 70% between 
1970 and 2004, mainly due to increased energy consumption46, the assessment 
concludes that climate change should be alleviated with a bundle of measures 
including changes in behavior and lifestyle, progress of technology, upgrades of 
energy infrastructure and improved EE.47 Finally, it deduces that reducing GHG 
emissions will not only have a positive effect on climate change, but will also improve 
health and energy security.48  
 
The IPCC 2007 synthesis report identifies five major concerns in regard of climate 
change impacts, vulnerabilities and risks:49 
• High risks to unique and threatened eco-systems, 
• Risks of extreme weather events, such as droughts, heat waves and floods, 
• Weakest economic regions are most vulnerable to the adverse affects of 
climate change and especially the poor and the elderly in those societies, 
• Growing economic cost of climate change over time when GHG emissions 
increase, and 
• The prospective of significantly rising sea levels due the melting of Arctic 
ice. 
                                            
45 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III 
tot he Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Press (quoted as IPCC 2007, 
WG III), available at, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg3_report_
mitigation_of_climate_change.htm (last visited: 24th June 2010).  
46 Id., Summary for Policymakers, at 8. 
47 See id., at Chapter 11. 
48 See id., at 669-672. 
49 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Group I, II, and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Press (quoted as IPCC 2007); 
available at, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_re
port.htm (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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The extraordinary scientific work of the IPCC presented in this section played a 
crucial role in convincing world leaders of the pressing need for an internationally 
coordinated response to challenge the adverse affects of climate change. The reaction 
to the IPCC´s conclusions by international political bodies will be elaborated in the 
following sections.  
 
B. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or 
Framework Convention) was adopted at the UN Headquarters in 1992.50 The 
UNFCCC took effect in 1994 and now has 194 parties.51 Egypt became a signatory 
party to the UNFCCC in June 1992 and ratified it in December 1994, while it came 
into force in March 1995.52 
 
The Framework Convention stipulates the ultimate objective of stabilizing GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference 
with the climate system (Article 2). To that end, it distinguishes between the common 
but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities of developed and developing 
countries (Article 3 No. 1). It is one of the most significant characteristics of the 
UNFCCC to formalize these critical distinctions between developed and developing 
countries by categorizing them into Annex I countries, comprised of OECD countries 
and economies in transmission, Annex II countries, comprised of OECD countries 
only, and Non-Annex I countries, comprised of developing countries. 
 
This differentiation between developed and developing countries is reflected and 
accounted for in many provisions of the UNFCCC. Pursuant to the preamble, 
developed countries have contributed the largest share of historical and current GHG 
emissions, while the per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively 
low (Preamble Point 3). At the same time, the preamble recognizes the distinctive 
                                            
50 UNFCCC, see supra note 4. 
51 UNFCCC Official Website, Status of Ratification, available at, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited: 
24th June 2010). 
52Id.  
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difficulties of developing countries in regard to their dependency on fossil fuels and 
their increasing need for access to sufficient energy resources to achieve sustainable 
social and economic development (Preamble Point 20 & 22). Therefore, developed 
countries agreed in the UNFCCC to adopt national policies and take the corresponding 
measures to demonstrate that they “take the lead” in addressing climate change 
(Article 4 No. 2 (a)). 
 
Developed countries agreed to the “aim” of reducing their GHG emissions to 1990 
levels based on the above-mentioned considerations (Article 4 No. 2 (a)). The 
progress of the latter shall be periodically reviewed by the Conference of the Parties in 
light of the objective of the Framework Convention on the basis of the experience 
gained in its implementation and in relation to the state of scientific and technological 
knowledge (Article 7 No. 2 (a)). Nonetheless, the Framework Convention does not 
provide for any binding commitment from developed countries to reduce GHG 
emissions by a certain amount or a specific date. 
 
Although the UNFCCC obliges developed countries to take the lead in challenging 
climate change, it requires all parties to formulate, implement and periodically update 
national programs to mitigate climate change (Article 4 No. 1 (b)). Furthermore, the 
UNFCCC stipulates provisions for research and systematic observations (Article 5), 
promotion of education, training and public awareness (Article 6), and communication 
of information on the implementation of climate change measures (Article 12) as well 
as annual meetings of the Conference of the Parties (Article 7). 
 
C. Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol)53 was adopted at the third 
session of the Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997.54 
However, only in 2005, following the ratification from Russia, did the Kyoto Protocol 
                                            
53 Kyoto Protocol, see supra note 5. 
54 Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC Official Website, Status of Ratification, available at, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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become effective.55 Egypt signed the Kyoto Protocol in March 1999 and it was ratified 
and came into force in early 2005.56 Today there are 191 parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(190 states and the European Union).57 The only major industrialized country that has 
not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol is the United States of America.58 
 
For the first time the Kyoto Protocol comprised binding GHG59 emission reduction 
objectives for developed countries. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
developed countries have agreed to reduce their overall GHG emissions by at least 5% 
below the 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. A comparable commitment is not 
included for developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol stipulates in its Annex B the 
individual commitments of developed countries. For instance, the German 
commitment is 8% below the 1990 levels. 
 
Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol introduces three market-based “flexibility mechanisms” 
to support Annex I countries in achieving their emission reduction commitment in a 
more cost-effective manner.60 Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol provides Annex I 
countries with the opportunity to participate in the Joint Implementation (JD) 
program. The JD program allows green investment in other Annex I countries to be 
used for achieving emission reduction units for the investor country´s emission 
reduction obligation. Additionally, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol encourages 
Annex I countries to participate in emission trading to reach their emission reduction 
commitment. Although the same Article requires the Conference of the Parties to 
develop principles and modalities for the implementation of an emission-trading 
scheme, the Kyoto Protocol itself does not promulgate any specifics of a potential 
emission market. Eventually, Annex I and non-Annex I countries can participate in the 
                                            
55 Id.; Pursuant to Article 25 No. 1 it was required that not less than 55 parties to the Framework 
Convention have ratified it and which accounted for at least 55% of the total GHG emissions for 
1990 of the Parties included in Annex I (industrialized nations). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 The Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, defines Greenhouse Gases in Annex A and includes Carbon 
dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N20), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) as well as Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
60 Lee Hart, International Emissions Trading between Developing Countries: The Solution tot he 
other Half of the Climate Change Problem, Florida Journal of International Law, April 2008 (quoted 
as Hart 2008), at 86.  
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) pursuant to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The CDM will be elaborated in greater detail in the following Section D due its 
importance for developing countries and thus for Egypt. 
 
Although the Kyoto Protocol is generally considered a breakthrough in climate change 
negotiations, the key point of its critique remains the missing binding commitment 
from non-Annex I countries to reduce their emissions, which allows large and 
important developing countries (such as India, China or Brazil) to continue 
polluting.61 The subsequent negotiation of the Conference of the Parties failed to 
include emission reduction requirements for non-Annex I countries. Therefore, it 
remains insufficient to combat the challenges of climate change on the global level, 
since especially the USA will remain reluctant to commit to any emission reduction 
obligation unless major developing countries are also willing to commit themselves.62 
The respective bargaining positions and the current status of climate change 
negotiations are dealt with in the following Section D by the example of the fifteenth 
Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
 
D. Copenhagen Accord and Future Climate Change Negotiations 
The world looked closely at Copenhagen during December 2009 where world leaders 
gathered at the fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC to negotiate a post-
Kyoto agreement. Unfortunately, it must be said that the leaders of the world failed 
again to reach a new global agreement on climate change which would include 
binding emission reduction commitments from developed and developing countries. 
Hence, the only outcome of the summit was the participants taking note of the so-
called Copenhagen Accord.63 This last-minute document was drafted by five nations 
led by the USA, but has no binding character under international law. The 
Copenhagen Accord promulgates three key features including the acknowledgment of 
                                            
61 Id., at 86. 
62 Id., at 87. 
63 Copenhagen Accord, 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Copenhagen, December 
2009, available at, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
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scientific necessities, financial assistance for developing countries and the obligation 
to submit national quantified emission targets. 
 
The parties recognized for the first time the scientific view that the increase in global 
temperature must remain below 2 degree Celsius in order to achieve the ultimate goal 
of the UNFCCC of stabilizing “greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system.”64 They 
furthermore acknowledged that the time needed to achieve this objective would be 
longer in developing countries, considering that social and economic development and 
poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries.65 
 
Recognizing the importance of the last point, it was agreed that developed countries 
should provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources as well as 
technology and capacity building to support measures to mitigate climate change in 
developing countries.66 To that end, developed countries agreed to collectively 
providing new and additional funding to developing countries amounting to USD 30 
billion for the period 2010 – 2012.67 Furthermore, developed countries committed to 
the goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion by 2020 to address the needs of 
developing countries.68 A significant portion of these funds will be provided through 
the newly established Copenhagen Green Climate Fund that will support projects, 
programs, and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation, adaptation 
and capacity-building as well as technological development.69 
 
Thirdly, although the Copenhagen Accord does not include any commitment to 
collectively reduce global GHG emissions by a certain percentage, it requires 
developed and developing countries to submit their respective national quantified 
                                            
64 Copenhagen Accord, Item No. 1; Article 2 of the UNFCCC.  
65 Copenhagen Accord, Item No. 2. 
66 Copenhagen Accord, Item No. 3. 
67 Copenhagen Accord, Item No. 8. 
68 Copenhagen Accord, Item No. 8. 
69 Copenhagen Accord, Item No. 10. 
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emission targets by 2020, which will be measured, reported and verified in accordance 
with existing and future guidelines adopted by the UNFCCC.70 
 
All in all, the Copenhagen Accord is just another item on a long list of failures to 
negotiate a substantial international agreement on climate change. In addition to the 
fact that the Copenhagen Accord is not a legally binding document, it lacks an explicit 
commitment of the parties to collectively reduce global GHG emissions. Moreover it 
does not stipulate any effective strategy for the adaptation to climate change, it 
neglects the importance of technology transfer and provides only a very limited 
commitment as regards to financing the mitigation of climate change.71  
 
The question remains why delegates left Copenhagen once again without a binding 
agreement, despite the common understanding that immediate actions are required to 
mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change. Political commentators blame the 
reluctance of key governments to reach a global agreement due to their domestic 
policies (China, USA), the insufficient negotiation-skills of the host government, and 
a lack of political strategy in general in addition to the 24-hour news culture that put 
immense pressure on the delegates.72 
 
It is obvious that a global bargain to challenge climate change faces many obstacles 
that differ substantially in form and kind. However, the major problem in simple terms 
is clear. The historic per-capita emissions in China are less than one-quarter the U.S. 
level and in many African countries or in a country like India they amount to only 
one-tenth the U.S. level.73 In addition, there is a common understanding that 
developing countries are going to be hurt most by climate change, although they have 
                                            
70 Copenhagen Accord, Item No. 4 and 5. 
71 Mohammed T. El-Ashry, An Overview of the Issue: Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate Change 
Agreement, Sustainable Law & Policy, winter 2008 (quoted as El-Ashry 2008). 
72 Richard Black, BBC News, Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal?, available at, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8426835.stm (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
73 U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the 
Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels 1980-2006, December 2008, available at, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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contributed relatively little to the creation of the problem.74 Therefore, many 
developing countries deem developed countries responsible for climate change and 
refuse to commit to any binding emission reduction obligation that could endanger 
their right for social and economic development.  
 
Nevertheless, it is also understood that industrial countries do not dominate GHG 
emissions alone. Developing countries contribute increasingly to GHG emissions, due 
to population growth, industrialization and economic growth as well as the related 
increase in the standard of living for millions. China, for instance, has entered a more 
energy-intensive stage of its economic development, exemplified by ever increasing 
energy consumption, while the economic growth rates remain constant at ten percent. 
75 Based on this development, it is projected that China either will very soon pass the 
United States in global GHG emissions or may indeed have already passed the United 
States last year.76 Developing countries are, however, at very different stages of 
economic development and contribute at very different levels to the problem of 
climate change. At the same time, the position of developed countries in regard of a 
binding climate change agreement is not coherent. While most European countries 
would be willing to submit themselves to such an agreement, the USA has 
traditionally rejected any internationally binding agreement that could impede their 
sovereignty. 
 
In Copenhagen the parties to the UNFCCC agreed that it is scientifically necessary to 
keep global temperature rise below 2 degree Celsius, in order to stabilize GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference 
with the climate system.77 Translated into GHG emission reduction this would mean 
that all countries should commit to collectively reduce global GHG emissions by at 
least 50 percent below the 1990 level by 2050.78 In case no such binding agreement is 
                                            
74 Christopher Flavin, Fordham Environmental Law Review Fifteenth Annual Symposium Energy 
and Climate Change: North and South Perspective – Keynote Address, 19 Fordham Environmental 
Law Review, 2009 (quoted as Flavin 2008), at 244 (231). 
75 Id., at 243. 
76 Id., at 243. 
77 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 61 Item No. 1. 
78 See e.g., Flavin 2008, supra note 72, at 235; El-Ashry 2008, supra note 69, at 2. 
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reached, climate change will seriously affect the way of life in all countries, damage 
fragile ecosystems and threaten global security through migratory pressures and 
resource conflicts.79 It is projected that for every year in which the international 
community fails to reach a global agreement on climate change, the cost of its adverse 
affects will amount to approximately USD 500 billion,80 while the cost of immediate 
action is comparably small amounting in total to about one percent of the global gross 
domestic product (USD 60 0000 million).81 It remains to be seen whether international 
policymakers will be able to reach a binding agreement on GHG emission reductions 
for both developed and developing countries at the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties 
to the UNFCCC at Cancùn, Mexico, in December 2010. 
 
E. Excurse: Clean Development Mechanism 
This short excurse on CDM will provide an overview of its implementation and 
development. It will help to evaluate the CDM potential and the procedures in place in 
Egypt. To that end, this section will discuss and evaluate the objectives and 
requirements of CDM in view of the related major barriers for project developers and 
host countries. 
 
The CDM is an increasingly important tool in international climate change policy that 
provides a cost-effective means of complying with the requirements of the Kyoto 
Protocol.82 Pursuant to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the purpose of the CDM is to 
assist Annex I countries to comply with their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments. The same article provides that the CDM should assist non-
Annex I countries in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the 
ultimate objectives of the UNFCCC. Basically the CDM can be classified as a “base-
                                            
79 See IPCC 2007, supra note 48. 
80 Fatih Birol, Chief Economist with the International Energy Agency, quoted by Robin Pagnamenta, 
Times Online, Watchdog warns of USD 500 billion annual cost of delaying action on climate 
change, available at, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article6911658.ece 
(last visited: 24th June 2010). 
81 Stern Review, supra note 1, at 212; The global gross domestic product amount in 2008 to USD 60 
000000 million, see World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, Gross Domestic Product, 
available at, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
82 Christina Voigt, Climate law Reporter: Is the Clean Development Mechanism Sustainable? – Some 
Critical Aspects, Sustainable Development Law & Policy, winter 2008 (quoted as Voigt 2008), at 15. 
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line-and-credit” system through which credits can be earned by reducing GHG 
emissions against a constructed baseline.83 It is important to note that the CDM does 
not reduce GHG emissions, but, instead, allows Annex I country investors to increase 
their emissions when they purchase credits.84  
 
In a CDM-Project an investor ordinarily implements emission-reducing measures 
either by investing in an existing project or by developing a new project.85 Emission 
reductions resulting from such project activity must be certified by the CDM 
Executive Board that issues the corresponding Certified Emission Reduction (CER).86 
The investor may use the CERs to comply with his own emission reduction 
commitments or sell them to third parties and thereby increase the profits of the 
certified project.87 From the perspective of an Annex I country CDM is therefore an 
incentive to invest in climate friendly projects in developing and emerging countries.88 
From the point of view of a non-Annex I country the potential of CDM is to increase 
the revenues from climate friendly projects thereby making the usage of environment-
friendly technology lucrative.89 The fundamental idea of CDM is to reduce the 
marginal costs for the commercial utilization of environment-friendly technologies 
thereby reducing total GHG emissions and thus advancing sustainable development in 
developing countries. 
 
In order to qualify as a CDM project two essential criteria of the Kyoto Protocol must 
be fulfilled. Article 12 No. 5 (c) of the Kyoto Protocol requires that a project should 
only be certified if based on reduction in GHG emission that are “additional” to any 
that would have occurred in the absence of the project. Furthermore Article 12 No. 2 
of the Kyoto Protocol provides that CDM projects must contribute to the “sustainable 
development” of the host country. Both of these requirements are vague in their nature 
                                            
83 Harro van Asselt and Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far? – Developing Countries and the Role of 
the Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, June 2009 (quoted 
as van Asselt/Gupta 2009), at 333. 
84 Id., at 333. 
85 Hart 2008, supra note 58, at 88. 
86 Id., at 88. 
87 Id., at 88. 
88 Voigt 2008, supra note 79, at 15. 
89 Id., at 15. 
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and thus open to interpretation and negotiation in the course of the approval procedure 
for a CDM project. Some of the related controversial issues will be elaborated on 
below. 
 
The objective of the criterion of “additionality” is to ensure that Annex I countries do 
not comply with their obligation under the Kyoto Protocol simply through the 
purchase of credits from projects that would have also been realized if the purchase 
had not taken place.90 In order to prove additionality each CDM project developer 
must propose a baseline emission scenario which describes the GHG emissions that 
would have occurred in the absence of the CDM project (business as usual).91 Against 
this baseline scenario the actual emission reductions of the CDM project are measured 
and credited.92 The problem is that project developers must estimate what would 
happened in the absence of the CDM project, which can lead to hypothetical 
assumptions and thereby create an inherent incentive for host countries and investors 
to cheat in order to increase the amount of CERs.93 The requirement of additionality 
also has an impact on policy considerations in CDM host countries. Standing policies 
in CDM host countries must be considered as a business as usual development and 
thus, GHG emission reductions under these policies are not valid under the CDM.94 
This leads to the predicament that if countries adopt stricter climate change policies, 
their prospects of getting GHG emission reduction funded under the CDM are 
reduced.95 
 
The criterion of sustainable development further increases the uncertainties for CDM 
project developers. It is very difficult to generalize what kind of projects contribute to 
sustainable development since the specific requirements are highly context-specific 
and subjective.96 Thus, CDM´s contribution to sustainable development was subject to 
intense debate during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent 
                                            
90 Van Asselt/Gupta 2009, supra note 80, at 345. 
91 Voigt 2008, supra note 79, at 16. 
92 Id., at 16. 
93 Id., at 16; van Asselt/Gupta 2009, supra note 80, at 345. 
94 Id., at 347. 
95 Id., at 347. 
96 Id., at 348. 
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Conferences of the Parties.97 Particularly, CDM host countries were concerned about 
their sovereignty and thus reluctant to accept any external determination of sustainable 
development priorities.98 These are some of the reason why the definition of 
sustainable development was eventually left to the non-Annex I countries.99 
 
It is a reality that most CDM funding is attributed to projects with high GHG emission 
reduction potential, but have only questionable non-climate sustainable developments 
benefits.100 CDM host countries could try to challenge this development through 
higher national sustainable development standards.101 However, they are unlikely to 
do so individually since this could mean that CDM projects would move to 
neighboring countries with lower sustainable development standards, which would 
lead to a race to the bottom. Finally, host countries must face the simple reality that in 
a market-based mechanism like the CDM investors will always seek low-cost projects 
that are easy to initiate and that the aspect of sustainable development is a 
consideration without financial value for those investors.102 Nevertheless, CDM host 
countries should not underestimate the potential of influencing what kinds of projects 
are being implemented through the adjustment of the specific national sustainable 
development standard. 
 
The related high transaction costs for project developers present an additional burden 
for the CDM. For instance, the registration process of large-scale CDM projects can 
take an average of 23 months from submission of a plan to obtaining a final approval 
by the CDM Executive Board.103 Unfortunately, due to the multilateral character of 
the CDM, this lengthy registration process in necessary and thus cannot be 
                                            
97 Voigt 2008, supra note 79, at 17. 
98 Id., at 17. 
99 See Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Seventh Session, Marrakesh, Morocco, November 
2001, Decision 17/CP 7: Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism as defined 
in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, available at, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/workshops/other_meetings/application/pdf/17cp7.pdf (last visited: 
24th June 2010). 
100 Van Asselt/Gupta 2009, supra note 80, at 349. 
101 Id., at 349. 
102 Id., at 349. 
103 Hart 2008, supra note 58, at 89. 
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circumvented.104 Moreover, the lengthy multilateral registration process provides an 
opportunity for governmental corruption. Cultural barriers and unstable governments 
could also further increase transaction costs.105 As shown above, the ambiguities of 
the Kyoto Protocol requirements also stipulate an uncertain outcome of approval 
procedures for developers that could constitute a significant loss for unsuccessful 
proposals. All of these aspects have the potential to increase the cost of transaction 
immensely. 
 
To date, a total of 2232 CDM projects are registered with the UNFCCC and 87 
registrations are pending.106 Although the CDM ideally provides mitigation incentives 
throughout the developing world, it is seems that large developing countries have 
benefited most from the CDM. Alone Mexico (121 projects), Brazil (173), India (509) 
and China (863) host 74.47% of all CDM projects worldwide, leaving relatively little 
to smaller developing countries.107 The reasons for this uneven distribution could be 
the size of the country in relation to its population, gross domestic product and energy 
use.108 Other explanations could be the potential for GHG emission reductions and the 
ease of implementation for CDM projects.109 In any case, this issue must be addressed 
at the Conference of the Parties in order to involve more small and mid-size 
developing countries in the CDM.  
 
In conclusion, the CDM can be criticized for focusing too much on the interest of 
Annex I countries to achieve their GHG emission reduction targets in a cost-effective 
manner, while it substantially neglects the prospect of developing countries for 
sustainable development. In addition, the participation of many developing countries 
is often inefficient due to high transaction cost. Hence the CDM has seen a focus on 
large-sized developing countries with considerable experience as regards the 
                                            
104 Id., at 89. 
105 Id., at 89. 
106 UNFCCC Official Website, CDM Statistics, available at, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
107 UNFCCC Official Website, Registered projects by host party, available in the internet, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html (last 
visited: 24th June 2010).  
108 Van Asselt/Gupta 2009, supra note 80 at 352. 
109 Id., at 352. 
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procedures. Thus, it can be concluded that the CDM favors developed countries with 
little consideration of the needs of small and mid-size developing countries. 
 
III. National Policy Options for the Diffusion of Renewable Energy & Energy 
Efficiency 
A sustainable and comprehensive RE & EE policy is needed to combat the challenges 
of climate change on the national level. Energy markets are traditionally structured in 
favor of conventional energies. Therefore, to create a market for RE & EE, 
considerable state intervention is necessary. This chapter will provide an overview of 
the obstacles and options policy-makers are facing when creating a domestic market 
for RE & EE. 
 
To that end, this chapter will first examine the barriers that regularly constrain the 
diffusion of RE & EE (1.). Then the major legal policy options for the promotion of 
RE will be discussed, including feed-in laws, quota models and tendering systems as 
well as further supporting policy schemes (2.). Subsequently, EE policy tools will be 
presented with a focus on EE building codes, EE standards for electronic appliances 
and the phasing-out of the incandescent lighting bulb (3.). The chapter will close with 
some general conclusions on the need for a consistent and comprehensive RE & EE 
policy (4.).  
 
Due the limited scope of this paper, the elaborations of this chapter are by no means 
conclusive. Nevertheless, they will provide the framework for the analysis to follow 
the current and prospective approach for the Egyptian regulator to promote RE & EE 
(Chapter V). 
 
A. Barriers for the Diffusion of Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency 
When addressing the reasons for the slow transition from an economy based on 
conventional energies to one comprising the potential of RE & EE several main 
categories of barriers can be identified. These are essentially cost and price as well as 
regulatory and technical issues. Policies and programs are required to support RE & 
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EE in the short term, because of the existence of those barriers, but it is also essential 
to eradicate such barriers over time. 
 
The key for any successful RE & EE policy is the re-shuffling or phasing out of 
government subsidies for conventional energies. This is essential because subsidized 
energy prices distort investment decision in RE and constitute a massive disincentive 
for EE.110 Estimates stipulate that global annual subsidies for fossil fuels range 
between USD 100bn to USD 200bn.111 They can take many forms and regularly 
include direct financial transfers, tax incentives and public funding for research and 
development (R&D) as well as trade restrictions and other regulations.112 
 
The removal or reduction of existing subsidies for conventional energies would have 
three major effects on the respective energy market. Most important, the removal of 
subsidies would send a strong market signal to consumers and would encourage them 
towards a rational and effective use of power resources.113 Moreover, the elimination 
of subsidies would improve competition in the electricity market, eliminating unfair 
advantages given to nuclear and fossil fuel technologies.114 Finally, the lifting of 
energy subsidies would free up billions of dollars of state revenues that could be 
utilized for R&D, reduction of national state deficits or funding of other programs.115 
 
An obstacle closely related to the extensive subsidies for conventional energy is the 
unfavorable electricity pricing structure that impedes the diffusion of RE & EE in 
many countries.116 Therefore, a solid and wisely adjusted electricity price reform is 
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essential for the sustainable promotion of RE & EE. An electricity price reform should 
include considerations to eliminate price caps that keep electricity prices artificially 
low and thereby facilitate excessive consumption, undervalue EE and distort 
consumer decisions. 117 An additional candidate for reform is the so-called declining 
block-rate pricing, the annulment of which could solve the irritating contradiction that 
large consumers of electricity pay lower prices than small consumers.118 Furthermore, 
a price reform should introduce time-of-use electricity rates and bills that could enable 
consumers to make more energy efficient decisions in regard to their consumption by 
providing information on how electricity production and consumption varies 
according to the time-of-use.119 Eventually, a reform should include the internalization 
of external cost, which would heavily increase electricity prices, but at same time 
ensure a more accurate price for electricity.120 All in all, a solid electricity price 
reform could improve the efficiency of the electricity sector, provide accurate price 
signals to consumers and enhance EE consumption on all levels. 
 
Another cost barrier for RE projects is their high initial investment cost.121 Although 
lower fuel and operating costs may make RE competitive on the long term, the higher 
cost of initial technology investment implies that RE projects may provide less 
generation capacities per initial dollar investment in comparison to conventional 
energies.122 Therefore, it can be said that RE projects generally require higher amounts 
of financing for the same capacity of electricity.123 This obstacle of primary 
investment is supplemented by a lack of access to affordable credit for RE projects.124 
 
From regulatory perspective, one must first to acknowledge that most regulatory 
systems were assigned to support conventional energies and thus, often discriminate 
against the use of RE technologies.125 In many countries, state owned electric utilities 
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still maintain a monopoly on electricity production, transmission and distribution.126 
Therefore, investment in RE is often discouraged, because utilities may not guarantee 
transmission access for RE producer, or may charge high prices for the connection to 
the national grid. Additionally, legal restrictions on siting and construction can 
complicate the erection of RE facilities.127   
 
Moreover, the absences of technical and commercial skills as well as a lack of 
sufficient information constitute barriers for the introduction of RE & EE into the 
market.128 This tendency is supplemented by the misguided perception that 
performances of RE & EE technologies are still uncertain and risky.129 This 
perception may be based on a lack experience or training in RE technologies or past 
negative experiences with such technologies.130 All of these factors decrease the 
acceptance of RE & EE policies within a society, and thus increase the reluctance to 
implement such policies. 
 
While the barriers mentioned above are equally valid for developed and developing 
countries, some specific characteristics of developing countries must be considered for 
sustainable RE & EE policies. The specific social, economic and political 
circumstances in developing countries provide a different set of challenges that affect 
the feasibility of the various policy measures. The most critical question for the 
application of RE is whether or not there is a substantial national grid without which 
RE policy measures cannot be applied in the same way as in developed countries.131 
The different situations in developing countries can be demonstrated by considering 
the respective rural grid-connection. In much of sub-Saharan Africa only 2% to 5% of 
the population is connected to the grid, while in comparison this figure in Thailand 
amounts to 98%.132 The problem of rural electrification is further increased by high 
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investment costs in rural areas due to long travel distances, poor transport 
infrastructure and a lack of trained personnel.133 And last, unrealistic political plans 
for electricity grid extension can form a serious barrier to RE market expansion in 
rural areas. When consumers expect that they will be soon connected to the grid, they 
have no incentive to invest in off-grid alternatives such as RE.134 
 
The diffusion of RE & EE policies in developing countries is closely linked to the 
relation between energy and poverty. Increased accessibility to electricity is crucial to 
alleviate poverty, since the availability of energy has a profound impact on general 
livelihood, the access to water, health and education as well as on other related 
issues.135 At the same time, the level of poverty in a country has a strong impact on 
the generation and availability of electricity. On the one hand, the level of poverty 
dictates the available funds for the development of large-scale energy infrastructure 
projects and on the other hand, it determines the ability of individuals to pay for 
electricity prices.136 Therefore, any RE & EE policy in developing countries must 
protect the poor by providing them with additional funds to minimize environmental 
classism.137 This is especially valid for electricity price reforms that necessarily lead 
to more realistic increased electricity prices (see above), from which poor families 
would suffer the most if no low-income assistance is provided.138 
 
Additionally, developing countries often lack the domestic capacities to implement 
RE & EE projects.139 Thus, it is imperative for developing countries to build domestic 
knowledge and expertise to develop, implement and operate RE & EE programs 
independently from foreign market actors.140 Every developing country must be able 
to draw on domestic capacities to ensure long-term sustainable development for the 
RE & EE sector. The diffusion of RE & EE policies in developing countries is, finally, 
complicated by the general perception that investment in developing countries is in 
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general very risky because of high uncertainties about political, regulatory and market 
stability.141 Despite all these challenges the implementation of RE & EE policies is not 
only a moral obligation, it is also a great opportunity for developed and developing 
countries to generate economic growth, decrease unemployment and enhance energy 
security. 
 
B. Renewable Energy Support Schemes 
The transition from an energy system based on fossil fuels to one based on RE is of 
fundamental importance for various reasons. Firstly, the future of humanity depends 
on the health and the survival of the planet´s natural resources and eco-systems that 
are being degraded by the utilization of fossil fuels.142 Secondly, the utilization of RE 
could increase independence from fossil fuels and also secure energy supply for all 
countries, which in turn could enhance overall global security.143 Thirdly, the 
economic potential of creating a green economy based on RE & EE is enormous for 
both developed and developing countries worldwide.144  
 
The moral imperative and the economic opportunities driving the dissemination of RE 
are mirrored by many indicators that have shown dramatic gains during recent years. 
The global annual investment in new RE capacities doubled from USD 63bn in 2006 
to USD 120bn in 2008.145 In the same time global installed RE power capacities 
(excluding large hydro) increased from 207 GW to 280 GW, of which 16 GW are 
contributed by solar PV and 121 GW by wind power, while the remainder is made up 
by small hydro, geothermal and biomass power generation.146 
 
In 2009, policy targets for RE existed in at least 73 countries.147 Representative 
national RE targets of developed countries are, for instance, Germany with 18% by 
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2020, Sweden with 49% by 2020 and Ireland with 40% by 2020; while representative 
targets for developing countries include China with 15% by 2020, Abu Dhabi with 7% 
by 2020 and Madagascar with 75% by 2020.148 In order to reach these ambitious 
objectives, it is imperative for each country respectively to implement an enabling RE 
policy and regulatory framework to attract large-scale investment and to achieve 
sustainable development in the RE sector. Three major regulatory options for the 
integration of RE into the national energy mix can be identified that are applied in 
various jurisdictions worldwide:149  
• Price-based feed-in laws that require mandatory purchase of RE at a fixed 
price, 
• Quantity-based RE portfolio standards (RPS) that require a minimum share 
of power or a minimum level of installed capacity in a given region is met by 
RE, and 
• Tendering mechanisms, which involve government-sponsored competitive 
bidding processes for the acquisition of RE whereby long-term contracts are 
awarded to the lowest price bidder. 
 
All of these regulatory options ensure the right of RE suppliers to recover the 
incremental cost between RE and conventional energy as well as the guarantee to 
connect to the national grid.150 However, each approach has its specific advantages 
and disadvantages that must be considered by policymakers in light of the specific 
country conditions and electricity sector structure. Nevertheless, the following key 
points provide a frame for the subsequent discussion of the various policy tools:151 
• Experience has demonstrated that considerable intervention in energy 
markets is required to introduce a significant amount of RE into the energy 
mix, 
• Effectiveness of government policies depends on how well they are designed 
and on the status of enforcement, 
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• Experience has shown that the key to steady and significant cost reductions is 
the development of a consistent and reliable market, 
• Most RE policies involve some kind of subsidy, direct or indirect, 
• Each country has unique circumstances and must design a system based on 
needs, circumstances and available resources, and 
• Markets in developing countries are particularly sensitive to the need for 
uncomplicated access to the electricity grid and low transaction costs. 
 
The success of a sustainable RE policy is generally measured by the development of 
certain key indicators, including: the installed capacity and energy generation from RE 
technologies, technological advances, reduction in cost and price, domestic 
manufacturing capacity and related jobs, and public acceptance.152 
 
Following, the three regulatory options mentioned above will be presented in greater 
detail and the respective advantages and disadvantages for each approach will 
examined, in order to analyze in Chapter V whether the current and prospective 
regulatory framework for RE in Egypt can be considered a success. 
 
1. The Feed-in Model 
Feed-in laws are considered to produce the quickest and most cost-effective 
deployment of RE technologies.153 The success of world leaders in RE technologies 
such as Germany, Denmark and Spain, is attributed to the opportunities created by the 
sudden and rapid market development through their respective feed-in laws.154 
 
A feed-in law can be defined as a pricing law, under which electric utilities are 
obligated to connect RE producers to the electricity grid and to purchase electricity 
generated through RE at a fixed minimum price.155 The tariffs are generally set higher 
than the regular market price and are guaranteed for a specific period of time to ensure 
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profitable operations for RE projects.156 Most feed-in laws, for instance in Germany, 
differentiate for the determination of tariffs between the technology type, the size of 
an installation and the location of a RE project.157 The extra costs of a feed-in tariff 
(FIT) can be covered either through cross-subsidies among all electricity consumers 
(Spain) or by those customers of the utility obliged to buy electricity from RE 
(Germany until 2000), or by the taxpayer, or a combination of both systems.158   
 
Key to the successful implementation of a feed-in law is the cautious determination of 
FITs in light of the respective country conditions. It is imperative that tariffs are high 
enough to cover incremental cost and encourage investment in particular RE 
technologies.159 It is further essential that tariffs are guaranteed for a timeframe long 
enough to ensure investors of an adequate rate of return.160 Additionally, FITs can be 
adjusted up or down to encourage more or less investment in RE and to react to 
externalities.161 
 
Figure 1. Tariff level in 2008 (€ Cents/kWh) and duration for support for different technologies 
Country Wind 
onshore 
Wind 
offshore 
Solid 
biomass 
Biogas PV Geothermal Small 
hydro 
Denmark (fixed) - - 8.0 
10 yrs. 
8.0 
10yrs. 
20.0-
25.0 
20 yrs. 
6.9 
20 yrs. 
- 
Germany (fixed) 9.2 
20 yrs. 
13.0-
15.0 
20 yrs. 
7.79-
22.67 
20 yrs. 
7.79-
29.67 
20 yrs. 
31.94-
43.01 
20 yrs. 
10.5-20.0 
20. yrs 
7.65-
12.67 
20 yrs. 
(fixed) 7.3 
20 yrs. 
- 10.8-
15.9 
15 yrs. 
8.0-
10.8 
15 yrs. 
23.0-
44.0 
25 yrs. 
6.9 
20 yrs. 
7.8 
25 yrs. 
Spain 
(premium) 7.1-8.5 
no limit 
14.1-
16.4 
no limit 
10.4-
16.6 
no limit 
9.4 
no limit 
- 9.5 
no limit 
6.5-8.5 
no 
limit 
Source: Klein et al, 2008, at 14. 
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Moreover, the success of a feed-in law depends on factors such as charges for access 
to the electricity grid, limits set on qualifying capacities and the ease of permitting and 
siting of RE projects.162 Where these general remarks are valid for all feed-in laws, 
several design options must be considered and applied by policymakers to fit the 
respective country conditions:163 
• Tariff levels should be differentiated according to the specific costs of 
generating electricity from different RE technologies. Appropriate levels can 
be determined by assessing costs, generation performance and estimated 
lifetime of a project, 
• Guaranteed tariffs should be long enough to ensure a sufficient rate of return 
to investors. The timeframe for a guaranteed support of RE is quite variable 
and ranges from one year to no limit, with an average of 14 years, 
• Tariff levels should be regularly revised to ensure that tariffs are high enough 
to cover costs and encourage development in order to achieve the respective 
national RE policy targets, 
• Tariff degression should be considered to accurately reflect decreasing 
technology prices,  
• Feed-in laws should be supplemented by incentives for technological 
improvements and more efficient designs in order to reduce costs through 
technological learning. 
 
A variant of FITs is the fixed premium mechanism (applied in Spain) that requires the 
government to pay a fixed premium on top of the market electricity price to RE 
producers.164 In contrast to a normal feed-in law the electricity market price has, thus, 
an influence on the remuneration of RE producer under the premium option.165 
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Therefore, the premium option presents a more market orientated approach to the 
diffusion of RE. 
 
Generally, inherent to the feed-in model is the so-called net metering which permits 
consumers to install small RE systems at their homes and to sell their excess 
electricity into the grid.166 Net metering differs from a feed-in law mainly in scale and 
implementation. Its success in attracting investment is determined by the limits set for 
participation (capacity caps, number costumers or share of peak demand) and the price 
paid for excess electricity.167 However, without additional financial incentives, net 
metering is insufficient to achieve high market penetration due to the high cost of 
initial investment in RE technologies.168 
 
Although feed-in laws were first a predominantly European approach to the diffusion 
of RE, they are now in place in 63 countries, states or provinces, including parts of 
Canada and India. They are also in place in Africa, Asia and Australia (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Number of Countries/States/Provinces Enacting Feed-in Policies  
Year Cumulative Number169 Countries/States/Province added that year 
1978 1 United States 
1990 2 Germany 
1991 3 Switzerland 
1992 4 Italy 
1993 6 Denmark, India 
1994 8 Spain, Greece 
1997 9 Sri Lanka 
1998 10 Sweden 
1999 13 Portugal, Norway, Slovenia 
2000 13 - 
2001 15 France, Latvia 
2002 21 Algeria, Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Lithuania 
2003 28 Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, South Korea, Slovak Republic, 
Maharashtra (India) 
2004 33 Israel, Nicaragua, Prince Edward Island (Canada), Andhra 
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh (India) 
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2005 40 Karnataka, Uttaranchal and Utter Pradesh (India), China, 
Turkey, Ecuador, Ireland 
2006 43 Ontario (Canada), Argentina, Thailand 
2007 49 South Australia (Australia), Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Uganda 
2008 61 Queensland (Australia), California (USA), Gujarat, Haryana, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil, Nadu and West Bengal (India), 
Kenya, the Philippines, Poland, Ukraine 
2009 63 Australian Capital Territory (Australia), South Africa 
Source: REN21, GSR 2009 
 
In regard of the outcomes of implemented feed-in laws the figures from Germany are 
particularly impressive. In 2009, the use of RE prevented the emission of 107 million 
tones of CO2.170 For the same year the share of total electricity consumption in 
Germany from RE rose to 16.1%, and German RE companies had a combined 
turnover of EUR 33.4bn of which 17.7bn were invested in new RE facilities.171 The 
German RE sector currently employs over 300,000 people and is expected to keep 
growing.172 These figures of the German RE sector demonstrate that the feed-in 
approach fosters quick and sustainable RE market development. 
 
2. The Quota Model 
In contrast to feed-in laws, the quota model is primarily applied in the USA and only 
to a relatively small extent in Europe, namely in the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Sweden. The two models work essentially in the reverse; while feed-in laws set the 
price for RE and let the market determine capacity and generation, the quota model 
sets mandatory RE targets and lets the market determine the price.173 
 
In a quota model, the government typically mandates a minimum share of RE capacity 
or generation that often increases over time and that includes a specified final target 
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and end-date.174 Generally it is a policy choice within the quota model whether such 
obligation is placed on producers, distributors or consumers.175 There are two main 
types of quota systems in place for the generation of electricity: obligate/certificate 
and tendering systems. The former will be analyzed subsequently, while the tendering 
system is presented below. 
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are the typical approach to an 
obligate/certificate system. Under a RPS, a mandatory target is established for the 
minimum amount of capacity or generation from RE that typically increases over 
time.176 The market then determines how it will comply in terms of the type of RE 
technology to be used and the respective business partners and the prices and contracts 
that will be applied.177 Once a target period is expired, the producers (or distributors or 
consumers, depending on the policy) must demonstrate that they are in compliance 
with the RPS, through the ownership of credits that they earn through transactions.178 
Otherwise they are obligated to pay a specific penalty determined by law.179 Credits 
may take the form of “Green Certificates” for the electricity generated from RE and 
function as proof for meeting the mandatory RE targets.180 Market actors with too 
many certificates can sell or trade them to earn additional income, while those who 
have not met the RE target have the option to build their own RE capacities, buy RE 
electricity from other producers or simply to buy certificates on the market.181 Once a 
RPS is successfully established, the governmental involvement is limited to certifying 
credits and monitoring compliance as well as enforcement.182  
 
In 2008, RPS policies were enacted in 49 countries, states or provinces, of which the 
vast majority were enacted in 29 states of the USA (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Cumulative Number of Countries/States/Provinces enacting RPS Policies 
Year Cumulative Number Countries/States/Province added that year 
1983 1 Iowa (USA) 
1994 2 Minnesota (USA) 
1996 3 Arizona (USA) 
1997 6 Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada (USA) 
1998 9 Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin (USA) 
1999 12 New Jersey, Texas (USA), Italy 
2000 13 New Mexico (USA) 
2001 15 Flanders (Belgium), Australia 
2002 18 California (USA), Wallonia (Belgium), United Kingdom 
2003 19 Japan, Sweden, Maharashtra (India) 
2004 34 Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, New York, Rhode Island (USA), 
Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island (Canada), Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa (India), Poland 
2005 38 District of Columbia, Delaware, Montana (USA), Gujarat 
(India) 
2006 39 Washington State (USA) 
2007 44 Illinois, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon (USA), 
China 
2008 49 Michigan, Missouri, Ohio (USA), Chile, India 
Source: REN21, GSR 2009 
 
The figure above shows that the implementation of RPS policies gained momentum at 
the beginning of the 21st century. By1998, RPS had been introduced in only 9 US 
states, while in the following four years this figure doubled to 18 including major 
economies like Australia, the United Kingdom and California. Owing to the only 
recent introduction of many RPS schemes, the experiences in regard to the outcome of 
quota systems are very limited.  
 
However, a recent study of the UK Renewables Obligation system provides some 
perspective on the potential of RPS policies.183 It is projected that  the UK 
Renewables Obligation will cost consumers approximately £ 14bn by 2020 and £ 
18bn by 2027, while RE capacities are only expected to reach 10.1% of total the 
electricity generation by 2020.184 This would mean that RE penetration would be only 
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half the way towards achieving the UK 2020 target of 20%.185 Experts draw from 
these exemplary figures the general conclusion that RPS may increase RE capacities, 
but are at the same time less cost-effective than the feed-in models.186  
 
3. The Tendering System 
Tendering systems are the third option for the integration of RE into the national 
energy mix. Under a tender system, the regulator issues an invitation to tender for a 
specified amount of RE capacity or share of total electricity to be achieved at certain 
price per kWh.187 In turn, project developers submit their bids for a power purchase 
agreement and/or governmental funds through a competitive bidding process.188 
 
The bidding process itself depends highly on the respective national tender 
regulations. In principle, regulators establish a set of criteria for evaluation prior to 
each round of bidding, including the desired level of generation and the growth rates 
required over time.189 Project developers then have the opportunity to submit their 
respective bids. Generally, the tender is awarded to the most competitive bid, starting 
with the lowest bid and working upwards until the desired level of capacity or 
generation is reached.190 Typically the regulator will issue separate tender invitations 
for the different technologies in order to avoid competition between the various 
sources of RE.191 
 
Project developers who win a competitive bidding process are guaranteed a price for a 
specific period of time, while the electric utility is obliged to purchase a certain 
amount of RE electricity from winning producers.192 The difference between the 
market and the price of the winning bid is either added to electricity bills in form of 
special levy (UK), or covered through cross-subsidization among all electricity 
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consumers.193 It is noteworthy that each tender invitation is a one time competition for 
funding and contracts. Therefore, the specific contractual arrangement is of paramount 
importance for project developers, especially the respective power purchase 
agreements and land-use agreements. An early example of a tendering system is the 
UK Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation that was introduced in 1991.194 Tendering 
mechanisms have been applied in Ireland, France, the US and China.195 Experiences 
from these countries have shown that the success of tender systems is very limited due 
to the uncertainty in the market created by the intermittency of tenders and the 
complexity of the involved procedures.196 
 
4. Discussion of the various Policy Options for Renewable Energy 
Although an in-depth analysis of the various models to integrate RE into the energy 
mix is beyond the scope of this paper, this section will attempt to compare the policy 
options presented above.197 And it will close with a chart presenting the key 
advantages and disadvantages of the feed-in and the quota model (including the 
specifics of tendering systems). Major issues such as capacity and generation, 
geographic distribution and technological diversity will be discussed below in greater 
detail. 
 
The quota model establishes specific targets for RE capacity or generation and thus 
provides certainty in regard of the future share of the market. In contrast, under a feed-
in model it is not possible to predict ex ante how much capacity or generation will be 
achieved. However, those countries with feed-in laws have regularly surpassed the 
national RE targets.198 This development is due to the lesser risk and greater expected 
profits stipulated by the feed-in model, because the subsidies are granted to all new 
                                            
193 Id., at 803. 
194 Niels I. Meyer, European schemes for promoting renewables in liberalized markets, Energy 
Policy 31, 2003, at 668 (quoted as Meyer), available at,  
http://in3.dem.ist.utl.pt/master/06energy/files/class4.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
195 Mendonca, supra note 107, at 15. 
196 Id., at 15. 
197 Since the tendering system is a sub-category of the quota model (see section X), the advantages 
and disadvantages are quite similar and only on some issues distinct. Therefore, the following 
discussion will predominantly focus on the comparison between the feed-in and the quota model, 
while the specific characteristics of a tendering system will only be emphasized.  
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projects and continue throughout the pay-off period determined by law.199 On the 
other hand, the lower prices obtained under a quota system, caused by the pressure of 
competition, limit the margin with respect to cost for project developers and thus 
result in fewer installed capacities.200 In a tendering system the uncertainty regarding 
the profitability of submitted projects is even stronger, since considerable costs occur 
in the preparation of bidding procedures that cannot be retrieved by unsuccessful 
bidders.201 Therefore, it can be said that the balance between the risk involved and 
expected profits is clearly to the disadvantage of the quota and tendering models, 
making them less attractive for investors and thus establishing less RE capacity or 
generation. 
 
The success of RE projects strongly depends on the local natural resources. Therefore, 
the impact of the models on the geographic distribution of RE facilities is of 
importance. Quota type schemes tend to favor least-cost projects and thus limit them 
to the areas with the best natural conditions.202 This cost pressure regularly causes 
project developers to neglect other important aspects including environmental impact, 
information programs and public interest as well as site integration, which in turn may 
lead to strong local opposition movement.203 In contrast, the acceptability of projects 
is much higher in countries that have FITs, because the certain profitability makes it 
possible to avoid a concentration of projects at the most efficient sites or the creation 
of large controversial RE projects.204 For instance, in Germany, the best wind 
conditions are found in the North Sea, yet only 53% of wind energy projects are 
located there.205 
 
In regard of the technological diversity, quota systems tend to encourage least-cost 
technologies that are close to market competitiveness.206 For instance, the Texan RPS 
caused a rapid diffusion of wind energy, while it has done little to encourage more 
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expansive technologies such as solar PVs, despite the excellent conditions for solar 
energy in Texas.207 In comparison, FITs can encourage technological diversity 
provided that tariffs vary according to technology type, since they create a market for 
all renewables and thus support technologies from early development to market 
competiveness.208 
 
This brief discussion gives an overview of the key issues policymakers have to 
consider when choosing the appropriate framework for the diffusion of RE in respect 
to the specific country conditions. However, this discussion is by no means conclusive 
due to the limited scope of this paper. The chart on the following page presents the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different policy options based on the studies of 
key RE analysts and will provide a comprehensive framework for the subsequent 
analysis of the Egyptian approach to the diffusion of RE (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Renewable Energy Policy Options Comparison 
Design 
Option 
Capacity or 
Generation 
Cost, price 
and 
competition 
Industry and 
Innovation 
Investor 
Certainty 
Ease of 
Implementation 
Feed-in 
Laws 
Pro: 
• Have 
proven 
most 
successful 
at 
developing 
renewables 
markets; 
• Large 
amounts of 
RE in short 
time. 
Pro: 
• Cost 
effective if 
the tariff is 
periodically 
and wisely 
adjusted; 
• Low 
transaction 
costs; 
Contra: 
• If tariffs are 
not adjusted 
over time, 
consumers 
may pay 
unnecessaril
y high prices 
for RE. This 
can be 
addressed 
through 
monitoring 
or tariff 
degression; 
Pro: 
• Have proven 
most 
successful at 
creating 
domestic 
industries; 
• FITs 
encourage 
steady 
growth of 
small- and 
medium-
scale 
producers; 
• Ease of 
entry; 
• Supports 
technologies 
that are not 
yet 
compatible. 
Contra: 
• Can involve 
restraints on 
Pro: 
• Can reduce 
investor risk 
with long 
guaranteed  
FITs; 
• Greater 
certainty, in 
particular in 
developing 
countries; 
• Ease of 
financing; 
• State 
determines 
price for RE. 
Pro: 
• Most simple to 
design, 
administer and 
enforce; 
• Flexibility: 
FITs can be 
adjusted to 
account for 
changes in 
technology and 
market; 
• Fixed premium 
mechanisms 
can create 
more market 
orientation; 
• Net metering 
can promote 
small private 
RE 
installations. 
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• Insufficient 
incentives to 
lower costs. 
• Stipulates 
less 
competition 
RE trade due 
to domestic 
production 
requirements
. 
Renewables 
Portfolio 
Standard 
and 
Tendering 
Systems  
Pro: 
• If  RPS 
enforced, it 
can meet 
realistic 
targets; 
Contra: 
• Targets can 
set upper 
limit for 
developme
nt – there 
are no high 
profits to 
serve as 
incentives 
to install 
more than 
the 
mandated 
level 
because 
profitability 
exits only 
within the 
quota. 
• Up to now 
tendering 
as not 
proven very 
successful 
(limited 
experiences
). 
Pro: 
• RPS and 
tendering 
best at 
reducing 
cost & price 
with 
competitive 
bidding; 
• Promote 
least-cost 
projects – 
cheapest 
resources 
used first, 
which 
brings 
down cost 
early; 
• Encourage 
competitio; 
 
• Perceived 
as being 
more 
compatible 
with open 
or 
traditional 
power 
markets; 
• Subsidies 
for RE can 
be best 
controlled. 
Contra: 
• Price 
fluctuation 
in thin 
markets, 
creating 
instability 
and 
gaming; 
• High 
transaction 
costs. 
Pro: 
• Favor least-
cost 
technologies 
(compatible) 
& 
established 
industry 
players; 
• More likely 
to integrate 
RE into 
electricity 
supply 
infrastructur
e; 
Contra: 
• High risks 
and low 
reward for 
equipment 
manufacture
rs and 
project 
developers, 
which slows 
innovation; 
• Tend to 
favor large, 
centralized 
merchant 
plants and 
not suited 
for small 
investors 
due greater 
investment 
risk. 
Pro: 
• Theoretically 
provide 
certainty 
regarding 
future market 
share for RE 
(often not 
true in 
practice); 
• Market 
determines 
price; 
• Green 
Certificates 
can provide 
additional 
income 
Contra: 
• Lack of price 
certainty for 
investors, 
standard 
PPAs can 
reduce risk; 
• Investors 
must assess 
future supply 
and demand 
balance for 
the lifetime 
of the project; 
• Costs occur 
up-front in 
preparation 
for tendering 
procedures. 
Contra: 
• RPS complex 
in design, 
administration 
and 
enforcement, 
leading to a 
lack of 
transparency; 
• Tendering is 
more complex 
than feed-in, 
simpler than 
RPS; 
• Tendering 
tends to create 
cycle of stop-
and-go 
development; 
• Complexity of 
tender 
procedures; 
• Lack 
flexibility – 
difficult to 
fine-tune or 
adjust in short 
term if 
situations 
change. 
Sources: Wang 2007, Sawin 2004 and Mendonca. 
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All the positive and negative aspects mentioned in Figure 4 must be considered by 
policymakers in order to identify the most appropriate policy option for the diffusion 
of RE in respect to the specific country conditions. However, most important for all 
systems is political stability and a long-term, enforceable and consistent RE policy. 
 
5. Supporting Policy Options for Renewable Energy 
For the introduction of RE into a national market, the implementation of one of the 
policy options discussed above is of utmost importance. Nevertheless, each option 
should be supplemented by a bundle of supportive measures that challenge the 
described barriers for the diffusion of RE. The policy tools enlisted below provide an 
overview on these supportive mechanisms:209 
• Cost reduction policies: Several policies can be applied as an incentive to 
reduce the high initial investment cost of RE and thereby reduce the risk for 
investors: (1) investment tax credits that directly reduce the cost of investing in 
RE and production tax credits that provide tax benefits against the amount of 
RE electricity actually produced, (2) other tax reliefs such as accelerated 
depreciation, relief from taxes on sales and property and value-added tax 
rebate as well as reduction or removal of import duties on RE technologies, 
and (3) rebates on a specific share of the cost for RE technology or installation 
and production payments on a certain amount of generation; (4) financing 
assistance through low-interest and/or long-term loans and/or loan guarantees, 
and (5) reduced costs through economies of bulk procurement. 
• Public funds: Funds can be collected through special levies on power 
consumption or penalties for the violation of environmental provisions. Public 
funds can serve several purposes including subsidizing the difference between 
RE and conventional energy prices, reducing the cost of RE & EE loans, 
providing EE services, funding public energy education, providing low-income 
energy assistance and supporting R&D.  
                                            
209 Sawin 2004, supra note 107, at 18 – 25; Eric Martinot, Global Energy Markets and Policies, New 
Academy Review special edition on climate change, Spring 2004 (quoted as Martinot 2004), at 3-6, 
available at, http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_NAR.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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• RE industry standards: RE standards, such as wind turbine standards, can 
prevent the introduction of inferior technologies into the market and thereby 
increase confidence in RE products; fair grid connection standards and charge 
can increase the predictability of profits and RE siting and planning 
requirements can reduce opposition to RE projects, if they address critical 
concerns like noise, visual and environmental impacts. 
• RE & EE education and information dissemination: An understanding of RE & 
EE industries is important to increase acceptance by the population and to 
show investors potential opportunities. These should include resources studies, 
education about the various RE & EE technologies and training and 
information about available governmental incentives and support schemes. 
 
An additional challenge for the diffusion of RE is an energy sector structure that has 
state-owned electric utility monopolies, which traditionally focus on conventional 
energies rather than on RE. Five key trends for restructuring energy sectors that 
facilitate the diffusion of RE have been identified by analysts:210 
• Competitive wholesale power markets and removal of price regulations on 
generation, 
• Self-generation by end users and small-scale generation technologies (net 
metering), 
• Privatization and/or commercialization of electric utilities, 
• Unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution, and 
• Competitive retail power markets. 
 
These measures regularly result in independent power production and competition in 
generation, decentralization and privatization as well as unbundling of generation and 
transmission and even competition in distribution.211 
                                            
210 Eric Martinot, Grid-Based Renewable Energy in Developing Countries: Policies, Strategies, and 
Lessons from the GEF, World Renewable Energy Policy and Strategy Forum, Berlin 2002 (quoted as 
Martinot 2002), at 1-5, available at, http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_WCRE2002.pdf  (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
211 Id., at 1. 
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C. Energy Efficiency Support Schemes 
EE is the natural and essential partner of RE. Without a sustainable EE policy, energy 
demand will continue to rise and will ultimately exceed global energy production 
capacities as countries are striving for economic growth.212 Therefore, it is essential 
that the energy system as whole is addressed – not only the process of generation, 
transmission and distribution, but the patterns of energy consumption as well.213 
 
Energy is consumed in a very wasteful manner. This situation is primarily based on 
out-dated assumptions on the availability of conventional energy resources. It is 
projected that only 37% of global primary energy is converted in useful energy, 
conversely nearly 66% of primary energy is wasted.214 Based on this projection, 
experts estimate the potential for EE gains in developed countries between 15%-35%, 
while the EE potential in developing countries even exceeds 40%.215 The realization 
of this huge potential depends on the implementation of a sustainable EE policy that 
should address among other issues energy consumption in housing, lighting and 
electronic appliances. 
 
The use of energy in buildings for several purposes including for heating and cooling, 
ventilation, lighting and water heating accounts for a large share of the total end use of 
energy. On the global level, commercial and residential buildings account for roughly 
40% of total end use of energy.216 It is estimated that EE building design can reduce 
this figure by 50% alone with measures that are already feasible today.217 An 
outstanding example for EE building design is the so-called Passive House 
Movement.218 To qualify as a passive house, the highest technological EE standards 
                                            
212 Bristow, Energy Efficiency: The Essential Partner of Renewables, in Mendonca (quoted as 
Bristow, Energy Efficiency), at 19. 
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214 Eberhard Jochem et al, Chapter 6: Energy End-use Efficiency, in World Energy Assessment: 
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http://www.undp.org/energy/weapub2000.htm (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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216 IEA, Energy Efficiency Requirements in Building Codes, Energy Policies for New Buildings, 
March 2008 (quoted as IEA 2008), at 10, available at, 
http://www.iea.org/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=2042 (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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must be applied in regard of heating and cooling, walls and windows as well as for 
insulations: it will typically have more windows on the south face to enable capture of 
the sun’s heat; it will use solar thermal collectors to heat water; and the ventilation 
system will use the warm outgoing air to heat the cooler incoming fresh air or vice 
versa.219  
 
Since the high EE standards of the passive house are not yet feasible and thus do not 
have a high market penetration, the introduction of mandatory EE building codes is 
essential for the implementation of a sound EE policy. EE Building Codes regularly 
stipulate provisions on exterior building design, heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning, RE and installed equipment and zoning of buildings as well as 
integrated design.220 Today, mandatory EE requirements exist in nearly all OECD 
countries and are extensively promulgated in the developing world.221 
 
The EE of electronic appliances is an additional key area where large end-use savings 
can be made. Electric appliances use 30% of all electricity generated in OECD 
countries, producing 12% of all energy-related CO2 emissions.222 It is projected that 
the introduction of an appliance efficiency policy could achieve a reduction in 
emission of nearly 322 million tons of CO2 per year, which is equivalent to nearly 200 
gas-fired power stations.223 For instance, the energy used by electric appliances left on 
standby is enormous. Although the energy consumption of each appliance ranges 
between only 0.5 to 10 watts on standby mode, it is projected that these inactive 
device all together account for 5% to 10% of the total electricity used in most homes, 
which translates into roughly 1% of global carbon dioxide emissions.224 To adequately 
tackle this issue it is essential to introduce minimum EE appliance standards.225  
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Another major approach to increase EE is the phasing-out of the incandescent lighting 
bulb (GLS) and the introduction of the more efficient fluorescent lamp (CFL). In 
general, grid-based electricity lighting accounts for 19% of total global electricity 
consumption which is equivalent to 900 322 million tones of CO2 per year.226 With 
these figures as the backdrop, it is imperative to reduce the energy consumption of 
lighting. Almost all European countries and many developing countries have 
introduced formal policies to phase-out GLS lamps.227 Cuba was the first country 
phasing-out GLS lamps by implementing a dual approach that included an import ban 
and a country-wide program to exchange GLS lamps in 2006/2007.228 The rational 
behind such policies is the fact that CFLs use only a quarter of the energy of a GLS 
lamp for the equivalent light output and thus leads to very significant and cost 
effective energy savings.229 It is projected that for each million GLS lamps replaced, 
the respective national electricity demand reduces by 25 MW.230 
 
The three policy options presented above are only a selection out of many ways to 
increase EE in the residential, commercial and industrial sector. A recent analysis of 
the IEA provides the following overview (Figure 5.) of available EE policy options.231 
 
Figure 5. Energy Efficiency Policy Options 
Sector Energy Efficiency Policy Option 
Cross-sectoral • Measures for increasing investment in EE; 
• National EE strategies and targets; 
• Compliance, monitoring, enforcement and evaluation of EE 
measures, and 
• EE indicators. 
Buildings • Building Codes;  
• Passive Energy Houses and Zero Energy Buildings; 
• Policy package to promote EE in existing buildings; 
• Building Certification schemes, and 
                                            
226 IEA, Light´s Labor´s Lost – Policies for Energy-efficient Lightning, 2006 (quoted as IEA 2006), 
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• EE improvements in glazed areas. 
Appliances and equipment • Mandatory energy performance requirements or labels; 
• Low-power modes, including standby power for electronic 
appliances, and 
• Energy performance test standards and measurement 
protocols.  
Lightning • Best practice lighting and the phase-out of incandescent 
bulbs, and 
• Ensuring least-cost lightning in non-residential buildings and 
the phase-out of in efficient fuel based lightning. 
Transport • Fuel efficient tires; 
• Mandatory fuel efficiency standards for light-duty vehicles; 
• Fuel economy of heavy-duty vehicles, and  
• Eco-driving. 
Industry • Collection of high quality EE data for industry; 
• Energy performance of electric motors; 
• Assistance in developing energy management capability, and 
• Policy packages to promote EE in small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
Energy utilities • Utility end-use EE schemes. 
Source: IEA 2007. 
 
Eventually, the design of a national EE policy must necessarily consider the so-called 
“Jevons Paradox”, which implies that increase in EE can result in increased energy 
consumption, since the lowering of demand reduces the cost of energy and thereby 
encourages greater consumption.232 The essence of this idea is that as long as the 
profit of utility companies is related to the energy they sell, they will have no interest 
in reducing energy consumption, because this would in turn diminish their profits. 
Therefore, if power companies would no longer generate profits in relation to their 
output, they would no longer be motivated to increase energy consumption.233 For 
instance, if a utility company would be contracted to provide the heating and lighting 
for a building, for a certain period and a fixed rate, it would have an incentive reduce 
energy consumption, since doing so would reduce costs.234 The decoupling of energy 
consumption from the profits of the utility companies would be a milestone of an 
increase in EE. However, such a reform would require a fundamental restructuring of 
the entire energy market, which will be very hard to achieve on the short-term.  
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All in all, the implementation of a sound EE policy may be difficult to achieve in an 
environment that lacks the awareness for the necessity of energy reduction in 
consumption, due to unrealistically low energy prices and outdated perceptions about 
the availability of conventional energy resources. Nevertheless, the large potential of 
EE and the related energy cost reduction and other economical gains provides an 
overwhelming argument for policy-makers to create and enforce a sustainable EE 
policy. 
 
D. Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the barriers regularly 
facing the promotion of RE & EE, the various policy options to overcome those 
barriers and their respective impact on the creation of a domestic market for RE & EE. 
In addition to these specific design options the following general considerations must 
be included in order to provide a comprehensive framework for the subsequent 
analysis of the current and prospective approach to the promotion of RE & EE in 
Egypt (Chapter V). 
 
All the policy options presented in this chapter tackle specific barriers to the 
promotion of RE & EE. However, their individual impact is very limited when 
implemented in isolation, since the barriers for RE & EE are diffuse but at the same 
inter-dependent. Therefore, any sound and sustainable RE & EE policy requires 
acknowledging the interdependencies between the barriers and the various policy 
tools:235 
• Making RE mandatory without changing subsidies and electricity prices would 
send improper price signals to consumers, 
• Making RE mandatory without providing information and education would 
ensure that consumers remain uninformed about EE technologies and practice, 
• Making RE mandatory without funding EE would force utilities to procure 
more electricity supply, 
•  Removing subsidies does little to eliminate the market power already afforded 
to conventional energies, 
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• More accurate electricity prices without low-income assistance will hurt poor 
families the most, and 
• Distributing information about RE & EE without internalizing the cost of 
negative externalities erodes the incentive for EE investment. 
 
When considering these reciprocal effects it is obvious that an effective and 
comprehensive approach would require treating the available policy options as 
complementary, rather than as isolated tools that stand in competition to each other.236 
There is no such thing as one magic policy bullet. Only the implementation of a 
comprehensive policy can ensure that RE & EE will realize their full potential. 
Furthermore, consistent and long-term RE & EE policies are important to ensure the 
healthy development of the emerging sector.237 The consistency of policy is crucial to 
guarantee steady growth and stability in the market, to develop a domestic industry, to 
reduce the investment risk and thereby to provide easy access to financing for RE & 
EE projects.238 For instance, when a certain incentive expires, the interest of investors 
could cease and thus, markets and industries could vanish.239 It is imperative to avoid 
such stop-and-go in RE & EE policies in order to anticipate uncertainties and market 
re-orientation which are risky and costly for project developers. 
 
A successful RE & EE policy will require consistent long-term commitment of 
governments and the implementation of a comprehensive regulatory framework. It 
will be the aim of Chapter V to analyze whether the current and prospective Egyptian 
framework for the promotion of RE & EE complies with these requirements. 
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IV. Egypt  
Egypt is located in Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Libya 
and the Gaza Strip and includes the Asian Sinai Peninsula. And it is bordered in the 
South by Sudan. The following chapter will provide an overview on the impact of 
climate change for Egypt, the Egyptian electricity market and Egyptian energy 
situation. The objective is to establish an empirical fundament for the subsequent in-
depth legal policy analysis of the current and prospective regulatory framework for 
RE and EE in Egypt. 
 
 
Figure 6. Map of Egypt (Source:www.weltkarte.com.). 
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A. Social, Political and Economic Background  
The Arab Republic of Egypt was established as a presidential republic after the 
revolution of 1953 and has been governed by President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak 
since October 1981.240 President Mubarak has been re-confirmed in office for the fifth 
time during the first ever multi-candidate elections in 2005.241  Mubarak´s National 
Democratic Party (NDP)242 is the dominant actor within the officially multiparty 
political system. The continuity and stability of the Egyptian system is, further, 
enhanced by the prevailing state of emergency that is operative pursuant to Law No. 
162/1958 since 1967. The Emergency Law empowers the Egyptian government to 
suspend basic liberties in regard to demonstrations and strikes or the freedom of press 
in the name of national security. Thus, it attracted massive critique by human rights 
activist for posing an imminent threat to democracy at large in Egypt.243 Nevertheless, 
Egypt must be characterized as one of the world´s most stolid, but capable 
authoritarian regimes.244 
 
Egypt has a population of approximately 80 million with an average growth rate of 
2%.245 The official language in Egypt is Arabic.246 However, English and French are 
widely understood by educated classes and used in business, government and 
diplomacy. Islam (mostly Sunni) is the predominant faith with 90% of the population 
adhering, whereas Coptic and other Christians make up the remaining 10%. 247 The 
urban population represents approximately 43% of the total population and the annual 
rate of urbanization is estimated at 1.8% for 2005-2010.248 
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With the appointment of Ahmed Nazif as Prime Minister in 2004249, a liberal reform 
agenda was initiated. The reform included the establishment of a well-functioning 
foreign exchange market, a reduction of import tariffs, a reform of personal and 
corporate income taxes and the streamlining of corporate regulations as well as the 
privatization of the banking sector combined with a profound financial sector 
reform.250 The reform policies led to growth rates of 6.8% to 7.2% for 2006-2008. 
However, a declining growth rate of 5.0% is projected for 2010/2011, due to world 
economic crisis.251 The main components of the current Egyptian GDP are the 
agricultural (13.1%), industrial (37.7%) and service sectors (49.2%).   
 
Figure 7. GDP of Egypt 2004-2008  
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GDP (current 
prices billion 
USD) 
n.a. 89.68 107.48 130.47 162.28 
Source: World Bank Data. 
 
In 2008, total inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to USD 9.5bn in 
Egypt, while outflows aggregated to USD 1.9bn for the same year.252 Despite falling 
FDI inflows from USD 12bn in 2007 to USD 9.2bn in 2008, Egypt remains among the 
largest recipients of FDI in the region and at the same time has maintained its position 
as a leading regional economy for outward FDI.253 
 
Traditionally, Egypt is one of the closed allies of the USA in the Arab World and 
receives annually USD 2bn aid from the US, much of it as a result of the Camp David 
Accord in 1978.254 In 2004, Egypt implemented the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) 
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Protocol, which established designated geographic areas within Egypt and Israel that 
enjoy a duty free status with the USA provided the agreed upon Israeli component is 
satisfied.255 However, the ties with Europe are gaining priority. In June 2004 an 
Association Agreement between Egypt and the European Union came into force. It 
forms the legal basis governing the relations between Egypt and the EU and stipulates 
free trade arrangements for industrial goods, concessionary arrangements for trade in 
agricultural products and opens prospect for a greater liberalization of trade in services 
that gradually will lead to the establishment of a free trade area.256 Moreover, Egypt 
and the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding to enhance their strategic 
partnership on energy in 2008.257 Additionally, Egypt is member of World Trade 
Organization (WTO)258 and signed free and preferential trade agreements with Libya 
(1990), Syria (1991) and Tunisia (1998) as well as with Morocco (1998), Lebanon 
(1999), Jordan (1998) and Iraq (2001).259 In 2008, the main trade partners of Egypt 
were the European Union (34.4%), the USA (9.8%), and China (7.5%), Saudi Arabia 
(5%) and Japan (3.8%).260 
 
Notwithstanding Egyptian economic growth up to 7.2% in the past decade, wealth is 
not trickling through to the weakest parts of society. A reported 18.4% of the Egyptian 
population is still living below the poverty line, while 41.5% of income goes to the 
wealthiest 20% of the population.261 The comparison of these two indicators is 
evidence of the ever increasing gap between rich and poor in Egypt. Therefore, it is 
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not surprising that the latest Human Development Index of the UNDP ranks Egypt 
123rd out of 177 analyzed countries.262 Another major hazard for the Egyptian political 
system is the widespread corruption in the public sector, which is exemplified by rank 
111 of 180 in the 2009 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.263 
 
B. Climate Change in Egypt 
Egypt is especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, due its 
growing population, its limited fetile land and the economic concentration in coastal 
zones. Negative effects will concern agricultural productivity, water resources, human 
habitat and human health as well as the ecosystem at large. Any adverse effect on 
these issues will in turn affect Egypt´s national economy and in particular the energy, 
industry, and tourism sector.264 
 
The low lying Delta and the narrow valley of the Nile comprises only 5.5% of the area 
of Egypt, but accounts for over 95% of its population and its agriculture.265 Therefore, 
it is particularly alarming that the Mediterranean coast and the Nile Delta have been 
identified as most vulnerable to sea level rise and coastal erosion.266 It is projected that 
climate change will cause saline sea water to penetrate far into the northern Delta and 
will turn coastal lakes into saline lagoons, decrease natural fish supply, cause the 
disappearance of weed swamps and endanger proper functioning of infrastructure 
facilities directly exposed to the sea water.267 Moreover, water balance in the lakes 
will be affected contributing to a possible extension of the lake boundaries 
                                            
262 UNDP, Human Development Report 2009, Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and 
development, at 173, available at, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
263 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2009, available at, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table (last visited: 
24th June 2010).  
264 EEAA, Egypt State of the Environment Report 2008, September 2009 (quoted as EEAA 2008), at 
90; available at, 
http://www.eeaa.gov.eg/English/reports/SoE2009en/Egypt%20State%20of%20Environment%20Rep
ort.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
265 EEAA, The Arab Republic of Egypt: Initial National Communication on Climate Change, 
prepared for the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), June 1999 
(quoted as EEAA 1999), at j, available at, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/egync1.pdf (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
266 Id., j. 
267 Id., at 73-74. 
57 
 
southwards.268 Sea level rise constitutes in particular a massive peril for human habitat 
and settlements. In a scenario based on a sea level rise between 0.5 m to 1 m about 
30% of the city of Alexandria will be lost due to inundation, which would force 2 
million citizens to abandon their homes and would destroy 195,000 jobs constituting a 
total economic loss amounting to USD 35 billions.269 A scenario including a sea level 
rise of 0.5 m would respectively affect 33% of the employment in the City of Rosetta 
and a loss of employment in Port-Said amounting to 6,759 jobs causing economic loss 
in billions of dollars.270 It is expected that 2 million people will be forced to migrate 
from the Delta coastal areas. Such a scenario would have tremendous socio-economic 
consequences, especially in the cost of resettlement and political stability. 
 
The adverse impact of climate change on the Egyptian agricultural sector could be 
devastating for the national food supply and employment situation. Although the 
agricultural sector accounts for only 17.3% of the Egypt´s GDP, it provides the 
income-base for 50% of the population.271 However, the rapid growth of the country´s 
population and the limited area for agriculture requires Egypt to rely on food 
imports.272 Climate change is projected to decrease the national production of major 
crops (ranging from 11% for rice to 28% for soybeans) by 2050 compared with 
production under current climate conditions.273 At the same time temperature rise will 
increase water requirements and thereby decrease the crop water-use efficiency.274 
Therefore, climate change as projected will adversely affect crop production and will 
thereby increase Egypt´s reliance on costly food imports.275 
 
More than 95% of the Egyptian water budget is generated outside of its territory and 
provided only through the flow of the river Nile.276 In 2000, Egyptian water 
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consumption was estimated at about 70 km3 which is already in excess of the available 
resources.277 The key issue will be to close the increasing gap between the limited 
water supply and the escalating demand due to high population growth rates and the 
rise in the standard of living.278 Recent studies on water resources in Egypt provide 
only uncertain estimates on the impact of climate change on the flow of the Nile.279 
Nevertheless, water management actions such as improvement of rain harvesting 
techniques, increased abstraction of ground water, recycling of water, desalination of 
water and the efficiency of water use must be considered to combat Egypt´s 
vulnerability.280 
 
Furthermore, climate change related temperature rise will have negative effects on 
Egypt´s magnificent Red Sea coral reefs. Corals may bleach when exposed to elevated 
sea surface temperature. Although corals can recover from short term bleaching, 
prolonged bleaching can cause irreparable damage and eventually mortality.281 Long-
term damage to the natural wealth of the coral reefs could have a devastating effect on 
the tourism industry in Egypt.282  
 
In regard of human health, scientists generally differentiate between direct and 
indirect adverse impacts of climate change. Direct effects are not limited to heat 
phenomena such as heat strokes, but also include physiological disorders, skin cancer 
and eye cataracts.283 Indirect effects cover factors like demographic dislocations, 
socio-economic disruptions, ecological system impacts and air pollution.284 Even 
though this differentiation between direct and indirect adverse impacts on human 
health is generally acknowledged by scientists, studies on the correlation between 
climate change and human health are still unavailable for Egypt.285    
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Although Egypt´s contribution to GHG emissions is relatively limited with 0.59% of 
total global CO2 emission (ranking 27th) in 2006,286 the above-mentioned adverse 
impacts of climate change constitute a serious challenge for Egyptian policymakers. 
Considering Egypt´s growing population, its limited fertile land and its large area of 
desert as well as the economic concentration in coastal zones, the potential social and 
economic effects could be devastating for the country´s future.287 Combating and 
adapting to climate change should be, thus, one of the major concerns of Egyptian 
policies during the next decades, in particular the mitigation of climate change 
through the implementation of sound RE & EE policy. 
 
C. The Egyptian Electricity Market 
The Egyptian electricity market is state owned and is to-date organized in a single 
buyer form. The Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC) owns 90% of the 
installed capacities, whereas three private projects contribute with 9% and the 
remaining 1% is made up by wind farms and small isolated units.288 
 
The only company licensed for extra high voltage and high voltage electricity 
transmission is the Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company (EETC). It purchases 
electric energy from all generation companies and in turn sells it to the nine 
distribution companies with 24 million households, 85 extra high voltage and high 
voltage consumers and to some of the 12 private distribution companies (less than 1% 
of the market).289 
 
The Egyptian electric energy market is constantly growing. In 2008, the peak load 
reached 21,330 MW and total electrical energy generation amount to 131,040 GWh, 
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which constituted a growth rate of 4.7% in comparison to 2007/2008.290 For the same 
year, total installed capacities reached 23,502 MW of which steam power stations 
accounted for 48.8%, combined cycle power plants for 30.5%, hydropower stations 
for 11.9%, gas-fired steam power plants for 7% and wind farms for 1.8%.291 
Additionally, Egypt has 35 decentralized power plants, including one wind farm in 
Hurghada (5 MW), that are not connected to the national grid with a combined 
installed capacity of 256.7 MW.292 
 
This following section will identify the key players of the Egyptian electricity market, 
the status of the national and international electricity grid as well as the Egyptian 
electricity prices and respective subsidies. 
 
1. Electricity Market Actors 
The Egyptian electricity market is structured and organized under the oversight of the 
Ministry of Electricity and Energy (MOEE). Key market actors include the Egyptian 
Electricity Holding Company (EEHC), the Egyptian Electric Utility and Consumer 
Protection Agency (EEUCPRA) and the New & Renewable Energy Authority 
(NREA). 
 
a) Ministry of Electricity and Energy 
The Ministry of Electricity and Energy 293 was first established in 1964 and is 
organized by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1103 of 1974 which is amended by 
Presidential Decrees No. 360 of 1976, No. 14 of 1978 and No. 131 of 1981.  
 
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1103 of 1974 it is the objective of the MOEE to 
provide electric energy for consumers in Egypt. For that purpose the competences of 
the ministry include the following: 
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• Development and implementation of a general national strategy for energy 
generation, 
• Transmission and distribution of electricity utilizing high tech and the latest 
technological developments, 
• Suggestions of the electric energy prices for all different voltage levels and the 
various consumer groups, 
• Supervision of studies and execution of essential electric energy projects, 
• Publication of statistics and data related to electric energy production and 
consumption, and 
• Provision of technical services and consultancies in the field of electric energy 
generation for Arab and international clients. 
 
Moreover, the MOEE supervises the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, the New 
& Renewable Energy Authority and the Hydro Power Projects Executive Authority as 
well as the Rural Electrification Authority and the Atomic Energy Authority.  
 
Figure 8. Organizational Chart of Agencies and Companies affiliate to the Ministry of 
Electricity and Energy (Source: Official Website of the MOEE). 
 
Due the focus on RE and EE and the respective relevance of the companies and 
governmental agencies affiliated to the MOEE to this issue, the explanations below 
will be limited to the competences and responsibilities of the EEHC, the EEUCPRA 
and the NREA. 
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b) Egyptian Electricity Holding Company 
The mission of the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC)294  is to provide 
electric energy to all kind of costumers taking into consideration environmental, social 
and economic indicators as well as the terms and conditions set by the EEUCPRA.295 
 
The predecessor of the EEHC was the Egyptian Electricity Authority (EEA), which 
was established by Law No. 12 of 1976 and had the exclusive right to produce 
transmit and distribute electricity throughout Egypt. Only in 1996, this exclusive right 
of the EEA was eliminated by virtue of Law No. 100 permitting the private sector to 
generate electricity on an Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) basis. 
 
In 2000, the EEA was transformed into a state owned Egyptian joint stock company 
by virtue of Law No. 164 modifying Law No. 12 of 1976 with the name EEHC. The 
EEHC owns, coordinates and supervises the activities of its affiliated companies in the 
field of production, transmission and distribution (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Organizational Chart of the EEHC and its affiliated production, 
transmission and distribution companies (Source: Official Website of the EEHC). 
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The purpose of the six Egyptian electricity production companies is the generation of 
electric energy from the annexed power plants, including management, operation and 
maintenance of these plants.296 They sell the generated electricity to the Egyptian 
Electricity Transmission Company (extra high and high voltages) and to the respective 
distribution companies (medium and low voltages).297 Additionally, the production 
companies implement new power plant projects, conduct research and studies and 
carry out any other activities in the framework of the company´s objectives.298 
 
The Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company (EETC) purchases electricity from 
the production companies and resells it to extra high and high voltages consumers.299 
For that purpose, it manages, operates and maintains the extra high and high voltages 
electricity grid.300 Moreover, it implements electric power transmission projects, 
including interconnection projects for the exchange of electricity with other power 
grids connected to the Egyptian grid.301 
 
The objective of the nine distribution companies is the distribution and selling of 
medium and low voltages to their costumers.302 To achieve this goal, distribution 
companies manage, operate and maintain the Egyptian medium and low voltages 
grid.303 The distribution companies have a total of approximately 24 million 
consumers, whereas the residential (71.5%), commercial (5.9%) and industry (2.5%) 
sectors make up for the vast majority of the customers.304 
 
Although NREA is ordinarily a R&D facility, it acts as the operator of the Zafarana 
wind farm and sells the generated energy for a “reasonable price” to the EEHC.305 For 
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future RE projects, the EEHC will be as well the counterpart in power purchase 
agreements for private developers.306 Furthermore the EEHC cooperates with NREA 
in the field of RE by taking into in consideration RE contributions for its electricity 
generation and network planning.307 The main role of the EEHC is to coordinate and 
monitor the activities of its 16 (+ NREA) affiliated companies to improve and develop 
their technical, operational and financial performances in order to optimize the 
utilization of all energy sources and to establish a profit oriented economic activity.308 
 
c) Egyptian Electric Utility and Consumer Protection Regulatory Agency 
(EEUCPRA) 
The Egyptian Electric Utility and Consumer Protection Regulatory Agency 
(EEUCPRA)309 was established by Presidential Decree No. 326 of 1997 and 
subsequently reorganized by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 339 of 2000.  
Pursuant to Article II of Decree No. 339 of 2000, it is the objective of the EEUCPRA 
to regulate, monitor and control all matters related to electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution as well as consumption, in order to ensure constant 
electricity supply at suitable prices and the protection of the environment by taking 
into consideration the interest of all stakeholders of the Egyptian electricity market. 
Additionally, Article II s. 2 stipulates the objective of creating an enabling 
environment for market-based competition in the framework of existing laws and to 
avoid the creation of commercial monopolies in the energy sector. 
 
In order to achieve these objectives, Article III of Decree No. 339 of 2000 
promulgates the following responsibilities and delegated powers to the EEUCPRA: 
• Ensuring that all activities of electric power generation, transmission 
and distribution and sale, are carried out in compliance with the laws 
and regulations in effect in the Arab Republic of Egypt, especially 
those relating to environmental protection, 
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• Reviewing regularly the plans arranged for the electric power 
consumption, production, transmission and distribution, including the 
investments necessary for such plans, so as to ensure availability of 
power for various usage in conformity with state policies, 
• Setting regulations that ensure lawful competition in the field of 
electric power     production and distribution in the best interests of the 
consumer, 
• Making sure that the cost of power production, transmission and 
distribution guarantees the interests of all parties involved in these 
activities, 
• Ensuring realization of fair return to the electric utilities to ensure 
continuity of the activities and a sound financial position thereof; 
• Reviewing the policy and procedures of the National Energy Control 
Center to ensure compliance with the optimum operation standards and 
technical performance levels in coordination with the Egyptian 
Electricity Holding Company framework and in the best interests of all 
parties within the Electric Utility, 
• Following up on the availability of technical, financial and economic 
capabilities for the Electric Utility, 
• Ensuring the quality of the technical and administrative services 
provided by the Electric Utility to the consumers, 
• Publishing such information, reports, and recommendations that assist 
the Electric Utility and the consumers to be aware of their rights and 
responsibilities and of the role played by the Agency for the Electrical 
Utility with full transparency, 
• Investigating consumer complains to ensure protection of their interests 
and settlements of any disputes that may arise among the parties’ 
involved in the activity, and 
• Issuing licenses for the construction, management, operation, and 
maintenance of the power generation, transmission, distribution, and 
sale projects. 
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EEUCPRA´s Board of Directors is appointed by the MOEE and consists of ten 
members, three members representing the electric energy sector, three members 
experienced practitioners that are not employed in the public sector and four members 
representing consumers (Article VI of Decree No. 339 of 2000). The key external 
functions of the Board of Directors pursuant to Article VII of Decree No. 339 of 2000 
include the following: 
• Issuing decisions for granting, renewing and monitoring licenses for the 
construction, management, operation, and maintenance of the power 
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale projects, 
• Reviewing the conditions required to be provided in agreements 
relating to the use by any Electric Utility, 
• Approving the decisions related to the settlement of disputes that may 
arise among the electric sector entities or between the electric sector 
entities and the consumers, 
• Settlement of complaints pertaining to activities contradicting with 
recognized rules of lawful competition among Electric Utility parties 
and taking necessary actions to avoid causes of complaints, and 
• Determining the fees of licenses generated and services rendered by the 
Agency to electricity sector entities.  
 
The budget of the EEUCPRA is comprised of funds allocated in the state budget, 
proceeds paid for obtaining or renewing licenses and for services rendered by the 
agency as well as of returns of its own investment and donations, allowances and 
grants that do not contradict its objectives (Article IV of Decree No. 339 of 2000). 
 
d) New & Renewable Energy Authority 
The New & Renewable Energy Authority (NREA)310 was established pursuant to Law 
No. 102 of 1986 with the objective of bundling the Egyptian activities in the field of 
RE and EE. The mandate of NERA is the planning and the implementation of RE and 
EE programs in cooperation with the competent national and international 
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institutions.311 For that purpose the responsibilities and competences of NREA include 
the following:312 
• RE resources assessment, 
• Research, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation of the of 
the different RE technologies focusing on solar, wind and biomass, 
•  Implementation of RE projects, 
• Proposing the Egyptian standard specifications for renewable energy 
equipment & systems and conducting tests to evaluate their 
performances, under the prevailing conditions in Egypt, hence issuing 
respective licensing certificates to that effect, 
• Rendering of consultancy services in the field of RE, 
• Technology transfer and development of local manufacturing of RE 
equipment, and  
• Education, training and information dissemination.  
 
NREA is the operator of all wind farms in Egypt, including the demonstration projects 
in Matrouh and Hurghada as well as the grid connected wind farms in Zafarana on the 
Gulf of Suez.313 However, NREA is increasingly trying to attract private investment 
for the RE sector. Therefore, it supports private investment by providing resource 
assessment, the necessary data for feasibility studies and technical support for 
potential project developers as well as information on reputable domestic partner 
companies.314 
 
Furthermore, NREA has established a national center for testing and certifying RE 
equipment and systems.315 Eventually, NREA will run two training facilities, one in 
Cairo and one in Hurghada, to comply with its mandate in regard of training and 
information dissemination. The training program is to include general awareness 
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courses, special programs for engineers and technicians and specific training programs 
for NREA staff as well as summer training for students.316 
 
2. Electricity Grid 
Egypt has an electrification rate of 99% with only some 121 remote communities not 
yet connected to the national grid.317 The Egyptian extra high and high voltage 
transmission grid is supervised by the EETC and consists of 41,016 km. It is divided 
into six geographical zones: Cairo, Canal, Delta, Alexandria and West Delta, Middle 
Egypt and Upper Egypt.318 
 
Figure 10. Key figures of the Egyptian transmission grid 
 500 kV 400 kV 220 kV 132 kV 66 kV 33 kV 
Transformer capacity 
(MVA) 
7 765 - 29 688 3 467 36 222 1 774 
Total transmission 
lines (km) 
2 479 33 15 647 2 504 17 515 2 838 
Source: EEHC Annual Report 2008/2009. 
 
The medium and low voltage grids are owned and controlled by the respective 
distribution company. In total the distribution grid consists of 147,143 km of medium 
voltage and 234,898 km of low voltage lines, whereas distribution transformers 
capacities amount to 53,664 MVA.319 
 
On the regional and international level Egypt makes profound efforts to improve its 
energy trade balance by increasing the electrical interconnection to Arab, African and 
European countries. To date, the interconnections between Egypt - Libya (May 1998), 
Egypt - Jordan (October 1998) as well as the interconnection between Syria - Jordan 
(March 2000) and Syria – Lebanon (April 2009) have been completed, which has led 
to the interconnection between the transmission networks of Syria, Jordan, Libya and 
Egypt.320  
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Figure 11. Electricity trade balance between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Libya and Lebanon 
2008/2009  
 Libya Jordan Syria Lebanon 
Voltage (kV) 220 400 400 400 
Exported energy 
(GWh) 
70 638 186 128 
Imported energy 
(GWh) 
111 13 2 - 
Source: EEHC Annual Report 2008/2009) 
 
Egypt is further aiming to increase the connectivity between the Arab Maghreb 
Countries through upgrading the interconnection with Libya to 500/400 kV.321 
Moreover, a feasibility study for an interconnection between the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt has been conducted. Activating these plans would further increase 
the connectivity between all Arab countries.322  
 
In regard of an Africa electrical interconnection, a feasibility study has been 
conducted for an interconnection between Egypt and the Inga Dam in Congo, passing 
through Central Africa and Sudan, to transmit hydro power from Inga to North Africa 
and Europe. Moreover, in the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative (Egypt, Ethiopia 
and Sudan)323 a recent feasibility study projected a possible export of 3200 MW from 
Ethiopia to Sudan and Egypt.324 
 
Eventually, Egypt is seeking in the long run an interconnection to the European 
electricity market. Links have been already established through the connection 
between Syria and Turkey in the east and Morocco and Spain in the west.325 
Nevertheless, discussions are on the way for a direct interconnection between Egypt 
and Greece with the long-term objective of exporting electricity from RE to the 
European market.326 
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3. Electricity Prices and Subsidies 
Electric energy prices in Egypt are among the lowest in the world, due the high 
subsidies of the Egyptian government.327 The respective energy tariff structure is set 
by the Egyptian authorities in a non-transparent manner. In principle, the prices of all 
voltage levels for the residential and commercial sector are set by the MOEE (see 
Figure.13). However, electricity prices for specific industries are set by virtue of a 
Prime Minister Decree (see Figure. 12). Generally, the Egyptian electrical energy 
tariff structure is set in respect to the different voltage levels (extra high, high, 
medium and low) considering the costs of installation and operation as well as the 
corresponding costs of the transmission and distribution networks. At the same time 
the purpose of the consumption is considered by differentiating between the tariff for 
residential and commercial use from those applicable to the agricultural, industrial and 
public sector.  
 
Figure 12. Electricity prices applied to specific industries pursuant to Prime Minister Decree 
No. 446/2009 
 Extra High voltage 
(220/ 132 kV) 
High voltage 
(220/132 kV) 
Medium voltage 
energy intensive 
Industries 
Medium voltage 
other industries 
 Energy 
intensive328 
Other Energy 
intensive 
Other Demand 
charge 
Energy 
rates 
Demand 
charge 
Energy 
rates 
€ 
ct/kWh 
2.52 1.73 3.06 2.10 1.30 4.17 1.18 2.87 
Pt/kWh 20.2 13.9 24.5 16.8 10.4 
EGP/kw-
month 
33.4 9.5 
EGP/kw-
month 
23 
Source: EEHC, Annual Report 2008/2009 
 
For the first time since 1992, several electricity tariffs were raised by an average of 
8.6% in 2004 and subsequently increased by 5% for the following five years. In total, 
electricity tariffs have been increased by an average of 10% till 2008.329 Pursuant to 
the Egyptian government this tariff increase is justified by the constantly high growth  
                                            
327 GTZ 2009, supra note 302, at 181. 
328 The definition of the MOEE for “energy intensive industries” includes the following sectors: 
Glass, Ceramic, Chemicals, Steel, Cement, Fertilizer, Aluminum, Copper and Petrochemicals. 
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rate of demand, the increase of 
investment costs for the construction of 
new power plants and networks and the 
devaluation of the Egyptian Pound in 
comparison to international leading 
currencies as well as by the increase of 
thermal power generation in Egypt.330 
Only the tariffs applied to the first 
segment of residential consumption (up 
to 50 kWh, representing 23% of 
residential costumers) remained 
unchanged at 5 Pt/kWh since 1993, while 
the actual service cost for this segment 
amounted to 18.62 Pt/kWh in 2008.331 
However, all other segments of 
residential consumption up to 350 
kWh/month are subsidized by the 
Egyptian government representing 98% 
of residential costumers.332 In total, 
electricity subsidies reached EGP 4.3bn 
in 2008 (EGP 2.9bn only for the 
residential sector).333 These direct 
subsidies to the electricity price must be 
differentiated from the subsidies already 
granted for oil and natural gas that still 
constitue the main inputs in the Egyptian 
electricty production.334  
Figure 13. Electricity Tariffs in Egypt 2008 
 € ct/kWh Pt/kWh 
Very high 
voltage 
(220/132 kV)  
0.59 - 3.40 4.7 - 27.3 
High voltage 
(66/33 kV) 
1.41 - 1.96 11.34 - 15.7 
Medium & low voltage  
≥ 500 KW 
Demand 
Charge 
(EGP/kW-
month) 
1.18 9.5 
Energy rate 2.67 21.4 
Medium & low voltage  
≤ 500 KW 
Agriculture 1.40 11.2 
Annual charge 
per fedan for 
irrigation 
(EGP) 
 135.2 
Other 
purposes 
 25.0 
Residential (kWh/month) 
0 – 50 0.62 5 
51 – 200 1.37 11 
201 – 350 2.00 16 
351 – 650 2.99 24 
651 – 1000 4.86 39 
≥ 1000 5.99 48 
Commercial (kWh/month) 
0 – 100 2.99 24 
101 – 250 4.49 36 
251 – 600 5.74 46 
601 – 1000 7.23 58 
≥ 1000 7.48 60 
Public 
lighting 
5.11 41.2 
Source: EEHC, Annual Report 2008/2009. 
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333 Id., at 44. 
334 World Bank, Egypt – Toward a more Effective Social Policy: Subsidies and Social Safety Net, 
December 2005 (quoted World Bank 2005), at 46, available at, 
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In 2008, financial subsidies for energy products were estimated at EGP 61.7bn.335 In 
total, direct energy subsidies for electricity prices and energy products, can be 
estimated at approximately EGP 66bn per annum. Therefore, any reform of subsidies 
for oil and gas products would in turn implicate far-reaching consequences for the cost 
structure of electricity prices.336 
 
It is acknowledged that high energy subsidies are a major disincentive for EE, since 
they lead to excessive energy consumption that contributes to pollution and 
environmental degradation. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Ministry for Trade and 
Industry called to freeze energy prices again in 2010, after they have been flat in 2009 
at 2008 levels, in order to support domestic industries dealing with the consequences 
of the financial crisis.337 
 
D. The Egyptian Energy Situation 
The Egyptian energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels, which amount to 94% of 
primary energy demand with oil taking a share of 50.4% and natural gas accounting 
for 43.6% in 2004/2005.338 The rest is made up by hydropower at 4.75%, coal at 
1.05% and RE at 0.2% for the same year.339  
 
The primary energy demand of Egypt has increased annually by an average of 4.64% 
in the time frame from 1981/1982 to 2004/05.340 In regard of the analysis of the sector 
shares for the same period of time, final energy demand of the transportation sector 
had growth rates of 5.1% with a flat share of around 30%.341 The residential and 
commercial sector share increased from 17.82% to 22.02% with annual growth of 
                                                                                                                             
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/490023-
1171551075650/Egypt_PSIA_121605.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
335 Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Egypt (quoted as EIA, Country 
Analysis Brief: Egypt), at 2, available at, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Egypt/pdf.pdf (last visited: 
24th June 2010). 
336 World Bank 2005, supra note 330, at 46. 
337 JCEE News of 21st of December 2009 quoting Minister of Trade and Industry Rachid Mohamed 
Rachid, available at, http://www.jcee-eg.net/newsDetails.asp?newsID=182 (last visited: 24th June 
2010).  
338 Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 3. 
339 Id., at 3. 
340 Id., at 21. 
341 Id., at 21. 
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6.5%, while the industry share decreased from 50% to 40.7%, due to technological 
advancement.342 It is projected that the Egyptian demand for oil and gas products will 
reach 117 million tons (mtoe) per year by 2021/2022.343  
 
The following section will provide an overview on the current status and potential of 
the various energy sources in Egypt including conventional energy (oil, natural gas 
and coal), renewable energy (hydropower, wind, solar, biomass) as well as an outlook 
of the recently re-launched Egyptian nuclear energy program. 
 
1. Conventional Energies 
Egypt is a significant oil producer and a rapidly growing producer of natural gas. 
Additionally, the Suez Chanel and the Sumed Pipeline are strategic routes for Persian 
Gulf Oil shipments, making Egypt an important transit corridor. Considering the fact 
that oil and natural gas satisfy 94% of Egypt’s primary energy demand, it is evident 
that fossil fuels will remain the key to any Egyptian energy policy in the next decades. 
Nevertheless, any sustainable Egyptian energy strategy must consider the finite 
availability of conventional energy resources and the corresponding increase in global 
market prices. 
 
a) Oil 
Different studies expect Egypt to become a net importer of oil in the near future, since 
domestic demand continues to grow while production is declining.344 Proven Egyptian 
oil reserves amount to 3.7 billion barrels, or 0.3% of world reserves.345 However, 
Egyptian oil production is declining from a peak of around 980,000 barrels per day 
(bbl/d) in 1995 to 664,000bbl/d in 2007, less than 1% of world production.346  
 
                                            
342 Id., at 22. 
343 Id., at 22. 
344 Id., at 12; IEA, World Energy Outlook 2005, Middle East and North Africa Insights (quoted as 
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Demand for petroleum products is rising in Egypt. After being relatively flat since 
1999 with 560bbl/d, domestic demand reached 660bbl/d in 2007.347 The main reason 
for this rapid increase in domestic consumption is the high level of Egyptian subsidies 
for oil products. Government subsidies to petroleum products increased from EGP 
14.3bn in 2004 to EGP 62.7 billion in 2008, whereas the subsidies for 2008 were 
71.3% higher than those that had been projected for the previous year at EGP 
36.6bn.348 
 
Egyptian oil production is allocated in four major areas: the Gulf of Suez, the Western 
Desert, the Eastern Desert and the Sinai Peninsula with the Gulf of Suez accounting 
for 50% of the Egyptian production.349 The last major discovery of oil reserves was 
the Saqqara oil field in 2003, which is estimated to contain reserves of 80 million 
barrels and went online in May 2008.350  
 
International oil companies play a key role in the field of exploration and production 
in the Egyptian oil sector. Operations are traditionally structured on a production 
sharing basis with a domestic stated owned entity.351 Oil from the Gulf of Suez is 
produced by the Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company (Grupco) under a Production 
Sharing Agreement between BP and the Egyptian General Petroleum Company 
Corporation (EGPC).352 The second largest producer of oil is Petrobel a joint venture 
between EGPC and the Italian company Agip. Other major companies operating in 
Egypt include Badr el Din Petroleum Company (EGPC and Shell), Suez Oil Company 
(EGPC and Deminex) and El Zaafarana Oil Company (EGPC and British Gas).353 
Although many international oil companies are operating in the Egyptian oil sector, 
many of the products are not of international standard – e.g. gasoline tends to be off a 
relatively low octane number and high sulphur content.354  
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b) Natural Gas 
Egypt has proven gas reserves of 66 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) that amount to over 1% of 
the world total.355 In 2006, Egypt produced approximately 1.9 Tcf and consumed in 
the same period of time 1.3 Tcf of natural gas.356 The IEA projects that that Egypt´s 
proven gas reserves will double between 2005 and 2030.357 
 
Power plants continue to dominate Egypt´s domestic gas demand with 63% of the 
market share, while industry and the energy sector´s own consumption as well as 
transport and residential consumption make up the remainder.358 It is, however, the 
declared objective of the Egyptian government to allocate one third of the proven gas 
reserves for domestic needs, the second third for long term strategic requirements and 
the remaining third for medium term export commitments.359  
 
Due to major recent discoveries and the continued expansion of the Arab Gas pipeline 
(see below), Egypt is on the way to becoming a leading supplier of natural gas 
throughout the Mediterranean region. Despite increasing domestic gas demand, 
Egypt´s net exports are projected to increase to 19 bcm by 2010 and 28 bcm by 
2030.360 
 
The Nile Delta region and the Western Desert are the most important gas exploration 
and production areas in Egypt.361 The Abu Qir, Badreddin and Abu Madi fields in the 
Nile Delta account for roughly 50% of Egypt´s gas production. Other sources include 
Port Fuad, South Temsah, Wakah, Rosetta and the Scarab/Saffron fields as well as the 
recently discovered Satis field found by BP and Eni in early 2008.362 Nevertheless, the 
most important national gas areas are the Obeiyed and Khalda fields in the Western 
Desert, since they have comparably low development and operating costs due to an 
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expanding network of pipelines and processing plants that allow for quick transport 
upstream to Alexandria via a 180 mile pipeline.363  
 
Egyptian gas exports are facilitated by the Arab Gas Pipeline that currently connects 
Egypt to Jordan and Syria and is expected to export some 33.2 billion cubic feet (bcf) 
rising to 77.3 bcf in 2013.364 Syria has signed an agreement with Turkey to connect 
the pipeline to the Turkish grid for use in 2011 and to extend it into Europe for exports 
to Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungry. Moreover, policymakers are currently 
discussing an extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline to Lebanon and Cyprus. The Arish-
Ashkelon gas pipeline to Israel became operational in 2008 and is expected to add 
another 60 bcf per year to Egypt´s gas exports.365 
 
Egyptian gas exports are further facilitated through the usage of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), which has immense technical advantages in regard of storage and 
transportation. Egypt became an LNG exporter in 2005 and reached an estimate of 
523 bcf of LNG in 2006.366 To date, two LNG terminals are operational in Egypt, one 
in Damietta with a production capacity of 240 bcf and one in Idku with a production 
capacity of 174 bcf.367 For the plant in Damietta a framework agreement has already 
been signed for operation of a second terminal by 2010/2011.368  
 
c) Coal 
Owing to the fact that coal resources are limited in Egypt, its share in the energy mix 
is relatively low with 1.05%.369 Egyptian coal reserves are estimated to amount to 27 
mtoe.370 Egypt only began mining in 1996 and has low quality coal that is primarily 
used as a raw material. Before 1996 Egypt depended totally on coal import. Today 
Egyptian coal production ranges between 0.025 and 0.6 mtoe a year. Nevertheless, 1 
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to 1.2 mtoe of coal is now being imported as feedstock for the Egyptian steel industry 
per annum.371 
 
2. Renewable Energies 
It is the declared objective of the Egyptian government to generate 20% of Egypt’s 
electricity through renewable energies by 2020.372 The natural prerequisites to reach 
this objective are excellent. Egypt is located in the North-African Sunbelt. Therefore, 
it is in a prime location to generate solar energy.373 Additionally, the wind conditions 
at the west coast of the Red Sea and in other parts of the country are among the best in 
the world constituting immense potential for the generation of wind energy.374 
 
The objective of the Egyptian government is, nonetheless, very ambitious: in the year 
2005 94% of Egypt’s energy supply was still generated through fossil fuels (50.4% oil 
and 43.6% oil). The seemingly high percentage of renewable energy of 4.95% is 
mainly generated through hydropower (from the Aswan High Dam). The portion from 
other sources of renewable energies for the same period of time covered only 0.2% of 
the primary energy demand (solar, wind, biomass and small-scale hydropower 
projects).375 The following section will provide an overview of the current status of 
renewable energies in Egypt and the respective energy potential, considering 
hydropower, wind and solar energy as well as biomass. 
 
a) Hydropower 
Hydropower generated from the High Dam and other waterfalls across the river Nile 
was a major energy source in Egypt. Although the first Nile dam in the area of Aswan 
was primarily used for water regulations, by 1967 the hydropower plant at the Aswan 
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High Dam started generating electricity for Egypt.376 In 1985, a further hydropower 
plant was put in operation in Aswan, followed by the Esna Barrage Hydropower 
Station in 1995. Today five hydropower plants are operating in Egypt with a joined 
capacity of 12,644 GWh: Aswan High Dam, Aswan I, Aswan II, Esna and Naga 
Hamady.377 
 
However, installed hydropower capacities could not keep up with the rapidly 
increasing Egyptian energy demand. Newly discovered oil and gas fields covered this 
gap in the 1980s with the relative importance of hydropower declining over the last 
25-30 years. While hydropower provided 13.2% of total primary energy demand in 
1981/1982, this figure went down to 4.75% in 2005/2006.378 Respectively hydropower 
provided 21% of Egypt´s electricity in 1995, whereas this share has come down to 
12% in 2005.379 This figures mirror the assessment of experts, namely that most of 
Egypt´s hydropower potential has already been exploited.380 Consequently, 
hydropower is projected to provide no more than 3% of total primary energy demand 
by 2020.381 
 
b) Wind Energy 
Egypt has excellent conditions for the generation of wind energy. In particular, the 
sparsely populated coastal regions with high and stable wind speeds are a prime 
location for the implementation of large wind energy projects. 
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The detailed Wind Atlas of Egypt was the result of a joint effort of NREA, the 
Egyptian Metrological Authority and the Danish UNEP research center Risø.382 The 
purpose of this project was the establishment of a solid meteorological assessment of 
wind resources all over Egypt.383 It not only provides a coherent and consistent 
overview of Egypt´s wind energy resources, but also the results of mesoscale 
modeling available in a database (numerical wind atlas) that can be employed for the 
assessment of site requirements for medium-seized and large wind farms.384 Although 
the Wind Atlas covers the entire country, particular attention was given to six 
promising regions: the Northwest Coast, the Northeast Coast, the Gulf of Aqaba, the 
Gulf of Suez, the Rea Sea and the Western Desert.385 
 
 
Figure 14. Wind resources map of Egypt (Source: Wind Atlas for Egypt, 2005). 
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The Wind Atlas documents the existence of very high wind resources in the Gulfs of 
Suez and Aqaba. Additionally, a large region in the Western Desert with fairly high 
resources was documented. A separate wind atlas only for the Gulf of Suez was 
completed in 2003.386 The Wind Atlas for Egypt is considered to be reliable source of 
information and is used as the basis for all governmental decisions related to wind 
energy project planning and feasibility studies.387  
 
In February 2008, the Supreme Council of Energy in Egypt adopted an ambitious plan 
committing to 20% of electricity generation from renewable energies by 2020, 
including 12% contribution from wind energy, translating into more than 7200 MW of 
grid-connected wind farms.388 The plan includes the objective of building 600 MW 
installed wind capacity per year by 2020. 389 The private sector is targeted to play a 
key role in achieving this goal. The Egyptian government anticipates that about 400 
MW/year will be developed by the private sector, while NREA will develop about 200 
MW/year.390 
 
The first demonstration wind farm was established in Hurghada on the Red Sea Coast 
in 1992. It includes 42 units with different technologies and capacities constructed in 
close cooperation with the USA, Denmark and Germany (pitch control, stall control, 
lattice and tubular towers as well as 100 and 300 kW units), with some components 
already locally manufactured such as blades, towers, mechanical and electrical 
joints.391 The demonstration farm produces only 5.2 MW; however it was connected 
to the local grid of Hurghada as early as 1993.392  
 
Large scale wind projects have been established in Zafarana at the Gulf of Suez. In 
Zafarana about 144 km2 were earmarked for NREA to implement large-scale grid 
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connected wind farms.393 In cooperation with Germany, Denmark, Japan and Spain 
the farm has been constructed and operated in stages since 2001 and produced the 
total capacity of 425 MW in 2009.394 In 2007/2008 the Zafarana wind farm generated 
840 GWh of electricity with an average capacity factor of 35.5% saving 466,000 tons 
of CO2.395 In the next stage, an additional 120 MW are planned in cooperation with 
Denmark, scheduled to be finalized in mid 2010, making Zafarana the largest wind 
farm in the Middle East and Africa with an installed capacity of 545 MW.396 
 
Figure 15. Installed Wind Capacity in Egypt: 2006-2009 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MW 230 310 390 430 
Source: World Wind Energy Report 2009. 
 
After passing the years of infancy focusing on resource assessments and 
demonstration projects, the Egyptian wind energy sector is growing in 2008/2009 with 
an annual rate of 10% and has established large-scale wind energy projects resulting 
in a total  installed capacities of 430 MW, ranking 26th worldwide.397 Though Egypt is 
on a good pathway to develop its high wind energy potential, the Egyptian wind sector 
would have to grow by over 100% per annum over the next ten years to reach the 
targeted electricity market share of 12% by 2020 (7200MW). To reach the goals of the 
Egyptian strategy for wind energy up to 2020, the Egyptian government earmarked 
additional 1300 km2 for extension north of the Gulf of El-Zayat.398 Furthermore, the 
Egyptian government designated 1.5 million acres of stated-owned land, located on 
the east and west of the Nile River in the governorates Beni Suef, El Minya and 
Assiut, for the construction and operation of wind farms that are supposed to 
contribute another 30,000 MW.399 In light of the excellent natural conditions for the 
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generation of wind energy in Egypt, the success of the national strategy for wind 
energy will highly depend on the implementation of a sound RE policy and 
corresponding legal framework. 
 
c) Solar Energy 
Egypt, being one of so-called North-African Sunbelt countries, is a natural location for 
the utilization of solar energy. A solar atlas issued by NREA in 1991 indicates that 
Egypt has extraordinarily high levels of solar concentration, ranging from 2000 
kwH/m2 in the north up to 2600 kwH/m2 in the south, whereas daily sunshine duration 
ranges between 9-11 hours with only a few cloudy days all over the year.400 Based on 
these excellent conditions in Egypt and the greater MENA region, solar energy is 
considered to have by far the biggest potential in comparison to all other sources of 
renewable energies.401 Therefore, Egypt must be recognized as a prime market for 
solar thermal application. Nevertheless, the Egyptian RE strategy is focusing 
predominantly on wind energy, neglecting the high solar energy potential. The reason 
for this surprising policy decision might be the high cost of solar energy projects with 
respect to the subsidized energy prices in Egypt.402 
 
The total Egyptian capacity of photovoltaic (PV) systems amount to 5.2 MW, of 
which 49% are used for communication, 22% for commercial advertisements on 
highways, 18% for lighting, 8% for water pumping and 2% for cathodic protection as 
well as 1% for desalination systems.403 Furthermore, the Egyptian government plans 
to use PV systems for the electrification of remote settlements that are not integrated 
into the national grid. For that purpose, NREA and the Italian Ministry of 
Environment signed a protocol of cooperation to electrify remote settlements in the 
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Matrouh Governorate with PV systems of about 43 kW, including 50 houses, 2 
medical clinic units, 3 mosques and 40 street lightning units.404 
 
The potential flagship of the Egyptian solar energy sector is, however, the Kuraymat 
Solar Thermal Power Plant (140 MW) located 90 km south of Cairo. The conventional 
part of the power plant (so-called Combined Cycle Island) consists of one gas turbine, 
one heat recovery steam generator and one steam turbine.405 The solar field (so-called 
Solar Island) consists of 1920 solar collectors with typically U shaped glass mirrors 
forming parabolic troughs.406  It is projected that the Solar Island will generate 20 
MW and thereby save 20,000 tons of CO2.407 The Kuraymat project is expected to be 
operational by October 2010.408 Additionally, two similar solar thermal power plants 
(each with 300MW) are planned to be installed during the period 2010 to 2020.409 
 
d) Biomass 
Biomass activities in Egypt have been focused mainly on small-scale biogas plants. 
Larger systems were limited or unsuccessful. Biomass resources contribute 
approximately 3.6 mtoe/year to Egypt´s primary energy generation.410 Most of the 
quantities used for energy purposes are burned in low efficiency (less than 10%) 
traditional stoves and furnaces.411 However, due to the lack of awareness of the 
biomass potential, many resources remain unused. For instance, the burning of about 
1.23 million tons of dry cotton stalks each year is evidence of  a great loss of energy, 
translating into 0.532 mtoe/year.412 
 
Today it is estimated that 800 small biogas digesters are installed in Egypt of which 
less than 50% are in operation, while the potential for small biogas plants is estimated 
                                            
404 Id., at 16. 
405 Id., at 14. 
406 Id., at 14. 
407 Id., at 15. 
408 Id., at 15. 
409 Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 38. 
410 Id., at 32. 
411 Id., at 32. 
412 Id., at 32. 
84 
 
as more than 1 million units.413 The main reason for this balance is the relatively high 
initial investment for small-scale biogas plants, approximately EGP 2500 combined 
with a payback period of 5-8 years, making it impossible for most rural Egyptian 
families to finance such an investment without subsidy or support.414 Thus, most small 
biogas plants were only installed as part of programs supported by donors or through a 
national subsidy scheme.415 
 
Large-scale biogas plants have not left the level of initial assessment and 
demonstration projects. Only a few large-scale biogas plants have been constructed in 
Egypt. One of the exemplary projects is a 170 m3 digester in the El-Giza Army Camp 
that was already constructed in the early 1980s.416 Today there are, however, no 
mentionable activities in the field of large-scale biogas plants in Egypt which can be 
associated with the failure to integrate biogas plants into the national grid.417 
Nevertheless, NREA is constantly trying to foster energy generation from biomass 
sources by providing state of the art research facilities in cooperation with 
international institutions.418 
 
3. Nuclear Energy 
Egypt is attempting to diversify its energy mix and to decrease its dependency from 
fossil fuels, not only through an increased utilization of renewable energies, but also 
through the usage of nuclear energy. After the Egyptian government had dropped a 
first nuclear energy program in the 1980s, it officially declared that it would relaunch 
a program for the peaceful usage of nuclear energies in September 2006. 419 Egyptian 
government officials project that 20% of Egypt´s energy demand could be satisfied 
through the utilization of nuclear energy.420 The international community welcomed 
                                            
413 Id., at 33. 
414 Id., at 33. 
415 Id., at 33. 
416 Id., at 34. 
417 Id., at 34. 
418 Id., at 34; NREA, Annual Report 2007/2008, supra note 9, at 16. 
419 BBC News, Egypt Unveils Nuclear Power Plan, 25 September 2006, available in the internet: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5376860.stm (last visited: 24th June 2010); Nasr 2009, supra 
note 15, at 1.  
420 Gamal Essam El-Din, A Nuclear Falling Out, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 963, 2009 (quoted as 
El-Din 2009), at 1, available in the internet: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/963/eg3.htm. 
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the Egyptian initiative and many countries have already offered support, including 
Russia, the EU and China.421 
 
The Egyptian nuclear project is planned for 2 stages of implementation. In the first 
stage studies of proposed locations for nuclear power plants will be updated. The 
second stage will include the evaluation and revision of submitted designs, necessary 
testing during the various stages of construction until the power plant is integrated into 
the national grid.422 For the implementation of the first stage, the Egyptian 
government signed a 10 year consultancy contract with the Australian firm Worely 
Parsons in 2009.423 
 
The primary objective of the nuclear program is the erection of the first Egyptian 
nuclear power plant in Al-Dabaa (220 km north of Cairo, east of Marsa Matrough), a 
site that was already earmarked by Presidential Decree No. 309 of 1981. However, the 
site is currently being criticized by parts of the Egyptian business community because 
the situation at the Northern Mediterranean coast has changed dramatically. It has 
gone from being sparsely populated desert land to a prime location for real estate 
development.424 Although site assessment included not only Al-Dabaa, but also Al-
Najila (west of Marsa Matrough), Marsalam and Safaga on the western coast of the 
Red Sea as well as Hamman Pharaon on the eastern part of the Gulf of Suez, Al-
Dabaa remains the preferred site by the Egyptian government.425 
 
4. Energy Efficiency 
Contrary to the extensive considerations given to the RE sector, the Egyptian 
government has not formulated a comprehensive strategy for EE. Nonetheless, the 
program of the ruling NDP party stipulates the unofficial objective of mitigating 
                                            
421 Nasr 2009, supra note 15, at 2. 
422 Id., at 1. 
423 Id., at 1. 
424 El-Din 2009, supra note 417, at 1. 
425 Id., at 2 quoting Egyptian Minister of Electricity Hassan Younis. 
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energy consumption by 8% by 2022.426 The projected sectoral energy saving potential 
is shown in Figure 15, with the saving potentials range between 5% and 20% for the 
various sectors, accumulating to a total of 70%. 
 
Figure 16. Potential Savings at the End User Side for 2022 according to 2007/2008 values 
Sector Current Use  Sector Potential Savings  
Agriculture 1% 5% 
Gov. & Pub Utilities 3% 15% 
Res. & Comm. 20% 15% 
Transportation 29% 15% 
Industry 47% 20% 
Total 100% 70% 
Source: RECREE, Annex 7, Characterization of Energy Efficiency Situation. 
 
Despite this huge potential for energy savings in Egypt, experts estimated that existing 
EE measures have a saving effect of only 0.5% to 1% of the annual primary energy 
consumption which equals the avoidance of 0.8 to 1.6 million tons of CO2 per 
annum.427 Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that Egyptian authorities must implement 
various measures to improve the EE situation from the supply as well as from the 
demand side. 
 
From the point of view of the supply side, fuel specific consumption has decreased 
from 346 goe/kWh (gram oil equivalent per kWh) for 1981/1982 to only 226 goe/kWh 
in 2005/2006 with an average annual decrease of 1.7%. This improvement in energy 
conversion efficiency is due to the rehabilitation of old power plants, adding 35% of 
the existing installed capacities through new modern power stations and switching all 
existing steam power stations to have dual firing (oil/gas).428 In addition, the ratio of 
transmission and distribution losses has decreased for the same period from 18% to 
12% due to the rehabilitation of transmission and distribution networks.429 
 
                                            
426 RECREE 2009, supra note 286, at 6; JCEE, Status of efficiency and renewables in Egypt: 
Institutions and Policies, available at, http://www.jcee-eg.net/reee.asp?sublinkID=22 (last visited: 
24th June 2010). 
427 Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 56. 
428 Id., at 51. 
429 Id., at 51. 
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The Egyptian government, further, tries to regulate the demand side by issuing EE 
building codes, developing EE and energy labels for appliances and by promoting the 
utilization of Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFL). With regard to EE in buildings, a 
non-binding guideline for green buildings was issued in 1999.430 In 2003, measures 
were taken in the form of comprehensive EE Building Codes for residential and 
commercial buildings stipulating minimum performance standards for windows, 
openings, natural ventilations and thermal comfort as well as for ventilating and air 
conditioning equipment and natural and artificial lighting (see Chapter V, Section 
E).431 Already as early as 1987 the Egyptian Minister of Housing issued Ministerial 
Decree No. 401/1987 prescribing the installation of solar water heaters in new 
buildings. Unfortunately, this early effort was not successful and the decree has been 
largely abandoned today.432 The reasons for this failure will be elaborated at a later 
point in this thesis (see Chapter V, Section D). 
 
The first EE standards in Egypt were issued for refrigerators and room air conditioners 
in 2002, followed by a standard for laundry machines in 2003.433 Today standards 
have been developed as well for electric water heaters and electronic ballasts.434 For 
the same appliances EE labels have been developed that are mandatory for all locally 
manufactured and imported products.435 The legal requirements and effects of the EE 
standards and labels will be presented in Chapter V, Section F.  
 
Egyptian authorities have identified lighting as the strongest use of electricity in the 
residential and commercial sector. Thus, the EEHC is promoting CFLs through its 
distribution companies, allowing their customers to pay the purchase price in 18 
installments added to the electricity bill (more than 6,000 lamps have been sold).436 
An even more ambitious program for the dissemination of CFLs was initiated by the 
MOEE, in which 6.2 million lamps have already been sold at half price through the 
                                            
430 JCEE, Buildings and Services: Regulations, standards and labels, available at, http://www.jcee-
eg.net/reee.asp?sublinkID=28 (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
431 EEHC, Annual Report 2008/2009, supra note 287, at 42. 
432 Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 38. 
433 Id., at 59. 
434 EEHC, Annual Report 2008/2009, supra note 287, at 42. 
435 Id., at 42; Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 42. 
436 EEHC, Annual Report 2008/2009, supra note 287, at 42. 
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distribution companies.437 In total, these programs are projected to annually save 400 
MW.438 
 
To further support the national EE standards and labeling program an EE testing 
center has been established at NERA.439 The center has a set of laboratories for testing 
and certifying the various appliances in regard of their EE standard.440 Eventually, it 
must be acknowledged that the driving force for a successful implementation of a 
profound EE policy in Egypt would be as simple as increasing fuel and electricity 
prices, but as complicated as creating market and framework that renders EE products 
and service economically profitable.441 
 
5. Summary: Egyptian Energy Situation 
Egypt`s primary energy demand is constantly rising with a growth rate of 4.64% with 
94% of the energy demand satisfied by oil and natural gas. Therefore, it is obvious 
that Egypt will have to rely on fossil fuels to satisfy its energy demand for the near 
future. However, Egyptian oil production is constantly declining and it is expected 
that Egypt will become a net importer of oil. On the other hand, it is projected that 
proven gas reserves will double until 2030. Nevertheless, increasing Egyptian gas 
exports combined with growing domestic demand poses the risk that Egypt will soon 
become a net gas importer as well.442 Such an energy crisis scenario in which Egypt 
would be a gross oil and gas importer could lead to an import bill amounting up to 
USD 90bn.443 
 
Other energy sources do not seem to provide a substantial alternative to solve this 
emerging Egyptian energy crisis. Nuclear energy is a compelling alternative, but is not 
expected to be available before 2020, provided that all political, financial and 
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technical obstacles are resolved.444 The hydropower potential has already reached its 
maximum and is expected to provide no more than 3% of the primary energy demand. 
Solar and wind energy represent only a minor fraction of the Egyptian energy mix 
today. As elaborated earlier the potential for solar and wind energy is massive in 
Egypt. At the same time efforts to reduce energy demand by EE measures are still at 
the beginning, however they could ultimately facilitate an enormous reduction of 
energy consumption (up to 70%) in Egypt. It is the responsibility of Egyptian 
policymakers to utilize the identified RE & EE potential to increase domestic energy 
production and to decrease national demand. Thus, it is imperative to implement a 
sound regulatory framework for RE & EE to attract private investment and to create 
local production capacities to challenge the looming Egyptian energy crisis. 
 
V. The Current and Prospective Regulatory Framework for Renewable 
Energies & Energy Efficiency in Egypt 
This chapter will analyze the current and prospective regulatory framework for RE & 
EE in Egypt. To that end, the general conclusions of Chapter III about the legal policy 
options available for the promotion of RE & EE will be applied in light of the specific 
Egyptian country conditions presented in Chapter IV. The Egyptian regulator has 
already implemented a series of measures to introduce RE & EE into the market. 
 
In 1994, the first Egyptian Environmental Protection Law (EPL, Law No. 4/1994) was 
issued as reaction to the ratification of the UNFCCC by Egypt in the same year. 
Despite its minor importance for the diffusion of RE & EE, the EPL must be 
mentioned as an early effort of the Egyptian regulator to mitigate the impact of human 
behavior on environment.  Therefore, the provisions of the EPL will be presented 
briefly below (A.).  
 
In the field of RE, it is the declared objective of the Egyptian government to generate 
20% of electricity supply through RE by 2020.445 This plan includes a 12% 
contribution from wind energy, which would translate into 7200 MW grid-connected 
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wind farms.446 In order to reach this ambitious goal the Egyptian regulator has 
developed a two stage strategy. In the first stage, the private sector is invited to 
participate in tender procedures based on competitive bidding for the development of 
RE projects. In this tendering system the risk for investors will bed reduced through 
long-term PPAs.447 In the second stage, a feed-in law should be issued based on the 
price experiences made in stage one.448 Egypt is to-date in the first stage of its RE 
strategy. The first tender invitations have been issued and international project 
developers are currently preparing their respective bids. Therefore, Section B of this 
chapter will analyze the applicable tender procedures including the specifics of land-
use agreements (2.) and PPAs (3.) that are essential parts of the respective tender 
documents. 
 
For the promotion of EE, the Egyptian government has not yet declared any official 
policy objectives. However, it has already implemented several legal policy tools to 
increase EE consumption of electricity in Egypt. In 1987 it issued a Ministerial decree 
on the mandatory use of solar water heating systems, the history of which and its 
acceptance in the domestic market will be analyzed in Section D. Subsequently, the 
recent Egyptian efforts to develop and enforce EE Building Codes will be presented in 
Section E. The part on the implemented EE legal policy option will be closed with 
Section F on the Egyptian EE standards and labeling program for electronic 
appliances. 
 
In addition to the measures mentioned above, the Egyptian regulator has recently 
developed a new Draft Electricity Law that for the first time stipulates explicit 
provisions on RE & EE by law in Egypt. The objective of the draft law is to encourage 
the implementation of private RE projects by guaranteeing access to the national grid 
and the mandatory purchase of electricity generated from RE. Moreover, it stipulates 
mandatory provisions for EE electricity consumption. The specific provisions of the 
Draft Electricity Law on RE & EE will be analyzed in Section C of this chapter.  
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Finally, this chapter will be concluded in Section G with a deconstruction of the CDM 
in Egypt. In particular, it will focus on the institutionalization of the CDM, the 
applicable evaluation and permit procedures and the current Egyptian CDM portfolio. 
 
A. Environmental Protection Law (Law No. 4/1994) 
The Egyptian Environmental Protection Law (EPL, Law No. 4/1994) came into force 
in February 1994. It is supplemented by its Executive Regulations (Decree No. 
338/1995), which came into effect in March 1995. The EPL replaced several 
individual laws and decrees that divided the competences and responsibilities for 
environmental protection among various governmental entities and therefore, lacked 
coherence in implementation. The objective of the unifying EPL was to establish 
comprehensive environmental guidelines and standards in order to empower the 
competent government entities with greater authority for monitoring and enforcement. 
 
The preliminary part of the EPL stipulates the general definitions related 
environmental protection (Article 1), the competences and responsibilities of the 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (Articles 2 to 13) and the establishment of 
the Environment Protection Funds (Articles 14 to 16). However, the normative 
elements of the EPL are the provisions on the environmental protection of land 
(Articles 19 to 33), air (Articles 34 to 47) and water (Articles 48 to 83) from pollution. 
The Executive Regulations of the EPL supplement its mandatory provisions on 
environmental protection by stipulating thresholds against noise and pollution, 
including the respective monitoring procedures. The EPL closes in its part four 
(Articles 84 to 101) with an extensive catalogue of penalties for violations against the 
provision for environmental protection. 
 
1. The Egyptian Environment Affairs Agency  
The Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) was established by virtue of 
Article 2 of the EPL. It replaced the old Egyptian Environmental Authority 
(established pursuant to Decree 631/1982) in all its obligations and rights (Article 4 of 
the EPL).  
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The mandate of the EEAA includes the development national policies for the 
protection of the environment and the monitoring of their implementation, the 
strengthening of regional and international environmental cooperation and the 
preparation of Egypt´s participation in international environmental conventions 
(Article 5 of the EPL). In order to fulfill these objectives, the EEAA may implement 
the following key functions pursuant to Article 5 of the EPL: 
• Preparation of draft legislation related to its mandate and commenting on 
proposed legislation related to the protection of the environment, 
• Preparation of studies on the state of the environment and the formulation of a 
national project plan for the protection of the environment, 
• Stipulation of criteria and conditions for environmental protection that project 
developers and establishments have to comply with in construction and during 
the operation of an project, 
• Monitoring of the compliances with the set environmental criteria and 
conditions, 
• Promulgation of principles and procedures for assessing the environmental 
impact of projects,  
• Administration of national environmental protectorates, 
• Preparation and implementation of programs for the environmental education 
of the public, and 
• Compilation on annual reports on the environmental situation in Egypt. 
 
Furthermore, the EEAA established the Environment Protection Fund, which is 
comprised of funds allocated in the state budget, grants and donations and fines for 
damaging the environment as well as of other revenues of the EEAA (Article 14 of the 
EPL). The resources of the fund should support the EEAA to finance its 
responsibilities mentioned-above (Article 15 of the EPL). Eventually, the EEAA has 
developed an incentive program to support other public entities with the 
implementation with environmental protection activities or projects (Article 17 of the 
EPL). 
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2. Protection of Land from Pollution 
The environmental protection of land from pollution is regulated in Articles 19 
through 33 of the ELP. In order for project developers to obtain a license, the 
competent administrative authority for the “establishment”449 must conduct an 
“environmental impact assessment”450 that must be submitted to the EEAA for 
evaluation (Article 19 of the ELP). 
 
Based on the “environmental impact assessment” of a proposed project, the EEAA 
must issue its respective opinion and propose measures to mitigate the project´s 
negative impacts on the environment (Article 20 S. 1 of the EPL). The EEAA must 
issue its evaluation within 60 days after obtaining the “environmental impact 
assessment” from the competent administrative entity, otherwise the assessment is 
deemed approved by the EEAA (Article 20 S. 3 of the EPL). The competent 
administrative authority is obliged to send the results of the evaluation to the 
respective applicant by registered mail (Article 21 S.1 of the EPL). Any objections by 
the project developer must be submitted in writing to a special committee of the 
Egyptian Ministry of Environment, comprised of the representatives of the EEAA, the 
competent administrative authority and the project developer (Article 21 S. 2 of the 
EPL). 
 
Already established projects must keep a register to record the effects of the project 
activities on the environment (Article 22 S.1 of the EPL). It is the role of the EEAA to 
verify these records by conducting the applicable environmental tests (Article 22 S. 3 
of the EPL). In case of violation, the EEAA notifies the competent administrative 
authority that must direct the owner to rectify the situation within 60 days. If the 
owner fails comply, the EEAA has the authority to implement the necessary steps on 
behalf of the owner and to claim compensation (Article 22 S. 4 of the EPL). 
                                            
449 “Establishment” is defined in Article 1 No. 34 of the EPL as “any industrial and touristic project, 
establishments used for electric power generation, mines and other exploration projects and all 
infrastructure projects as well as any other establishment that may have a considerable impact on the 
environment.” 
450 “Environmental impact assessment” is defined in Article 1 No. 36 of the EPL as “studying and 
analyzing the environmental feasibility of proposed projects, whose construction or activities might 
affect the safety of the environment in order to protect it.”   
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3. Protection of Air and Water from Pollution 
The procedural provisions on the protection of air and water are essentially similar to 
those concerning the protection of land that were presented above. Any environmental 
damage must be reported and the owner is required to eliminate the damage or to bear 
the costs of remediation. 
 
Pursuant to Article 34 of the EPL, a project site must be suitable for a project activity 
to guarantee that the thresholds of air pollutant emission are not exceeded. The 
specific thresholds are stipulated in the Executive Regulations of the EPL. Explicitly 
mentioned in the EPL is the prohibition of certain machines with high emission levels 
(Article 36 of the EPL), to burn garbage and solid waste (Article 37 of the EPL) and to 
use pesticides and other harmful chemicals (Article 38 of the EPL). 
 
In regard of the protection of water, the ELP differentiates between pollution caused 
by ships (Articles 48 to 68 of the EPL) and pollution caused on land (Articles 69 to 75 
of the EPL). The Executive Regulations stipulate a list of substances that are 
prohibited from being released into the water. Moreover, there are some special 
regulations concerning the transport of oil by sea (Articles 48 to 49 of the EPL). 
 
4. Penal Provisions 
Any violations of the environmental protection provision of the EPL and its Executive 
Regulations are either punishable with fines or even imprisonment (Article 84 to 101 
of the EPL). In order to provide a comprehensive overview on the penal provisions of 
the EPL, the following list summarizes the key categories: 
• A fine of up to EGP 5,000 is imposed for minor violations, e.g., causing noise 
above the permitted threshold, 
• A fine of up to EGP 20,000 is imposed for the violation of legal provisions 
protecting air and water, whereas each day of pollution is deemed to constitute 
a separate violation, 
• A fine of up to EGP 300,000 may be imposed for a violation of the obligation 
to inform the authorities of environmental damage, for not having a requisite 
approval, or for simple cases of oil pollution, 
95 
 
• A fine of up to EGP 500,000 is imposed for a ship accident caused 
intentionally or by negligence, and 
• Imprisonment may be imposed if someone causes an incurable disease to a 
human being, or causes the death of a human being by violating an 
environmental protection provision. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The EPL has only a minor importance for RE & EE. It does not conclude any 
provisions in this regards. However, any RE & EE project developer must comply 
with “environmental impact assessment” and make the changes in the project structure 
proposed by the EEAA. 
 
B. The Egyptian Tendering System 
The tendering system is the central policy instrument for the promotion of RE in 
Egypt. This section will analyze the Egyptian tender procedures and the corresponding 
land-use agreements and PPAs, which are an essential part of the tender document for 
RE projects. 
 
Currently, the EETC has issued a tender invitation to Build Own Operate (BOO) a 
wind farm at the Gulf of Suez with installed capacities of 250 MW.451 The invitation 
for tender allows operation of the wind farm for 20-25 years while the Egyptian 
government guarantees the purchase of the generated electricity under the terms and 
conditions of the respective power purchase agreement for the same period of time.452 
 
In addition to the designated areas for wind energy projects at the Gulf of Suez, 
Egyptian authorities have earmarked 247 km2 for the development of large-scale wind 
farms at the Gulf of El-Zayet.453 Projections for the Gulf of El-Zayet include various 
                                            
451 The Development of BOO Wind Power Project at the Gulf of Suez, Invitation for Pre-
Qualification (RFPQ 75/2008/2009), available at, http://www.moee.gov.eg/arabic/tender111.pdf (last 
visited: 24th June 2010). 
452 Id., at 1. 
453 NREA, Annual Report 2007/2008, supra note 9, at 9: 93 km2 are still subject to governmental 
approval pending a bird’s migration study. 
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projects that will add up to 720 MW.454 The complete capacity of 720 MW is planned 
to be reached in three stages: 200 MW in cooperation with Germany and the European 
Investment Bank, 220 MW in cooperation with Japan and an additional 300 MW in 
cooperation with Spain.455 Moreover, a number of private companies have expressed 
their interest in developing large-scale wind farms at the Gulf of Zayet. In November 
2007, an Italian company signed a MoU with the Egyptian government to install 120 
MW with the option for an extension up to 400 MW.456 In order to develop RE 
projects in Egypt, private investors have to comply with applicable public tender 
procedures and have to sign the respective land-use agreements and PPAs. 
 
1. Tender Procedures 
Any contract with the object of purchasing of movables, or agreements for 
construction works as well as all service contracts to be concluded by Egyptian 
government or other public entity has to follow the procedures and rules stipulated by 
Law No. 89 of 1998 on the Reorganizing of Tenders and Auctions (Tender Law), 
which replaced Law No. 9 of 1983. The Tender Law is supplemented by its Executive 
Regulations, which were promulgated by Ministerial Decree No. 1367 of 1998.  
 
The Tender Law is divided into four parts: the purchase of movables, contracts for 
construction and service agreements are treated in part one; the second part deals with 
the purchase and lease of real estate; this is followed by the provisions for the sale and 
lease of realties and movables including ancillary rights such as the right to exploit 
and usufruct rights in part three. The fourth part contains further general conditions, 
which apply to all cases. The Executive Regulations consist of four parts which reflect 
the Tender Law and mainly stipulate procedural rules for the concerned government 
bodies. 
 
Any public tender under Egyptian law must consider the general principles of 
publicity as well as equal chances and competition (Article 2 of the Tender Law). The 
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law sets out two basic procedures for the tendering of contracts with governmental, 
public or administrative entities: public tender and public negotiations, the selection of 
which is at the discretion of the competent authority (Article 1 of the Tender Law). 
Subject to certain conditions, it is possible to issue a limited tender pursuant to Article 
3 of the Tender Law. The tender can be issued locally (local tender, Article 4 of the 
Tender Law), or the negotiations may be limited to certain pre-selected companies 
(limited negotiations, Article 5 of the Tender Law). Only in very limited situations 
may contracts be directly entered into between the public entity and the private 
contractor (Articles 30 and 31 of the Tender Law); and, once a public tender has been 
issued, the public entity may not change it to limited negotiations.  
 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Tender Law, each tender begins with the publication of the 
contractual specifications in the Egyptian press and by specific invitation to order the 
tender documents, which include the appeal to the bidders to make their respective 
offers. In order to participate in a public tender Article 61 of the Executive 
Regulations requires that the bidder must be resident in Egypt or have an Egyptian 
agent. Offers are to be submitted in two parts, one for the technical specifications and 
one for the financial calculation of the bidder, which need to be submitted in two 
different envelopes (Article 10 of the Tender Law). In addition, each bidder has to 
deposit a bond or other guarantee according to the specifications of the issuing entity. 
Generally this is 2% of the estimated contract value, and same deposit is restituted to 
the unsuccessful bidder without the need for any request (Article 17 of the Tender 
Law). 
 
Upon the expiration of the time limit for the submittal of the bids, the designated 
“decision committee” composed according to Article 33 of the Tender Law, will 
evaluate the bids. First, the technical envelope will be opened. Only in case of 
fulfillment of the technical requirements, the financial envelope will be opened as 
well; the bidder with the lowest offer will be selected.457 Pursuant to Article 28 of the 
Executive Regulations, the “decision committee” must establish a point system to 
                                            
457 Florian Amereller, International Public Procurement – Egypt, Oxford University Press 2007 
(quoted as Amereller 2007), at 8. 
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assess the financial and technical aspects of each bid, which will provide the basis for 
the decision that should be made by dividing the financial calculations of the contract 
by the total technical points given to a bid. It is noteworthy that Egyptian bidders with 
a high percentage of local production can be preferred to cheaper foreign bidders, if 
their offer does not exceed the foreign bidder’s offer by more than 15% and if the 
same quality standard is assured (Article 16 of the Tender Law). Following a 
successful tender, the selected bidder is required to deposit a bond or other guarantee 
over 5% of the contract value (Article 18 of the Tender Law). 
 
For the purpose of ensuring quality standards, special tendering procedures, i.e. local 
and limited tender, are restricted to participants who meet certain requirements such as 
technical know-how and financial means (Article 3 of the Tender Law). Pursuant to 
Article 4 of the Tender Law, the local tender aims at privileging the domestic 
economy and is only permitted in cases where the value of the contract to be 
concluded does not exceed EGP 200,000.  
 
According to Article 7 of the Tender Law, the above mentioned procedures may, in 
situations of urgency, if inadequate to meet the needs of the contracting entity may be 
deviated from, thus enabling the authority to enter into contracts directly with a 
suitable contract partner by way of the negotiation procedure. The tender procedure is 
then replaced with the approval of the competent Egyptian authority and, where the 
specific contract value exceeds EGP 100,000, with the additional approval of the 
competent Minister and in certain cases even of the Prime Minister (Article 7 of the 
Tender Law). 
 
In difference from the former law, Article 42 of the Tender Law expressly permits 
arbitration in case of dispute between the Egyptian government and the other 
contracting party, the approval of the competent Minister provided. 
 
a) Purchase and Rental of Movables and Real Estate 
The basic form for the acquisition or use of public land or movables is the public 
auction, which may also be locally restricted. Perishable goods do not have to undergo 
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a public auction in cases of urgency (Article 30 of the Tender Law). Further reasons 
for the non-implementation of a public auction are cases in which the minimum of 
EGP 50,000 has not been attained and in all other cases, where the minimal amount 
for sale has not been reached or where no offers were received (Article 31 of the 
Tender Law). 
 
b) Operating Models 
Operating models are gaining increasing popularity in Egypt.458 The best known 
operating model in Egypt is the so-called BOT (Build Operate Transfer), in which the 
government awards a project developer the right to build and operate, for instance a 
RE facility, in the frame of a kind of concession for a specific time period, at the end 
of which the project developer must hand over the installation to the State.459 
Additional varieties of operating models are BOO (Built Own Operate), BOOT (Built 
Own Operate Transfer) and DBOT (Design Built Own Transfer). With regard to RE 
projects, Law 100 of 1996 modifying Law 12 of 1976 is of particular importance for 
the implementation of operating models, since in Article 7 it permits that private 
investors may construct and operate power facilities and other facilities for the public 
welfare for a period up to 99 years. 
 
2. Land-use Agreements 
Land-use Agreements are an essential part of the tendering documents for RE 
projects. Traditionally, there are three basic scenarios for land use for RE:460 
• The project developer buys the land, 
• The project developer rents the necessary land, or 
• The landowner is the project developer or there is cooperation between the 
landowner and the project developer. 
 
                                            
458 Id., at 18. 
459 Id., at 18. 
460 RCREEE, Land Use Agreements for Renewable Energy Installations – Experiences, Principles 
and Draft Model for Lease Agreements for Public Property Lease, May 2009 (quoted as RECREEE, 
Land Use Agreements), at 11, available at, http://www.jcee-eg.net/download.asp?path=library/MED-
EMIP_RCREEE%20report%20LUA%20for%20RE%20installations.pdf (last visited: 24th June 
2010). 
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In Egypt land was allocated by virtue of a Presidential Decree from the government to 
NREA for the erection of RE installations.461 The Egyptian regulator intends not to 
sell the land, but instead lease it to RE project developers.462 It is problematic that the 
respective land-use agreement is not to be concluded between NREA and the project 
developer, but between the project developer and the EETC.463 Therefore, the current 
allocation raises the issue that the land is not allocated to the administrative entity that 
will be the contractual counterpart for project developers. To solve this situation the 
land could be reallocated to the EETC, NREA could assign the land use rights to the 
EETC or the land-use agreement could be signed as a tri-party agreement, including 
NREA. In any case, this situation should be resolved to provide project developers 
with a clear contractual counterpart. Another critical point in land-use agreement for 
RE facilities is the agreed contract period. Ideally, the contract duration should cover 
the production phase of a RE facility, which is ordinarily between 20 to 30 years.464 
However, longer periods could function as an incentive for project developers to 
redevelop and repower the sit with new RE installations.465 In this regard, no 
information on the position of the Egyptian government is available. 
 
In order to provide RE project developers with certainty in regard of the conditions of 
land-use agreement, it would be desirable to develop standard land-use agreements 
that could provide legal certainty for project developers. 
 
3. Power Purchase Agreements 
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) are the other essential part of the tendering 
documents for RE projects. Up to now, PPAs have been signed between NREA, as 
operator of the Zafarana wind park, and the EETC. However, the EETC will remain 
the counterpart for future private RE project developers. Unfortunately, only limited 
details of the PPAs between NREA and the EETC are available. 
 
                                            
461 Id., at 8. 
462 Id., at 9. 
463 Id., at 8. 
464 Id., at 17. 
465 Id., at 17. 
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Generally, the EETC will cover all expenses of overhead transmission lines and 
substations that are required to connect a RE facility to the grid.466 The PPAs between 
NREA and the EETC stipulate a tariff of 12 piaster/ kWh (2.11 US cents); in contrast 
the EETC purchases thermal generated electricity at 10 piaster/kWh (1.8 US cents).467 
Due to this price difference some analysts deem the PPAs as inherent incentive for the 
promotion of RE in Egypt.468 However, this conclusion seems a bit exaggerated in 
comparison to a German feed-in tariff of 9.2 € cents/kwH guaranteed for period of 10 
years (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the Egyptian 
government intends to use the price experiences from the PPAs for the adjustment of 
an appropriate future feed-in tariff. In the absence of a fixed feed-in tariff it would be 
also desirable to develop a standard PPA for the RE sector, which could avoid lengthy 
negotiation and thereby increase legal certainty. These agreements could leave the 
respective price open for negotiation, in order to help the Egyptian government to 
assess the appropriate price level for the subsequent establishment of a fixed feed-in 
tariff. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Although prospectively the establishment of feed-in model is the overall objective of 
the Egyptian regulator, the choice for now is the implementation of a tendering system 
for the promotion of RE. This decision brings along the respective advantages and 
disadvantages of a tendering system compiled in Figure 4.  
 
In contrast to a feed-in law, under a tendering system the regulator determines the 
level of installed capacity, while the market determines the price. A tendering system 
is best at reducing cost and price through the implementation of a competitive bidding 
process, which favors least-cost projects. This explains the focus of the Egypt RE 
sector on wind energy, instead of more cost intensive solar energy. In theory, a 
tendering system can provide certainty regarding the future market share of RE, but 
RE targets could also set the upper limit for capacity development, since there is no 
incentive to install more than the mandate level of RE. In the absence of a fixed tariff, 
                                            
466 Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 46. 
467 Id., at 47. 
468 Id., at 46. 
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a tendering system includes a lack of price certainty for potential investors. The 
problem of price uncertainty should be reduced through the development of standard 
PPAs for RE facilities in Egypt. 
 
One of the major disadvantages of a tendering system is the related high transaction 
cost for RE project developers. These costs occur through the often complex and 
intransparent tendering procedures. This observation is especially valid for Egypt, 
since the Tender Law provides for relatively broad discretion of the competent 
authorities in selecting the respective tender process. Additional cost may occur in the 
preparation of tender documents that can not be retrieved by unsuccessful bidders. 
Furthermore, the “decision committee” could be undermined by personal interest and 
the widespread corruption in the Egyptian legal system. Generally, a tendering system 
is considered more complex than a feed-in law, but simpler than a RPS. However, the 
complexities of tender procedures lack the necessary flexibility to fine tune or adjust 
prices in case of a change in circumstances. In addition, a tendering system tends to 
create cycles of stop-and-go in the development of RE, since new projects depend on 
the issuance of new tender invitation by the competent authorities. 
 
While the aforementioned advantages and disadvantages are also true for Egypt, the 
key explanation for the decision of the Egyptian regulator for a tendering system 
could be the greater control of subsidies in comparision to the other available legal 
options. It is entirely up to the competent Egyptian authorities to decide the location 
and number of RE projects implemented as well as the respective purchase price in 
PPAs and the conditions in land-use agreements. In addition, energy subsidies are a 
politically sensitive issue in Egypt that will take many years to tackle, since vast part 
of the population could not afford unsubsidized energy prices. Therefore, any 
reshuffling of energy subsidies towards RE must be handled cautiously in order to 
protect economic growth and the poorest parts of society.  
 
In conclusion, the greater control a tendering system provides in the development of 
the RE sector in regard of number of approved projects and price, seems to be the key 
argument for Egyptian policymakers to continue to favor a tendering system. 
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Nevertheless, the prospective implementation of feed-in law exemplifies the increased 
commitment of the Egyptian government to create a domestic RE sector. 
 
C. The New Draft Electricity Law 
The new Draft Electricity Law is the result of many years of development and legal 
consultations.469 To date, it is under discussion in the Shoura Council and the People´s 
Assembly, before it will be submitted for approval to the Egyptian Cabinet. It is 
expected that the Draft Electricity Law will not be promulgated before 2011 because 
the current parliamentary term is exceptionally short due to the upcoming presidential 
elections in 2011, and thus, does not provide sufficient opportunity for in depth 
discussion.470 The general objective of the new Draft Electricity Law is to unify the 
several laws regulating the energy sector in Egypt, namely Law No. 12 of 1976 
establishing the EEA, the predecessor of the EEHC, and Presidential Decree No. 339 
of 2000 re-organizing the EEUCPRA.471 In addition, it aims to re-define the role of 
the Egyptian government from managing the public electric utility directly to a more 
organizational and controlling function.472 
 
For first time in the history of Egyptian legislation, Part IV of the Draft Electricity 
Law stipulates provisions on the implementation of RE projects (Chapter I, Articles 
45 to 50) and mechanisms to improve EE in Egypt (Chapter II, Articles 51 to 57). The 
objective of this section will be to deconstruct the provisions of Part IV of the Draft 
Electricity Law and to assess their potential to promote RE & EE in Egypt. 
 
1. The Role of the EEUCPRA and Licensing Procedures 
Pursuant to Article 4 No. 9 of the Draft Electricity Law it will be the mandate of the 
EEUCPRA to set the applicable rules and procedures for developing RE & EE in 
Egypt. For generating electricity from RE it will be mandatory to obtain a respective 
                                            
469 Nadia Mansour, The Unified Electricity Law – will it meet the interest of low-income brackets? 
(Interview with Dr. Hafez El Salmawy, Director of the EEUCPRA), Al Ahram Daily Newspaper, 15 
of February 2010, English translation available at, http://www.jcee-eg.net/libdetails.asp?typeID=1 
(last visited 24th June 2010).  
470 Id., at 1. 
471 Id., at 3. 
472 Id., at 3. 
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license from the EEUCPRA (Article 13 of the Draft Electricity Law). In this respect, 
the Draft Electricity Law mirrors the current procedures applicable pursuant to 
Presidential Decree No. 339 of 2000. 
 
A license for generating electricity must be applied for at the EEUCPRA and should 
ordinarily be issued within 60 days as of the date of submission of all required 
documents by the licensee (Article 14 of the Draft Electricity Law). A granted license 
generally includes the following obligations that must be honored by the EEUCPRA 
and the licensee (Article 15 of the Draft Electricity Law): 
• The license period, 
• The type of service (generation, transmission or distribution), 
• The geographic location of the project, 
• Abidance by the vocational and environmental safety and health 
regulations, 
• Submitting to the EEUCPRA any information and data requested in 
connection with the respective license, and 
• Any additional permit conditions the Board of Directors of the EEUCPRA 
may decide. 
 
Once a license for the generation of electricity is granted, Article 24 of the Draft 
Electricity Law requires the licensee to execute the approved project, sell the 
generated electricity to the transmission company and to provide ancillary services 
that are required for the safe and stable operation of the transmission network as well 
as to conduct research and studies within the scope of the approved project. Although 
a license is granted for specific geographic area, it does not entail a monopoly right to 
generate electricity in the designated territory (Article 13 of the Draft Electricity 
Law). Moreover, the licensee is not permitted to transfer the license to any third party 
without the prior approval from the EEUCPRA (Article 19 of the Draft Electricity 
Law). Pursuant to Article 16 of the Draft Electricity Law, a license is generally 
granted for a period of 20 years and is subject to renewal. Each year of the granted 
license period the EEUCPRA must issue a certificate evidencing the validity of the 
license after verifying that the licensee is in compliance with all license requirements. 
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In case a licensee is not in compliance, the EEUCPRA may impose the following 
penalties after giving a sufficient grace period (Article 21 of the Draft Electricity 
Law): 
• A written notice for the suspension or revocation of the license, 
• Fines that should not exceed 1% of the authorized capital of the license for 
each violation, 
• Suspension of the license for a fixed period and additional procedures to 
maintain the concerned project activity and the rights of consumers, or 
• Revocation of the license and additional procedures to maintain consumer 
rights, including the operation of the concerned project on the account and 
the expense of the violator. 
 
In case electricity is generated without obtaining a license from the EEUCPRA, the 
penalty will be not less than 6 months to 3 years imprisonment and/or a fine up to 
EGP one million, and this penalty will be doubled in case of recidivism (Article 74 of 
the Draft Electricity Law). 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the described licensing procedures and 
requirements essentially mirror the procedures in place pursuant to Presidential 
Decree No. 339 of 2000. Therefore, any private investor aspiring to implement a RE 
project in Egypt, must obtain a license for generating electricity and comply with 
respective approval procedures. 
 
2. Provisions on Renewable Energy 
The Draft Electricity Law stipulates provisions on RE in Article 45 to 50. However, 
the term RE is already defined in Article 1 of the Draft Electricity Law as “non fossil 
fuel that can be used for electricity generation.” This rather wide definition of RE 
includes not only traditional sources such as wind, solar, biomass or “small” 
hydropower, but also big hydropower plants, such as the Aswan High Dam. The 
rational behind this broad definition might be that the very ambitious political goal of 
generating 20% of Egypt´s energy supply from RE by 2020 may not be otherwise 
achievable. 
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Article 45 No. 1 (a) of the Draft Electricity Law codifies a mandatory tendering 
system for building and operating RE facilities. The generated electricity from those 
projects will be sold to the EETC at a rate proposed by the EEUCPRA and approved 
by the Cabinet and subsequently negotiated between the EETC and investors in the 
respective PPAs. It will be the responsibility of the EETC in cooperation with the 
NREA to call domestic and international investors for public tenders and issue the 
respective tender documents (Article 45 No. 1 (b) of the Draft Electricity Law). In 
comparison to the current regulatory framework for the promotion of RE, the 
applicable tendering system remains unchanged. Although the Draft Electricity Law 
does not provide any new developments in this respect, the codification of a tendering 
system for RE projects would exemplify the commitment of the Egyptian regulator to 
create a domestic RE industry. 
 
In addition to the tendering system, the EETC may set fixed tariffs for electricity 
generated from small RE projects up to 50 MW (Article 51 of the Draft Electricity 
Law). This instrument aims at supporting small RE facilities that are built by local 
private developers for which a competitive tender process would lead to extraordinary 
and unnecessary expenses. However, it is to be expected that the first tariffs for small 
RE facilities will only be fixed after the initial experience from the competitive 
bidding process in regard of the price levels that are available. 
 
Furthermore, the Draft Electricity Law includes the guarantee that the EETC and the 
Egyptian distribution companies are obliged to connect RE facilities to the national 
grid, while RE generators would have to bear the cost for a grid expansion, if required 
(Article 46 of the Draft Electricity Law). A guaranteed access to the grid for RE 
facilities would constitute an additional incentive for project developers that would 
decrease investment uncertainties. 
 
The Draft Electricity Law, further, introduces the “Fund for Development of Power 
Generation from Renewable Energies” that will have its own legal personality 
(Articles 47 to 50 of the Draft Electricity Law). It will be financed from the national 
budget and income from its own investment and other subsidies (Article 48 of the 
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Draft Electricity Law). The funds should provide the necessary support for the EETC 
to cover the additional costs that will occur from purchasing electricity generated from 
RE for prices which are above the price level for conventionally produced electricity 
(Article 47 of the Draft Electricity Law). 
 
3. Provisions on Energy Efficiency 
The provisions on RE in the Draft Electricity Law are supplemented with some 
instruments for the promotion of EE in Egypt, which will be now presented in brief.  
 
The EETC and the distribution companies are obliged to connect co-generation473 
units and recoverable-energy474 generation units to the grid and cover a potential 
network expansion cost, while producers have to pay the connection cost (Article 52 
of the Draft Electricity Law). In addition, the EETC and the distribution companies 
may conclude contracts with consumers to reduce or shift loads at a specified price 
(Article 53 of the Draft Electricity Law). Both instruments introduce a greater 
flexibility for the electric utility towards electricity consumer behaviors.  
 
Article 54 of the Draft Electricity Law obligates electricity consumers with a capacity 
above 500 KW to assign a specialist to improve EE and to maintain an energy register. 
Furthermore, the Egyptian EE standard and label program (see Section F) will be 
codified into law (Article 57 of the Draft Electricity Law). Producers and importers of 
electronic appliances are required to tag their products with EE labels. In addition, 
Article 56 of the Draft Electricity Law mandates the concerned Ministries with the 
task to develop policies to expand the application of EE standards and labels for 
electric appliances and to replace appliances with low EE. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The enactment of the Draft Electricity Law would be a milestone for the promotion of 
RE & EE in Egypt and could be an important stimulus for the entire region. Although 
                                            
473 Co-generation is defined by Article 1 of the Draft Electricity Law as “simultaneous production for 
both electrical and thermal energy. 
474 Recoverable Energy is defined by Article 1 of the Draft Electricity Law as “wasted energy that 
can be used for electricity generation.” 
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the tendering system remains the central instrument for the diffusion of RE, its 
codification in the Draft Electricity Law would exemplify the political commitment of 
the Egyptian government to create a domestic RE industry. Fixed prices for small RE 
facilities, a guaranteed grid access for project developers and additional funds for 
purchasing green energy, would all together further increase the incentive for 
international and domestic investors to participate in the emerging Egyptian RE 
sector. 
 
The provisions on EE in the Draft Electricity Law stipulate a more efficient 
consumption of energy. Especially, the requirement to install EE specialists in 
facilities that consume above 500KW stipulates the commitment of the regulator to 
improve EE in Egypt. In addition, the codification of EE labels might improve the 
weak impact of the Egyptian EE standard and label program. All in all, the lack of 
details and constant reference to the not yet existing Executive Regulations of the 
Draft Electricity Law renders it impossible at this point to assess its real potential in 
regard of EE. 
 
The success of the Draft Electricity Law will depend highly on the specifics of its 
Executive Regulations and the degree of its enforcement. In addition, many critical 
questions are unanswered: this is in particular valid for the contractual details of the 
PPAs and Land-Use-Agreements, which would be essential to provide investment 
certainty in the absence of a feed-in law.  
 
It is noteworthy that the tendering mechanism, which is the most important instrument 
for the promotion of RE, is already in place today as described in Section B of this 
Chapter. Therefore, any delay by the Egyptian regulator in enacting the Draft 
Electricity Law will have no negative impact on ongoing tendering procedures. 
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D. Ministerial Decree No. 401/1987 for the Mandatory Use of Solar Water 
Heating Systems 
Already by 1987 the Egyptian Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development 
(MoH) had issued Ministerial Decree No. 401/1987 that stipulated the mandatory use 
of domestic solar water heating systems in new houses and communities. This effort is 
exemplary as evidence for the early understanding of the Egyptian government of the 
need to promote RE & EE. 
 
In the years from 1987 to 1993 solar water heating systems were increasingly used in 
Egypt and domestic production capacities ranged between 1000 to 2500 units per 
year.475 Unfortunately, this initial success was undermined by a lack of after-sale 
services and the absence of enforcement standards, which led in sum to unsatisfactory 
market performance of domestic solar water heaters(DSWH) and thus, to a bad market 
reputation in Egypt.476 The effect was that new building constructions did not comply 
with Decree No. 401/1987, thus rendering it irrelevant eventually.477 Until today, no 
efforts have been made to re-vitalize the compliance with the Ministerial Decree. 
 
Despite this early frustrating experience, NREA started the establishment of a research 
facility for solar water heating systems in 2008 which will provide technical 
consultancy services as well as monitor the market development of DSWH.478 
Although the market potential for DSWH is estimated at 10 million units, 
approximately only 200,000 DSWH units are installed in Egypt today.479 The main 
reasons for this under exploitation of the RE & EE potential of DSWH are the 
subsidized energy prices that distract consumer decisions and the still unsatisfying 
production standards and after-sales service of domestic DSWH producers.480 
 
                                            
475 Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 38. 
476 Id., at 38. 
477 Id., at 38. 
478 NREA, Annual Report 2007/2008, supra note 9, at 15. 
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E. Energy Efficiency Building Codes for the Commercial and Residential 
Sector 
In order to realize the enormous potential for energy savings in the building sector 
(see Chapter III), the MoH developed and published EE building Code No. 305/2005 
for the commercial and residential sector. Although promulgated under the same 
number, the codes were published in two separated editions. Nevertheless, the 
respective structure and context are essentially the same and only adjusted for the 
specific construction requirements of the commercial and residential sector. Both 
stipulate provisions on the exterior building design (chapter 3), natural ventilation and 
heating (chapter 4) and equipment for air-conditioning (chapter 4) as well as on 
artificial and natural lighting (chapter 5), systems of electrical power supply (chapter 
8) and on the total building performance (chapter 10). Due to the limited scope of this 
thesis and the focus on legal aspects, the respective construction details of the EE 
Building Codes cannot be analyzed in-depth here. It should be sufficient to mention 
that the codes comply with international EE standards for buildings. 
 
The major problem was that the codes are not binding and that efforts of enforcement 
were practically non-existent. The newly founded Egyptian Green Building Council 
(EGBC),481 headed by the Egyptian Minister of Housing, Utilities and Urban 
Development, tried to close this gap between code requirements and code compliance 
in the housing sector with a bundle of measures.482 The EGBC developed a Green 
Building Rating System and corresponding Green Building Permits which are 
expected to be in place in the course of 2010.483 In order to gain the acceptance of the 
Egyptian building sector the following incentives are included in Green Building 
Permits:484 
• Access to preferred and prime locations and property, 
• Tax breaks, wavers and postponements, 
• Financial assistance guarantees, credit and insurance, 
                                            
481 EGBC Official Website: http://egypt-gbc.org/ (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
482 EGBC, Egyptian Green Building Council: Formation & Achievements, October 2009, at 2, 
available at, http://egypt-gbc.org/Templates/EGBC_Report_October%20_2009.docx  (last visited: 
24th June 2010). 
483 Id., at 2. 
484 Id., at 3. 
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• Utility concessions, 
• EE equipment support and finance, and 
• EE training and assistance for employees. 
 
In addition, the EGBC proposed a national eco-villages project with the objective of 
providing a platform for EE technologies, methodologies and systems, which 
eventually could define what constitutes a green building in Egypt.485 Another effort is 
the initiation of a training program for EE building inspectors, which is a reaction to 
the insufficient technical expertise in the field of EE building constructions.486 
Eventually, the EGBC promoted EE in buildings with a series of conferences and 
workshops held in Egypt.487 
 
Despite the efforts of the EGBC the level of compliance with the Egyptian EE 
Building Codes was still rudimentary. Therefore, the MoH issued Ministerial Decree 
No. 368/2008 making the Egyptian EE Buildings Codes for the commercial and 
residential sector mandatory law. It remains to be seen whether the issuance of this 
decree can raise the level of enforcement and compliance in the Egyptian building 
sector. 
 
F. Energy Efficiency Standards and Labels for Electronic Appliances 
As the result of the joined efforts of the Energy Efficiency Improvement and Gas 
Reduction Project and the Organization for Energy Planning, the Egyptian regulator 
developed EE standards and labels for specific electronic appliances.488 Based on a 
local manufacturer´s survey and the review of international EE standards and 
programs,489 the following four EE standards for electronic appliances have been 
promulgated so far: 
• Egyptian Standard No. 3794/2006 for refrigerators up to 1100 liter and 
deep freezers up to 850 liters, 
                                            
485 Id., at 3. 
486 Id., at 6. 
487 Id., at 7. 
488 Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 58. 
489 Id., at 59. 
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• Egyptian Standard No. 4100/2006 for laundry machines up to 10kg of dry 
washing load, 
• Egyptian Standard No. 5806/2007 for electric water heaters up to 150 
liters, and 
• Egyptian Standard No. 3795/2008 for window and split air-conditioners up 
to 6500 BTU/h. 
 
Each of these EE standards applies to imported and domestic products and stipulates 
specific energy performance requirements for the respective appliance, the applicable 
test procedures and the minimum energy consumption level. NREA established an 
internationally accredited testing and certification center to implement the required 
testing procedures of the Egyptian EE standards for electronic appliances.490 Through 
2008, NREA has tested 413 imported and domestic refrigerators and 368 laundry 
machines.491 The results of the testing are presented below in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 17. NREA EE Test Results for Specific Imported and Local Electronic Appliances 
 Imported 
Refrigerators 
Local 
Refrigerators 
Imported 
Laundry 
Machines 
Local Laundry 
Machines 
Not Accepted 10% 26% 0% 0% 
Poor Efficiency 14% 17% 2% 11% 
Low Efficiency 11% 7% 1% 45% 
Medium Efficiency 14% 12% 3% 22% 
High Efficiency 20% 23% 8% 0% 
Excellent Efficiency 31% 15% 86% 22% 
Source: NREA Annual Report 2007/2008. 
 
These figures clearly indicate that imported electric appliances are still superior in 
comparison to locally produced electric equipment in regard of EE. This in 
particularly obvious when comparing the test results of imported (86% excellent 
efficiency) and locally produced (only 22% excellent efficiency) laundry machines. It 
desirable that the Egyptian electric appliance producers face this challenge and 
increase the EE standards of domestically produced products. 
                                            
490 NREA, Annual Report 2007/2008, supra note 9, at 17. 
491 Id., at 17; official results of the testing of electronic water heaters and air-conditioners are 
unfortunately not available – yet.  
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Based on the test results of NERA, the Egyptian Organization for Standardization and 
Quality Control (EOS) issues corresponding EE labels for laundry machines, 
refrigerators, air-conditioners and electric water heaters. The selected label format is a 
graduated bar design that starts from the green letter (A) and ends with the red letter 
(E), with (A) representing the highest EE standard in the local market and (E) the 
lowest EE standard of the respective appliance.492 Since market introduction in 2006, 
the success of the Egyptian EE standard and labeling program has been very limited. 
It suffers especially from a low market understanding of the program´s objectives and 
lack of consumer awareness.493 In addition, the trust of the market in the compliance 
of the issued labels and standards is relatively low and retailers do not support the 
program through promotion of EE labels.494 Nevertheless, the establishment of the 
necessary framework conditions of the Egyptian EE standard and labeling program is 
a crucial first step for the promotion EE electric appliances, which will in time, create 
market acceptance and will raise the awareness of consumers. 
 
G. The Clean Development Mechanism in Egypt 
This section will identify the institutional and procedural framework of the CDM in 
Egypt. Moreover, it will assess the potential of CDM projects, in order to validate 
whether the CDM is viable option to generate much needed additional revenues 
streams for clean technology projects. 
 
The Egyptian national CDM strategy was initiated through the National Strategy 
Study (NSS) launched by the World Bank and the Government of Switzerland in 
1997, having the objective of identifying the potential and opportunities of the CDM 
in Egypt.495 The NSS concluded that Egypt would in particular benefit from the CDM 
through increased profitability of clean technology projects and thereby from an 
                                            
492 Georgy/Soliman, supra note, at 58. 
493 Id., at 62. 
494 Id., at 62. 
495 The Official CDM Website for Egypt, National Strategy Study on the CDM, available at, 
http://www.cdm-egypt.org/NSS.htm  (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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increased inflow of FDI.496 Furthermore, the CDM is identified as an instrument that 
can promote the transfer of state of the art technologies for GHG emission mitigation 
to Egypt.497 In order to secure these benefits of the CDM, the NSS stipulated that 
Egypt must develop an effective institutional framework for marketing, approving and 
monitoring CDM Projects, which would ensure the mentioned benefits and could 
create an attractive environment for international CDM investors.498 
 
The potential for GHG emission reductions is enormous in Egypt. The main sectors 
responsible for GHG emissions in Egypt are the energy (22%), industry (21%) and the 
transport sector (18%).499 Based on these figures, the NSS proposed the following list 
of CDM projects types for Egypt:500 
• Co-generation and EE in textile, chemicals, food and beverages, metals, 
buildings as well as the hotel sector, 
• Fuel switching to natural gas in industry and transportation, 
• Wind energy, 
• Organic waste management and municipal solid waste methane utilization, and 
• Afforestation projects. 
 
The NSS was followed by an UNDP led study on “Capacity Development for the 
CDM” (CD4CDM) that aimed at improving Egypt´s technical and institutional CDM 
capacity.501 Both of these two studies formed the basis for the subsequent 
establishment of an Egyptian Designated National Authority (DNA) in 2005. The 
institutional structure of the Egyptian DNA, the respective CDM approval procedures 
and the current Egyptian CDM project portfolio will be analyzed below. 
                                            
496 National Strategy Study on the Clean Development Mechanism - Egypt, Executive Summary, 
2003 (quoted as NSS 2002), at 2, available at, http://www.cdm-egypt.org/CDM/NSS_Summary.pdf 
(last visited: 24th June 2010). 
497 Id., at 3. 
498 Id., at 2. 
499 Id., at 3. 
500 Id., at 4 
501 UNDP et al., Capacity Development for the Clean Development Mechanism –Egypt, December 
2006 (quoted as CD4CDM 2006), available at, http://www.cdm-
egypt.org/EgyptCd4CDM_FinalReport.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
115 
 
1. Designated National Authority 
The Egyptian DNA was established under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Environment pursuant to Ministerial Decree No. 42 of 2005. The mandate of the DNA 
includes all CDM related issues, including the promulgation of evaluation and 
approval procedures, the assessment of the CDM requirements stipulated in the Kyoto 
Protocol and the promotion of Egyptian CDM projects.502 The DNA consists of two 
related but distinct entities, the “Egyptian Council for CDM” (EC-CDM) and the 
“Egyptian Bureau for CDM” (EB-CDM).503 
 
The EC-CDM has 13 permanent members that represent all related CDM 
stakeholders, such as government departments, private business and non-
governmental organizations.504 The Egyptian Minister for Environment is the 
chairman of the EC-CDM.505 On the national level, the EC-CDM is responsible for 
the implementation of the CDM. Its mandate includes, inter alia, the proposal of new 
legislative projects, the enactment of directives for the approval process, the 
establishment of criterias and procedures for the assessment of existing CDM-Projects 
and the approval of new CDM-Projects.506 On the international level, the EC-CDM is 
the counterpart to the CDM Executive Board of the UNFCCC and contact point for all 
other CDM stakeholders. The members of the EC-CDM participate in international 
debates, with a particular focus on the climate change negotiations of the UNFCCC.507  
 
The EB-CDM is the permanent secretariat of the EC-CDM. It is supervised by the 
Chairman of the EEAA and consists of seven members including representatives from 
the Ministry of Environment (5), the Ministry of Trade and Industry (1) and the 
MOEE (1).508 The key operational functions of the EB-CDM are monitoring of 
                                            
502 The Official CDM Website for Egypt, Designated National Authority, available at, 
http://www.cdm-egypt.org/index.htm.  
503 Id. 
504 Id. 
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506 Id. 
507 Id. 
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existing CDM-Projects, fostering of the relations with the CDM Executive Board of 
the UNFCCC and preparation of EC-CDM meetings.509 
 
2. CDM Project Evaluation and Permit Procedures 
As elaborated in Chapter II, the UNFCCC requires the fulfillment of two essential 
criteria to qualify as a CDM project. A CDM project must achieve GHG emission 
reductions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project 
(“additionality”).510 Moreover, a CDM project activity must contribute to sustainable 
development in the respective host country (“sustainable development”). 511 It is the 
mandate of the Egyptian DNA to assure that a proposed CDM projects fulfills these 
two essential requirements of the UNFCCC. While the DNA must consider the 
international standard of “additionality” that will be reassessed by the UNFCCC, it 
must apply the Egyptian national standard of “sustainable development” (see Chapter 
II, Section B). The Egyptian DNA established a two-stage procedure for the 
assessment of potential CDM projects in regard to their compliance with these two 
requirements of the UNFCCC.  
 
In a first step, CDM project developers are required to submit a Project Idea Note 
(PIN), which will be the basis for a first report conducted by the EB-CDM.512 This 
initial report assesses the compliance of the proposed CDM project with international 
requirements and the Egyptian standard of sustainable development.513 With reference 
to the respective conclusions, the EB-CDM consults the EC-CDM, which in turn 
either issues a Note of Interest or a negative notification within two weeks after the 
submission of the PIN.514 The purpose of this first evaluation is to signal to a potential 
investor as early as possible whether a specific project has a chance to be recognized 
as a CDM-Project and thereby avoid unnecessary additional expenses for project 
developers. 
                                            
509 Id. 
510 Article 12 No. 5 (c) of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5. 
511 Article 12 No. 2 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
512 The Official CDM Website for Egypt, Preliminary Evaluation, available at, http://www.cdm-
egypt.org/ProjectsAP.htm#Preliminary%20Evaluation (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
513 Id. 
514 Id. 
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In a second step, provided a project developer has obtained a Note of Interest from the 
EC-CDM, it is required to submit a detailed Project Design Document (PDD) that will 
describe the project activity in the standard format of the UNFCCC, which will be the 
basis for CDM project validation and registration.515 The assessment of the PDD will 
primarily focus on the Egyptian standard of sustainable development by applying 
certain environmental, social and economical criteria.516 Provided that the PDD 
complies with the Egyptian standard of sustainable development, a National Approval 
Notification will be issued that confirms Egypt´s voluntary participation in the CDM 
activity and that the project contributes to the country´s sustainable development.517 In 
a last step, the nationally approved CDM-Project must be registered with the CDM 
Executive Board of the UNFCCC. 
 
In 2010, the Egyptian CDM project portfolio is comprised of 29 projects, including 
projects in the fields of RE (7), Industry (3), EE (6) and fuel switching (11) as well as 
afforestation (1) and transportation (1.).518 However, only the following six projects 
have been so far registered with the UNFCCC:519 
• Catalytic N20 destruction project in the tail gas of the Nitric Acid Plant of Abu 
Qir Fertilizer Co. (registered October 2006), 
• Onyx Alexandria Landfill Gas Capture and Flaring Project (December 2006), 
• Egyptian Brick Factory GHG Reduction Project (under review for minor 
corrections), 
• Zafarana Wind Power Plant Project (June 2007), 
• Waste Gas-based Co-generation Project at Alexandria Carbon Black Co., and 
• Zafarana KfW IV Wind Farm Project. 
 
                                            
515 The Official CDM Website for Egypt, In-depth Evaluation, available at, http://www.cdm-
egypt.org/ProjectsAP.htm#In-depth%20Evaluation (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
516 Id. 
517 Id. 
518 The Official CDM Website for Egypt, Accepted Projects, available at, http://www.cdm-
egypt.org/ProjectsAP.htm#Accepted%20Projects (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
519 The Official CDM Website of the UNFCCC, Project Search, available at, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
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3. Conclusion 
The Egyptian government has created a positive institutional environment for the 
CDM, for which the initial support of the NSS and the CD4CDM study were crucial. 
With six CDM projects registered with UNFCCC and additional 29 projects in the 
pipeline, Egypt can be today considered as one of the more advanced CDM host 
countries.520 However, in comparison to major CDM host countries such as China 
(863 projects) and India (509), the CDM potential in Egypt is nowhere near to being 
exploited. This is especially surprising since Egypt cannot be considered a small 
developing country, which traditionally benefit less from the CDM (see chapter X), 
but is comparable to Mexico (121) in regard to size and GHG emission reduction 
potential. 
 
The reasons for this underdevelopment of the Egyptian CDM potential are the rather 
lengthy approval procedures in Egypt and a lack of familiarity with the procedures of 
the Kyoto Protocol.521 Insufficient funding and the general lack of transparency in the 
carbon market constitute further barriers for the CDM in Egypt.522 Egypt is, however, 
already approaching these barriers through the presentation of the Egyptian CDM 
project portfolio at international conventions and a series of conferences and 
workshops to increase domestic CDM capacities.523 Provided that the international 
community will extend the CDM beyond the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, the 
efforts of the Egyptian government could not only enfold the entire eco-political value 
of the CDM, but could in particular stipulate increased FDI inflows, the modernization 
of important infrastructure as well as the creation of new employment in Egypt. 
 
 
                                            
520 Dagmar Koths/Wolfgang Sterk, Clean Development Mechanism – Egypt: Country Profile, 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, August 2006 (quoted as Koths/Sterk 
2006), at 13, available at, http://www.jcee-
eg.net/download.asp?path=library/laenderprofil_egypt_eng_final.pdf (last visited: 24th June 2010). 
521 Id., at 13. 
522 Id., at 13. 
523 Id., at 13. 
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VI. Conclusion & Recommendations 
As a signatory party to the UNFCCC, Egypt is committed to its ultimate objective of 
stabilizing GHG concentration in the atmosphere at level that would prevent 
dangerous interference with the climate system (Article 2 of the UNFCCC). In 
addition, Egypt is currently at an energy cross-road and faces critical choices about its 
future energy supply. Egypt´s primary energy demand is currently rising and will be 
satisfied with conventional energies for the near future. However, energy experts 
project that domestic gas and oil reserves are constantly declining and thus Egypt will 
become a net importer of conventional energy resources in the near future. Other 
alternative energy sources do not seem to provide a substantial alternative to solve 
Egypt´s emerging energy crisis. Although nuclear energy is a compelling alternative, 
it cannot be expected to be available before 2020, provided all political, financial and 
technical obstacles are resolved. The Egyptian hydropower potential has already 
reached is maximum and is expected to provide no more than 3% of the primary 
energy demand. RE energy sources cover today only 0.2% of the primary energy 
demand representing a minor fraction of the Egyptian energy mix. However, the 
natural condition for the utilization of wind and solar energy are excellent in Egypt. 
Moreover, Egypt could reduce its primary energy demand by EE measures that have 
the estimated potential to reduce energy consumption by 70% (see Chapter III, 
Section D). Therefore, the utilization of the huge Egyptian RE & EE potential is not 
only an international obligation for Egypt, but as well a pressing domestic need to find 
an alternative solution for the emerging Egyptian energy crisis. 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the question whether the current and 
prospective regulatory framework for RE & EE in Egypt is tailored to challenge the 
emerging Egyptian energy crisis as well as to satisfy Egypt´s international obligations; 
and whether the chosen legal policy instruments might lead to the creation of green 
economy based on RE & EE in Egypt. 
 
It is the declared objective of the Egyptian government to generate 20% of electricity 
supply through RE by 2020. The natural conditions to reach this objective are 
excellent. Egypt is located in the North-African Sunbelt and the wind conditions at the 
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West coast of the Red Sea are among the best in the World. Therefore, Egypt is a 
prime location for the utilization of wind and solar energy (see Chapter IV, Section 
D). In order to use this huge natural RE potential and to reach the ambitious goal of 
20% by 2020, the Egyptian regulator has developed a two stage strategy for the 
promotion of RE. In the first stage, the private sector is invited to participate in tender 
procedures based on competitive bidding for the development of RE projects. In the 
second stage, a feed-in law should be issued based on the price experiences made in 
stage one (See Chapter V). 
 
Egypt is currently in stage one of its RE policy, implementing a tendering system for 
the promotion of RE. In general a tendering system is the best policy options for 
reducing price and cost of RE project through a competitive bidding process. 
Additionally, it can provide certainty regarding the future market share of RE, while 
the price determination is left to the market. The latter point creates the problem of 
price uncertainty for RE project developers. In the absence of a feed-in law, this 
problem could be reduced through the development of standards PPAs for RE 
facilities in Egypt. The same solution should be applied for legal uncertainties related 
to land-use issue by developing standard land-use agreements for RE projects (see 
Chapter V).  
 
Furthermore, tendering systems ordinarily suffer from high transaction cost for RE 
project developers. These costs occur through the often complex and intransparent 
tendering procedures. This conclusion is in particular valid for Egypt, since the Tender 
Law provides for a relatively broad discretion of the competent authorities in the 
selecting the respective tender procedure. In addition, RE project developers must 
only comply with the applicable tender procedures, but as well with the licensing 
procedures for the generation of electricity and the required environmental impact 
assessment stipulated in the EPL. Therefore, the entire process to erect a RE facility in 
Egypt is related to several administrative hurdles that all together increase transactions 
cost. This is especially true for the cost that may occur in the preparation of tender 
documents that can not be retrieved by unsuccessful bidders. Eventually, the 
uncertainties of transaction costs are increased through the unpredictable decisions of 
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the “decision committee” that could be undermined by personal interest and the 
widespread corruption in the Egyptian legal system. Despite all these difficulties 
related to tender procedures, the key argument for the Egyptian regulator for a 
tendering system could be the greater control of subsidies and installed capacity in 
comparison to the other available policy options for the promotion of RE. In tendering 
system, it is entirely up to the competent Egyptian authorities to decide the location 
and number of RE projects implemented as well as the respective purchase price in 
PPAs and the conditions in land-use agreements (see Chapter V). In light of these 
considerations it can be concluded that the two stage approach of the Egyptian 
regulator is a wise and balanced decision. In the first stage, it can keep direct and strict 
control over the development of the Egyptian RE industry through the implementation 
of a tendering system, while the experience made in the first stage could lead to 
appropriate fixed feed-in tariff that could increasingly facilitate the growth of the RE 
sector through market forces.  
 
However, when considering former Egyptian RE targets, the success of the tendering 
system must be considered very limited. In the late 1980s the Egyptian RE target was 
to satisfy 5% of the primary energy demand with RE by 2005, then during the mid 
1990s this target was reduced to 3% of primary energy demand by 2005.524 In 2000, 
the target period was again adjusted to reach 3% of primary energy demand by 
2010.525 In light of these objectives, a current share of 0.2% of the primary energy 
demand must be considered failure of the Egyptian RE policy so far. Therefore, the 
current target to of satisfying 20% of primary energy demand through RE by 2020 
seems to be exaggerated and unlikely to be achieved by the Egyptian RE sector.  
 
For the promotion of EE, the Egyptian government has not yet declared any official 
policy objective. However, it has already implemented several legal policy tools to 
utilize the huge Egyptian EE potential of reducing primary energy consumption by 
70%. In 1987, the Egyptian regulator has issued a Ministerial decree on the mandatory 
use of solar water heating systems. The success of this early effort was very limited, 
                                            
524 Georgy/Soliman, supra note 10, at 36. 
525 Id., at 36. 
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due to a bad market reputation of solar water heaters and a lack of enforcement in the 
construction sector, which rendered the decree eventually legally irrelevant (Chapter 
V, Section D). Another more recent effort has been the development of EE Building 
Codes for the commercial and residential sector. Although the codes comply with 
international EE building standards, they suffer from a lack of enforcement and EE 
capacity in the building sector. The Egyptian government is trying change this 
situation with the issuance of a Ministerial decree in 2008 making the codes 
mandatory and through capacity building measures in cooperation with the EGBC 
(Chapter V, Section E). Furthermore, the Egyptian regulator has developed an EE 
standard and labeling program for electric appliances. But again the success of this 
program has been very limited, because of a low market understanding of the program 
objective´s and a lack of consumer awareness. In addition, the trust of the market in 
the compliance of the issued labels and standards is relatively low and retailers do not 
support the program through the promotion of EE labels (Chapter V, Section F). All in 
all, the Egyptian policy choices for the promotion of EE lack enforceability and 
market acceptance by consumers. 
 
In regard to the thesis questions it must be concluded that the implemented RE & EE 
policy options have neither created a substantial domestic RE & EE market, nor have 
they increased the installed RE capacity in a manner that could overcome the 
emerging Egyptian energy crisis. The reasons for the failure to promote RE & EE in 
Egypt are manifold. In general, the Egyptian legal strategy for the diffusion of RE & 
EE lacks comprehensiveness and a consistent long-term commitment of the Egyptian 
government (see Chapter III, Section D). The tender invitations focus entirely on wind 
energy projects, while neglecting the huge potential of solar energy in Egypt. The 
diffusion of RE is, further, impeded through legal and price uncertainties for RE 
project developers. Also the perspective of the future issuance of feed-in law changes 
nothing in this situation, since it is rather a vague political promise than legal 
certainty. The Egyptian approach to promote EE is highly fragment and not coherent. 
In addition neither the Ministerial decree stipulating the mandatory use of solar water 
heaters, the EE Buildings Codes nor the Egyptian EE standards and labeling program 
are enforced and accepted by the domestic market.  
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The key barriers for a sustainable promotion of RE & EE remain the existing subsidies 
for conventional sources of energy and unfavorable electricity pricing structures for 
RE. Both elements distort investment decisions in RE and constitute an immense 
disincentive for EE electricity consumption. The phasing out of subsidies for 
conventional energies would send a strong market signal to consumers and would 
encourage them towards a more rational use of power resources. It would also 
increase the competition in the electricity market by eliminating unfair advantages 
given to fossil fuel technologies. Moreover, the lifting of subsidies would free up 
billion of dollars in the state budget that could be used for other activities. In addition, 
a solid electricity price reform could further improve the efficiency in the electricity 
sector, provide consumers with accurate price signals and enhance EE consumption on 
all levels (see Chapter III, Section A). In 2008, Egyptian subsidies for conventional 
energies and directly to the electricity prices amounted to approximately to EGP 66bn. 
Although it is acknowledged that those subsidies are a key barrier for the diffusion of 
RE & EE, Egyptian government officials declared that electricity prices will be frozen 
again in 2010 to support domestic industries scoping with the consequences of the 
financial crisis (see Chapter IV, Section C). 
 
Another key barrier for RE projects is their high initial investment cost. Although 
lower fuel and operating cost may make RE competitive on the long term, the higher 
cost of initial technology investment implies that RE projects may provide less 
generation capacities per initial dollar investment in comparison to conventional 
energies This obstacle of primary investment is supplemented by a lack of access to 
affordable credit for RE projects in Egypt (see Chapter III, Section A). As a potential 
solution to this problem, the CDM could provide additional revenue streams to green 
technology projects. The Egyptian government has created thoughout a positive 
institutional environment for the CDM. However, the Egyptian potential with six 
registered CDM projects is nowhere near being exploited (see Chapter V, Section G). 
 
The Egyptian regulator has already identified the lack of a coherent and consistent 
regulatory framework as one of the key barriers for the promotion of RE & EE and 
has thus developed a new Draft Electricity Law. The general objectives of the Draft 
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Electricity Law are on the one hand, the unification of the several laws regulating the 
Egyptian energy sector and on the other hand, the re-definition of the role of the 
Egyptian government from managing the public electric utility directly to a more 
organizational and controlling function. Although the enactment of the Draft 
Electricity Law would be milestone for the RE sector, the tendering system would 
remain the key instrument for the diffusion of RE in Egypt. Nevertheless, the Draft 
Electricity Law would stipulate further incentives for RE investors such as fixed 
prices for small RE facilities, a guaranteed grid access for RE facilities and additional 
funds for Egyptian government to purchase energy generated from RE facilities. 
Furthermore, the Draft Law stipulates a more EE consumption of energy by requiring 
the installation of EE specialist in facilities consuming more than 500KW and 
codification of EE labels that could improve the so far poor market performance. The 
success of the Draft Electricity Law will depend highly on the specifics of its 
Executive Regulations and the degree of its enforcement.  
 
Although the Draft Electricity Law is a step in the right direction and exemplifies the 
increased commitment to develop an Egyptian RE & EE industry, it is by no mean 
sufficient to reach that objective. Therefore, Egyptian policymakers should consider 
the following seven key steps to further promote RE & EE in Egypt: 
• The phasing out of subsidies for conventional energies and an electricity price 
reform in order to eliminate unfair competitive disadvantages for RE and to 
provide consumers with accurate electricity prices that could enhance a more 
efficient consumption of electricity. It is important that any price reform 
considers the increasing gap between rich and poor in Egypt and thus must 
include low-income assistance for the weakest part of society. 
• The Egyptian RE strategy should be refocused to include not only wind 
energy, but also the huge potential for the application of solar energy. 
• In the absence of a feed-in law, the Egyptian regulator should develop standard 
PPAs and land-use agreements to provide RE project developers with greater 
investment certainty. 
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• In the field of EE a holistic approach is required that establishes not only EE 
policy tools, but guarantees their enforcement. EE should be further supported 
through increased capacity building and consumer awareness programs. 
• In order to obtain additional revenue streams for RE & EE projects, the 
Egyptian CDM potential should be increasingly explored by streamlining 
national CDM approval procedures and increasing the domestic familiarity 
with procedures of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, Egypt should formulate 
comprehensive and available sustainable development strategy to provide 
CDM investors with certainty in regard to potential project that could 
contribute to the sustainable development of Egypt (requirement of 
“sustainable development” pursuant to Article 12 No. 2 of the Kyoto 
Protocol). 
• The Draft Electricity Law should be issued as soon as possible and 
subsequently a feed-in law should be developed for promulgation in the near 
future. 
• In general, the Egyptian government should increase RE & EE funding, 
capacity building and public awareness through all appropriate means.  
 
All of the measures mentioned above could further diffuse RE & EE in Egypt. 
However, only the consistent long-term commitment by the Egyptian government to 
promote RE & EE can lead to the establishment of a healthy domestic industry. The 
Egyptian political agenda is, though, not topped by the promotion of RE & EE, but by 
more pressing social and economic issues such as economic growth, social injustice 
and education (see Chapter IV, Section A). Nevertheless, the development of an 
Egyptian RE & EE industry could contribute to the country´s economic growth by 
increasing FDI, creating employment and providing technology transfer. In addition, a 
strong Egyptian RE industry could provide Europe with a much supplemented energy 
supply in the long-term. Eventually, the mitigation of climate change and the related 
promotion of RE & EE could be one of the rare positive topics on the Egyptian 
political agenda that could be promoted as cornerstone for campaigning in the up 
coming presidential elections in 2011. 
